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ABSTRACT                       ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
There has been a global trend towards the decentralization of protected area 
planning and management. This study used a decentralization framework to determine if 
the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park has been decentralized since 
its inception in 1909. The study found that public participation in the planning and 
management decision-making process has increased, but that decentralization has not 
occurred. However, it was found that even though actors such as local communities, 
ENGOs, and tourism outfitters do not have the power to make planning and 
management decisions, they are able to influence the decision-makers through 
participating in the process and developing relationships with all actors including the 
government representatives. 
Keywords: governance, decentralization, public participation, power, social capital, 
participation, relationships, protected area planning, Quetico Provincial Park.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
BACKGROUND 
In 1909, the area now known as Quetico Provincial Park was designated as a 
Forest Reserve, with the purpose to protect moose and other game animals from over 
harvesting by local mining and forestry work camps (Peruniak, 2000). At that time in 
Canada, it was unusual to protect an area for ecological purposes (Malcolm, 2009). 
From the 1800s to the 1960s, areas were protected at the behest of the public for more 
utilitarian purposes, such as commercial recreation and tourism. Ecological protection 
did not become the norm until the environmental movement of the 1960s when the 
public became concerned about pollution and rapid industrial and commercial 
development within parks. At the same time, due to public and environmental non-
governmental organization pressure, commercial and industrial development was 
superseded by a greater emphasis on ecological integrity and recreation (Killan, 1993; 
McNamee, 2009). 
The first parks in Ontario under the 1913 Provincial Parks Act were designated 
and managed by government experts with the aim to satisfy the will of the public for the 
protection of recreational values (Malcolm, 2009). Then in 1971, through public 
pressure of the environmental movement, the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources 
(OMNR) changed its policies so that there was a requirement for public participation in 
the development and review of all park management plans (Killan, 1997). As a result, 
when the Quetico Provincial Park Master Plan (the first in Ontario) was developed the 
public, for the first time, was able to provide planning input to an advisory committee 
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consisting of provincial leaders through public meetings and written submissions. Later 
in 1993, minimum levels of public participation were legislated in the Environmental 
Bill of Rights guaranteeing public opportunities for input prior to the Government of 
Ontario making environmentally significant decisions for policies, Acts, regulations. 
The requirement for public participation in park planning was legislated in the 2006 
Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves Act.  
The change to public involvement in park planning and management in Ontario 
followed the global trend towards greater public participation in protected area 
management. Public participation in park planning and management has been found to 
improve conservation efforts and bring social and economic benefits to local 
communities and other stakeholders such as  tourism operators, resource extraction 
industries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), environmental non-governmental 
organizations (ENGOs), and ministry staff among others (Buteau-Duitschaever, 2009; 
Eagles, McCool, and Haynes, 2002; Jeanrenaud, 1999; Porter, 2001). Other benefits of 
public participation in natural resource decision-making include the incorporation of 
public values, improved quality of decisions, greater cost effectiveness, increased 
capacity of stakeholders, increased trust in government, and enhancement of public 
environmental problem knowledge through education (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; 
Colfer and Wadley, 1996; Cote and Bouthillier, 2002; Reed, 2008).  
There are also potential negative consequences to public participation. Existing 
power structures can be negatively affected through the empowerment of peripheral 
groups, or can become more entrenched minimizing the impact that peripheral groups 
have (Reed, 2008). Stakeholders can suffer from consultation fatigue if processes are 
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mismanaged, or if there is a perceived lack of power over decisions (Reed, 2008). 
Stakeholders can also feel powerless if there are actors that have non-negotiable positions 
or veto powers. This can result in low participation rates and negatively influence the 
significance of participation. The value of participation can also be questioned due to a 
lack of capacity to meaningfully engage in often highly technical debates. While 
information may be shared, if it is done in such a manner that some of the actors do not 
understand that information, it can negatively affect their ability to participate in decision-
making (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Reed, 2008; Robson et al., 2010). 
An increase in public participation can range from a minimum of allowing 
communities to advise agency personnel of their wishes all the way up to communities 
being able to negotiate or having the majority of decision-making power (Arnstein, 
(1969). The act of giving up the power and responsibility for the management and 
planning of resources by a government agency to stakeholders is called decentralization 
(Ribot, 2004). There has been a global trend towards decentralization of authority and 
responsibility for conservation management (Davey, 1998).  
Numerous functions of government agencies can be decentralized. They include 
planning, finances, information, service delivery, and human and other resources. It is 
rare for all government functions to be decentralized concurrently, and some may not be 
decentralized at all. The extent of decentralization is differentiated by a few key 
initiatives that are introduced in stages. Each function can range from being fully 
centralized to being fully decentralized, with most systems falling somewhere in 
between (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Hutchcroft, 2001; Hutton, 2002; Ribot, 2004). 
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 One of the positive aspects of decentralization is that as citizen participation 
increases, the decision-making actors within government become more responsive to 
citizens’ needs, resulting in greater equity amongst all actors and more efficiently 
delivered services (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999). These benefits are realized because the 
actors who control the resources in a decentralized system are downwardly accountable 
to constituents (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999).  
Decentralization also has some negative characteristics. They include political 
obfuscation, corruption, lack of resources and capacity, and unwillingness to cede power 
by authorities (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Capistrano and Colfer, 2005). One cause of 
these negative aspects can be the lack of the necessary support (i.e. funding, technical 
skill, supporting policy, etc.) to a community when the responsibility for a natural 
resource is downloaded. 
THE TREND TOWARDS DECENTRALIZED PROTECTED AREA 
MANAGEMENT 
There has been a trend towards decentralization of the planning and management 
of protected areas in Ontario such as Quetico Provincial Park. There have been three 
phases of park establishment. The first phase (~1893–1960s) consisted of public 
pressure being placed on government to protect specific areas for generally utilitarian 
purposes (forestry, tourism, hunting and angling). It was at this stage that Quetico was 
designated as the Quetico Forest Reserve in 1909, and then became the first park under 
the 1913 Provincial Parks Act. The next phase (~1960s–1970s) was the establishment of 
parks to meet recreation and ecological goals that are based on representation of 
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ecoregions or ecodistricts (Killan, 1993). At this stage parks such as Quetico were 
managed by ministry experts that were mandated to care for the ecological integrity of 
the park over all other objectives. The third and current phase (1970s–present) has 
increased inclusiveness by mandating that the rights of or impacts on local communities 
(especially Aboriginal people) are considered when making planning or management 
decisions (Dearden and Langdon, 2009; Department of Justice, 2000, 2002; OMNR, 
1992; OMNR, 2009c; Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves Act, 2006). At this 
stage public participation was included for the first time in the first provincial park 
management plan in Ontario, though ecological integrity remains the primary objective 
of all park management and planning decisions.  
During the first two phases, planning and management were highly centralized, 
because once land was under the purview of the park agency, it was assumed that 
agency staff had planning and management education and skills not available to the 
general public. Over time, however, agency staff capabilities have become less 
respected. One factor contributing to this is that, contrary to legislative mandates, the 
state of many parks’ ecological integrity has deteriorated, particularly high profile parks 
such as Banff, Riding Mountain, and Waterton Lakes National Parks (Nevitte, 1996; 
McNamee, 2009). Park agencies have also likely lost some of their lustre through the 
forced removal of communities when developing parks, such as Kouchibouguac 
National Park and Ipperwash Provincial Park (Linden, 2007; McNamee, 2009). 
Criticism of the centralized approach to park planning and management in the 
Canadian and Ontarian protected area systems began to escalate. These criticisms were 
based on the discontent and obstruction of cooperation between the public and planning 
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authorities that a centralized authority causes, because a centralized authority is prone to 
doing what it feels is right rather than what others think is right (Brown & Harris, 2005). 
It was not until the 1980s that public participation in park planning and management 
became more acceptable to conservationists and park superintendents. The first two 
events that led to this shift in attitude by conservationists and park superintendents were 
the 1980 World Conservation Strategy and the 1982 World Congress on National Parks 
in Bali (Wells, Brandon and Hannah, 1992). 
The 1980 World Conservation Strategy is significant because it emphasized the 
value of connecting parks and the economic activities of communities rather than 
separating the two. The significance of the 1982 World Congress on National Parks was 
that conservationists and park superintendents supported the inclusion of local people in 
the planning and management of parks, which was also contrary to previous ideology. 
Congress participants also established the requirement for increased support of local 
participation in decision-making, greater access to resources, and appropriate 
development near parks for the benefit of nearby communities. In short, both the World 
Conservation Strategy and the World Congress on National Parks recognized that for 
long-term successful management of parks, there must be cooperation and support from 
local communities or the parks and their ecological integrity were at risk (Wells et al. 
1992).  An example in Canada of a protected area that fulfills the mandates of the World 
Conservation Strategy and the World Congress on National Parks is Gwaii Haanas 
National Park Reserve. The creation of the National Park Reserve involved multiple 
levels of government, and stakeholder groups such as ENGOs and the tourism industry 
(Parks Canada, 2010; Wright and Rollins, 2009). 
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In concert with the increased pressure for greater public involvement in park 
planning and management was the emergence, in the 1970s, of a new approach to 
resource management called ecosystem-based management (EBM). According to 
Slocombe and Dearden (2009) there are various definitions for EBM, but most share 
concepts around management that is collaborative and participatory, based on 
biophysical and not administrative boundaries, where management goals are concerned 
with ecological integrity, sustainability, and biodiversity maintenance.  While the focus 
of EBM is largely ecological integrity, some other elements that have contributed to its 
success are the cooperation between stakeholders and government agencies who each 
have different objectives and constituencies, and viewing social, political, and 
environmental issues holistically and not individually (Slocombe and Dearden, 2009). 
Ecosystem-based management began to be used in Canada during the 1980s; 
however, the Canadian version of EBM has been focused more on the scientific and 
ecological integrity component than on the participatory or process component which 
has developed in other areas of the world (Slocombe & Dearden, 2009). Parks Canada 
officially recognized EBM in 1994 through the Parks Canada Policy and in the 2002 
National Marine Conservation Areas Act, both of which have a strong focus on public 
participation in the planning and management of parks (Slocombe and Dearden, 2009). 
No similar policy exists specifically for Ontario Parks (Ontario Ministry of Natural 
Resources, 1992; OMNR, 2009b; Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves Act, 
2006). However, Ontario’s 1993 Environmental Bill of Rights has a strong focus on 
environmental integrity, and requires public input for park management plans. 
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DECENTRALIZATION FRAMEWORK 
In 1999, Agrawal and Ribot developed the only analytical framework found that 
evaluates decentralization in natural resource management. The framework provides a 
foundation that limits and guides the analysis to three discrete components the authors 
identified that underlie all acts of decentralization: actors, powers, and accountability 
(see Table 1).  Agrawal and Ribot found that by limiting the analysis to these three 
components the analysis is organized, but explanations of the outcomes or behaviours 
are neither provided nor predicted. They also found that if the powers of the actors, the 
spheres of influence in which they exercise those powers, and to whom and how they 
are held accountable are not understood, it is not possible to determine the extent to 
which meaningful decentralization has occurred. 
  
Table 1. The three most significant components of Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) decentralization framework with important aspects and examples. 
Components of 
the framework 
Important aspects of the components Examples 
Actors Can be controversial to determine Elected and appointed officials 
  Powerful and influential individuals 
 
Process to identify should not exclude on a de facto basis 
Corporate bodies (i.e. communities and industrial interests) 
 Committees 
 Different types of influence for each actor Cooperatives 
 Each is accountable to others Non-governmental organizations 
  First Nations leaders 
  General public 
Powers Affected by laws, policy and legislation The power to create or modify rules 
  The power to make decisions about the use of resources 
 
Can be dependent on wealth, heredity, electoral clout, 
etc. 
The power to implement and enforce compliance of the new or altered rules 
  
The power to adjudicate disputes that occur during the creation and 
enforcement of compliance of new or altered rules 
Accountability 
Measure of responsibility to those represented by an actor 
Electoral Process 
 Horizontal and vertical ties between government departments 
 Decentralization only effective when actors are 
downwardly accountable 
Relationship between the administrative superiors and customary authorities 
 Procedures for recall 
 Accountability prevents arbitrary decisions or actions by 
an actor 
Third party monitoring by media, NGOs, or independently elected 
controllers 
 Auditing and evaluation 
 Downward accountability can increase participation Political pressure and lobbying   
Note: The powers listed are the four powers identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999). 
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The framework can be used to examine whether or not the policies, legislation 
and actions on the ground by the controlling actors constitutes decentralization. To do so 
the researcher conducts document reviews and interviews the actors involved to 
determine who the actors are, which of them hold power, and how they are held 
accountable. The framework also traces changes in actors, powers, and accountability, 
and identifies political obfuscation or deficiencies such as design flaws in the action of 
decentralising. The results of identifying any shortcomings can allow advocates of 
decentralization and agency personnel to move reforms beyond dialogue to on-the-
ground action. The framework is able to do this because it is applied to a single sector, 
and therefore determines any agency shortcomings that may be lost in otherwise well-
designed initiatives or legislation.  
STUDY OBJECTIVES AND SIGNIFICANCE 
Today, because of the requirements for public participation during management 
planning, the park planning system has become less centralized. As well, the literature 
indicates that a system of resource control that is fully decentralized will be more likely 
to realize the benefits of decentralization than is one that is partially decentralized 
(Agrawal & Ribot, 1999). Therefore, the aim of the study is to utilize Agrawal and 
Ribot’s (1999) framework of actors, powers and accountability to assess the extent of 
decentralization that has occurred over the history of the planning and management of 
Quetico Provincial Park, and measure the present day extent of decentralization that 
exists in the management of the park. 
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The framework has been used to determine the degree of decentralization in 
natural resource management in developing nations including Mongolian pasture-land 
management (Mearns, 2004), African forestry projects (German et al, 2010; Muhereza, 
2005), and other natural resource community-driven developments in developing 
nations around the world (Ribot and Mearns, 2005). It has not been applied to gauging  
decentralization in protected area management, nor in a highly developed country 
context. Therefore, the study will also test the framework and contribute to theory 
regarding decentralization of management of natural resources, specifically parks, in a 
developed country context.  
Quetico Provincial Park was chosen as the study area because it is a large (i.e. 
4,758 km²), highly protected area, and has a history that encompasses all of the global 
and provincial phases of park planning and management. Quetico’s large size is makes 
it a Wilderness Class Provincial Park. Ontario Parks (2009) defines a wilderness class 
park as an area greater than 100,000 hectares that visitors may travel through using non-
mechanized means such as hiking and canoeing “while engaging in low-impact 
recreation to experience solitude, challenge and integration with nature”. The equivalent 
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) classification would be a 
category II (national park), because the area protects large-scale ecological processes 
and is compatible with cultural, spiritual, scientific, education, recreation and other 
tourism opportunities (Dearden and Rollins, 2009; IUCN, 2009). It is hoped that by 
tracing the history and determining the degree of decentralization of planning and 
management in Quetico Provincial Park, the study will provide agency staff with 
information that can increase the management success of the park. Given that Agrawal 
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and Ribot’s (1999) decentralization framework has been applied to natural resource 
settings only in a developing country context, this study will also test the framework and 
contribute to theory regarding decentralization of management of natural resources, 
specifically parks, in a developed country context. 
The study has the following research objectives: 
1. To trace how and why acts of decentralization in the planning and 
management of Quetico Provincial Park have occurred from the 
inception of the park to the present day. 
2. To determine the stakeholders involved, the powers they wield, to whom 
and how they are held accountable, and if their participation has 
increased or decreased in the planning and management of Quetico 
Provincial Park since inception. 
3. To determine which aspects of decentralization are most significant to 
stakeholder success. 
To meet these objectives, a document review and informant interviews were 
conducted. The documents reviewed consisted of newspaper articles, historical accounts 
and government documents, including background reports, management plans, policies 
and legislation. There were 12 individuals interviewed from groups such as the Ontario 
Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR), environmental non-governmental organizations 
(ENGOs), local community representatives, commercial tourism operators, and park 
users. 
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It is hoped that by tracing the history and determining the degree of 
decentralization of planning and management in Quetico Provincial Park, the study will 
provide agency staff with information that can increase the management success of the 
park. As well, it is anticipated that testing the framework will determine the viability of 
the framework to measure the degree of decentralization of the planning and 
management of protected areas in Ontario and other developed country contexts. 
DEFINITIONS 
The following is a list of terms and definitions that will be used throughout the 
thesis.  
Aboriginal people: “is a collective name for the original peoples of North 
America and their descendants. The Canadian constitution recognizes three groups of 
Aboriginal people: Indians (commonly referred to as First Nations), Métis and Inuit. 
These are three distinct peoples with unique histories, languages, cultural practices and 
spiritual beliefs.” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2010a). 
Deconcentration: The transfer of powers to lower level actors who are upwardly 
accountable. Also known as administrative decentralization (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999). 
Ecodistrict: An ecodistrict is a subdivision of an ecoregion that is based on 
relatively homogeneous biophysical and climatic conditions and are appropriate for 
strategic planning at the sub-regional level (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2008; 
OMNR, 2005). 
Ecoregion: An ecoregion is an ecological division based on climate, soil type, 
landform, species and ecological processes (Racey Wiltshire & Archibald, 1999). 
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Environmental Registry: A repository of public notices about environmental 
matters covered by the Environmental Bill of Rights that ministries of the government 
of Ontario must use to communicate and receive comment from the public. 
Legislation: For the purposes of this study, legislation refers to an act that has 
been passed into law by Parliament. An example would be the 2006 Provincial Parks and 
Conservation Reserves Act. Legislation sets out the objectives, principles and rules that 
are required of those affected by it. Failure to comply can result in fines or other 
penalties.  
Policy: OMNR defines policy “as a statement of intended direction developed to 
guide present and future actions and decisions” (OMNR, 2012). Policies are designed by 
ministry staff such as the park superintendent or others and are not debated by parliament, 
but are subject to final approval by senior ministry staff or the Minister in charge. An 
example of an Ontario Parks policy would be the Quetico Provincial Park Management 
Plan. Policies can become laws, and to do so would require Parliamentary debate. An 
example of a policy that became law is the policy requiring public participation during 
park planning that became law under the 2006 Provincial Parks and Conservation 
Reserves Act.  
Stakeholder: A stakeholder is all the individuals or groups of any size or social 
status who affect or are affected by the decisions, actions, and policies of the park 
(Grimble & Chan, 1995; Nelson & Wright, 1995). McCool (2009) found that a wide 
variety of stakeholders expected to be included in park planning and management. 
Examples would include park users, the local communities, politicians, businesses, 
trappers, and both ENGOs and NGOs.  
CHAPTER 1                     15 
 
STUDY LIMITATIONS 
The majority of the study limitations are a result of the sample size of 12. Below 
is a list of the limitations, the steps if any to mitigate their affect, and potential 
implications. 
The first two limitations are that it was not possible to interview anyone from the 
major actors representing the provincially elected officials or Lac La Croix First Nation. 
Approximately 40 attempts were made through phone calls, faxes, emails, and on site 
visits to meet with and interview someone from the First Nation. Information on this 
actor group was obtained through the document review and obtaining information from 
informants that had knowledge regarding Lac La Croix based on personal and 
professional interactions with members of the community.  
The third limitation is that no one from the United States was interviewed for 
this study. The reason that this is significant is that U.S. citizens represent 80-95% of 
park users. Unfortunately, it was not possible to contact anyone from the United States 
to be an informant. An attempt was made to use internet based chat forums that cater to 
Quetico and Boundary Waters Canoe Area users to contact potential informants. 
However, there were no responses from any members of the American public. 
Fourth, it must be remembered that this study is based on 12 interviews, of 
which the majority of informants provided environmental advocacy responses. The 
result of this is that saturation may have been achieved prematurely because of a lack of 
sample variance.  For some of the actors I am very confident in my findings. However, 
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for others, particularly the General Public group, it would have been preferable to 
interview more individuals as this group is not homogeneous. Unfortunately, it was very 
difficult to identify and interview the two that I was able to contact. For the General 
Public group it would have been particularly helpful to interview a number of different 
individuals. First would have been those who have participated in the past, but had 
stopped doing so. Second, would be representatives from Thunder Bay, Fort Frances, 
northwestern Ontario, and southern Ontario. The reason for this is that the General 
Public actor group encompasses all of the members of the Ontario public including 
Thunder Bay, Fort Frances, northwestern Ontario, and southern Ontario. In the past all 
of these groups have individually been major actors, but as noted earlier it was very 
difficult to identify and contact individuals from the General Public actor group.  
It may be that some members of the general public are represented by interest 
groups such as the ENGO and NGO groups from which individuals were interviewed. 
However, there may be a segment of the population that does not participate and is not 
represented by any interest group or political party. For example, Petry and Mendelsohn 
(2004) found in Canada that the consistency of public policy meeting with majority 
opinion dropped 20% over 16 years from 69% for the period 1985-1993 to 49% for the 
period 1994-2001. They also found that policy was more likely to match public opinion 
for high profile issues than it was for low profile issues, and that the public was less 
likely to be aware of the low profile issues. Therefore, the results from the General 
Public perspective are unlikely to be representative of the entire actor group. 
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The final limitation of the study is that the findings cannot be generalized to 
other park management agencies in Canada, or elsewhere, but is limited to Ontario 
Parks’ planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park.  
DELIMITATIONS 
The study will be delimited to the history and present level of decentralization in 
the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park. The examination of the 
history and present level of decentralization in all wilderness class parks in Ontario is 
beyond the reach of the researcher given the limited time and money for conducting the 
study. 
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CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter contains the literature review. It is divided into five sections: 1) 
governance, 2) public participation, 3) social capital, 4) political capital, and 5) Agrawal 
and Ribot’s (1999) decentralization framework. 
GOVERNANCE 
This section will provide a definition of governance, explain the different types 
of governance, and describe the five categories of governance as outlined by Eagles 
(2009). These categories are based on the ten principles of governance as outlined by 
Graham et al. (2003). 
Governance is “the interactions among structures, processes and traditions that 
determine how power and responsibilities are exercised, how decisions are taken, and 
how citizens or other stakeholders have their say” (Graham et al., 2003, p. 1). The 
significant aspects of governance are power, relationships and accountability, 
specifically who has influence, who decides, and how are influential individuals held 
accountable (Graham et al., 2003). There are three spheres of governance—political, 
administrative and economic—involving many entities including government, 
corporations, NGOs, and individual citizens. Political governance refers to decisions 
regarding policy, while administrative governance is the implementation of law and 
policy. The process of economic decision-making is known as economic governance 
(Eagles, 2009). 
Graham et al. (2003) categorized ten principles of governance, which Eagles 
(2009) combined into five categories: legitimacy and voice, strategic vision, 
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performance, accountability, and fairness. The first category, legitimacy and voice, 
consists of public participation and consensus orientation. Public participation refers to 
all people having either a direct or indirect voice in decision-making. Consensus 
orientation concerns attaining the best decision for the population through mediation 
resulting in a consensus.  
The second category, strategic vision, involves constructively looking towards 
the future while considering the historical, cultural, and social intricacies of all 
situations. The third category, performance, consists of three principles. First is 
responsiveness to stakeholders, which pertains to proactively serving stakeholder by 
dealing with their complaints and criticisms through institutions and processes. The 
second principle in this category is effectiveness, which involves having the capacity to 
attain objectives, while the third principle, efficiency, involves making the best use of 
those resources.  
The fourth category, accountability, consists of two principles. First is 
accountability, which is the requirement of government officials, such as agency staff 
and political leaders, to answer to stakeholders regarding their responsibility for any 
failures (including incompetence and fraud), dispose of their duties and powers, and 
respond to criticisms or any obligations they have. The second principle in this category 
is transparency, which concerns acting openly and sharing information. The last 
category, fairness, consists of two principles: equity, the just and fair treatment of 
similar cases, and rule of law, the fair and impartial enforcement of legal frameworks.  
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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
This section discusses public participation including: a discussion of the levels 
of public participation in natural resource management identified by Berkes, George, 
and Preston (1991); mechanisms of participation used by stakeholders; stakeholder 
motivations to participate; barriers to participation; and the positive and negative aspects 
of public participation. 
Levels of public participation 
As seen in the previous section, governance requires public participation in 
decision-making. Public participation is a vague label that can include an individual or 
group taking part in a cooperative action or being an active participant with other 
community members (Ingles, Musch, and Qwist-Hoffman, 1999). There are a number of 
levels of participation ranging from complete government agency control over decision-
making to low power level stakeholders making decisions. The most often cited 
literature discussing the different levels of public participation is Arnstein’s (1969) 
Ladder of Participation. 
Berkes et al. (1991) modified Arnstein’s ladder of citizen participation for the 
co-management of natural resources (see Figure 1). Their model has seven levels with 
each step up the ladder increasing the influence of non-governmental actors on the 
management of the resource. At the lowest stage, the non-governmental actor is simply 
informed about decisions after the governmental actor has made them. At the next stage, 
consultation, the non-governmental actor has some face-to-face contact with 
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governmental actors, but their input may not be utilized. The third stage, co-operation, is 
when non-governmentalal actors begin to have input into management of the resource 
by providing services such as knowledge and data gathering. The fourth stage, 
communication, is the start of a two-way information exchange when non-governmental 
actor concerns begin to be addressed in management plans. At the fifth stage, advisory 
committees, actors become partners in decision-making, and governmental and non-
governmental actors jointly act towards common objectives. The sixth stage, 
management boards, is when non-governmental actors are given opportunities to take 
part in developing and implementing management plans. The last stage, 
partnership/community control, is when all actors are considered to be equal partners, 
decisions are made jointly, and where possible the non-governmental actors assume 
responsibility for all decision-making (Berkes, 1994). 
 
Figure 1. Levels of Co-management 
7 Partnership/Community Control
6 Management Boards
5 Advisory Committees
4 Communication
3 Co-operation
2 Consultation
1 Informing  
Source: Berkes et al., 1991. 
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Mechanisms of participation 
There are a wide range of public participation mechanisms used by stakeholders to 
influence decision-makers (Ingles et al., 1999). They include: lobbying, written 
submissions, voting, elections, referenda, litigation, advisory committees, participation 
through ENGOs and NGOs, public and individual face-to-face meetings, public protest, 
questionnaires, round tables, interviews, field trips, and publicity (Cleaver, 1999; Cote 
and Bouthillier, 2002; Ingles et al., 1999; Irvin and Stansbury, 2004; Nelson and Wright, 
1995; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000c). However, it should be noted that not all of these 
mechanisms are accepted throughout the literature (Beierle and Cayford, 2002). 
For example, violence, while listed as a mechanism by some (Ingles et al., 1999), 
is not considered an acceptable form of participation by others (Beierle and Cayford, 
2002). As well, there is some argument about the validity of some traditional participation 
mechanisms such as lobbying, voting, referenda and litigation, because they are too 
individualistic or rooted in power politics to be considered participatory mechanisms 
(Beierle and Cayford, 2002). It should be noted that the effectiveness of participation 
mechanisms can be limited by personal agendas, personalities, and social capital (Cote 
and Bouthillier, 2002). 
Motivations for public participation 
According to Cleaver (1999) and Aguilar, Garcia, Alvarez, and Garcia-Hidalgo 
(2012), the two motivations for stakeholder participation are economic incentive and 
social norms. Of the two, economic incentive is the main driver for stakeholder 
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participation according to Cleaver (1999). Economic incentive is also directly linked to 
the level of participation, as the greater the economic incentive, the more likely a 
stakeholder is to participate, while the lower the economic impact to the stakeholder, the 
less likely they are to participate. Social norms such as the need for recognition, respect, 
purpose, community service, and responsibility can be strong motivators for stakeholders 
to participate. However, they are usually seen to eventually serve the aims of economic 
development (Cleaver, 1999). 
DeCaro and Stokes (2008) found that those stakeholders that participate based on 
economic incentives are less motivated to participate fully, or over the long term, while 
those who participate for non-economic reasons are more likely to participate longer, 
fully commit to participation, and attain their goals. 
Barriers to public participation 
Barriers to participation are any impediment to the ability of a stakeholder to 
participate in a planning or management processes. According to Diduck and Sinclair 
(2002), there has been little study of barriers, even with the increased emphasis on public 
participation in natural resource management. Below is a list of the public participation 
barriers identified in the literature. 
 Inadequate information – This includes inaccessible information, information that 
is excessively technical, and incomplete information (Coburn, 2011; Diduck and 
Sinclair, 2002; Robson et al., 2010).  Robson et al. (2010) found that these barriers 
can also be an issue for highly educated individuals.  
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 Capacity – The capacity barrier includes a lack of financial resources, knowledge 
about the topic, policy, or planning processes, and expertise working with policy 
or participating in a planning process (Cleaver, 1999; Coburn, 2011; Diduck and 
Sinclair, 2002; Robson et al., 2010; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b). It was found 
that those stakeholders who had previously engaged in at least one full planning 
process were less likely to have knowledge or expertise capacity issues (Robson et 
al, 2010). 
 Lack of power – Included in this barrier is the inability to influence decisions due 
to a process that lacks openness, decisions being forgone conclusions, and 
insufficient opportunities to make meaningful suggestions that are evaluated 
through a systematic process (Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002).  
 Personality traits – Included in this barrier is a lack of motivation, interest, time or 
acceptance of the status quo. Many stakeholders believe that they are adequately 
represented by others, individuals are too busy due to life issues such as work and 
family commitments, or they feel that as long as there is no or little change, there 
is no need to participate (Cleaver, 1999; Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 
2002).  
 Structure of the process – This barrier is caused by policies, legislation, and 
procedures that limit a stakeholder’s ability to participate effectively. Included are 
the lack of opportunity to participate due to policies and legislation that limit the 
number of times a stakeholder can participate, the length of time allowed for 
comments to be submitted, or inconvenient meeting times or locations (Coburn, 
2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002). Also included in this category is government 
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administration resistance, whereby agency staff are so resistant to public 
participating that stakeholders do not feel comfortable being involved 
(Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b).  
 Extreme partisan behaviour – Included in this barrier are extreme positions being 
claimed by stakeholders that intimidate other individuals from participating 
(Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b).  
 Not knowing process was occurring – Often this barrier is due to poor 
communication by the controlling entity, or policies limiting notification to certain 
geographic locations (Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Wondolleck and 
Yaffee, 2000b).  
 Potential for conflict – Some stakeholders choose not to participate because they 
know that their stance on an issue will result in conflict between them and other 
individuals or groups. Therefore, they choose to avoid participating and not cause 
issues with other stakeholders such as neighbours, colleagues, family, or friends 
(Coburn, 2011; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b).  
 A lack of trust – Trust can involve the belief in the process, decision-makers, or 
other stakeholders (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b).  
Positive and negative aspects of public participation 
There are many benefits of public participation in natural resource management 
decision-making. They include the empowerment of peripheral decision-making citizens, 
and, if the process is transparent and uses a diversity of opinions, it can increase the 
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public trust between stakeholders and government agencies and planning processes 
(Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Cote and Bouthillier, 2002; Reed, 2008).  
Trust is “a belief that another will faithfully act upon promises made” (McCool, 
2009, p. 143). Trust between parties is easily lost and difficult to develop and maintain, 
and a lack of trust in one of the greatest barriers to implementing protected area 
management plans (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; McCool, 2009; Reed, 2008). There are 
two types of trust: interpersonal and organizational. Interpersonal trust includes 
reciprocity, understanding, and honesty. Organizational trust is people being treated fairly 
through rules and institutions that ensure fairness of plan development (McCool, 2009). 
Two other aspects of trust are competence (the ability of the agency to do what is right) 
and fiduciary duty (that the government will do what is right). Stakeholders that trust 
government agencies feel that the agency is able, willing, and obliged to do what is in the 
public interest (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Reed, 2008). 
Another benefit of public participation is capacity. Capacity can increase through 
the “co-generation of knowledge”, the results of which are higher quality decisions based 
on a broader body of knowledge (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Colfer and Wadley, 1996; 
Reed, 2008). Public participation can provide a sense of ownership over the management 
plan, and empowerment of low power groups or individuals (Colfer and Wadley, 1996). 
Additionally, public participation can result in government accountability (Knack, 2002), 
greater cost effectiveness, the reframing of issues (Beierle and Cayford, 2002) (e.g. 
environmental clean-up can be made into economic development plans), and the 
resolution or mitigation of conflicts (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Colfer and Wadley, 
1996; Cote and Bouthillier, 2002). Conflict, if resolved through negotiations, 
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communication, and mediation, can result in positive relationships in which formerly 
antagonistic parties can become allies (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000a). Also, when 
actors do not agree, they often find that they do have some things in common. They can 
work together to accomplish those goals and agree to disagree on those where they are 
not able to find common ground (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000a, b) or by avoiding the 
issue (Beierle and Cayford, 2002). Participation can also increase conflict, though there 
can be positive outcomes such as increased sustainability (Colfer and Wadley, 1996), 
greater creativity in solutions, and increased awareness of knowledge, needs and goals of 
other participants (Lawrence, 2007). 
However, participation does not always live up to claims. There can be negative 
consequences to existing power structures from the empowerment of peripheral groups, 
or those power structures can become more entrenched minimizing the impact that 
peripheral groups have (Reed, 2008). Stakeholders can suffer from consultation fatigue if 
the processes are mismanaged, or if there is a perceived lack of power over decisions 
(Reed, 2008). Stakeholders can also feel powerless if there are actors that have non-
negotiable positions or veto powers. This can result in low participation rates and 
negatively influence the significance of participation. The value of participation can also 
be questioned due to a lack of capacity to meaningfully engage in often highly technical 
debates. While information may be shared, if it is done in such a manner that some of the 
actors do not understand that information, it can negatively affect their ability to 
participate in decision-making (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Reed, 2008; Robson et al., 
2010). 
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Participation in planning and management can provide a degree of power to actors 
(Nelson and Wright, 1995), and that is why individuals decide to participate in planning 
processes (Cote and Bouthillier, 2002). However, agency institutions can limit the amount 
or types of power of actors, and often do because they are reluctant to relinquish their 
power over resources (Cleaver, 1999; Cote and Bouthillier, 2002; Nelson and Wright, 
1995). One of the issues of empowerment through participation is who is being 
empowered: the individual, the community, or categories of people based on socio-
economic class, gender, social standing (Cleaver, 1999). The degree of influence 
achieved by marginalized stakeholders can impact public participation processes. If, for 
example, previous low power stakeholders gain equal or greater power than the 
traditionally powerful, it can upset social norms (Cote and Bouthillier, 2002). However, 
there is little evidence that participation results in empowerment of the disadvantaged 
(Cleaver, 1999; Lawrence, 2007), while there is evidence that the socially, economically 
and educationally advantaged experience greater benefit from processes that utilize public 
participation (Lawrence, 2005).  
Social learning occurs when stakeholders and the wider society they live in learn 
from each other, and can result in deepening existing relationships, developing new 
relationships and transforming adversarial relationships into cooperative ones (Reed, 
2008). The development of these relationships occurs through the discovery of 
trustworthiness, common ground, and the legitimacy of other viewpoints (Cleaver, 1999; 
Reed, 2008). Other positive aspects of public participation include higher quality 
environmental decisions because information and creativity from more sources is used 
(Reed, 2008; Huitema et al., 2009). As well, those decisions are more resilient, and better 
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adapted to local environmental and socio-cultural circumstances. As such, the decisions 
are more likely to be accepted and adopted locally (Reed, 2008). 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
The trust developed through public participation is essential for the development 
of social capital (Berkes, 2007). Social capital is the organized facilitation of cooperation 
within or amongst groups using trust, formal and informal social networks, shared social 
norms, values and understanding (Jones et al., 2012; Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2007; 
Putnam, 1993).  It has been found that public participation processes that have higher 
levels of social capital result in more positive management of natural resources, to the 
degree that it is considered to be essential for successful implementation of environmental 
management and policy (Jones et al., 2012; Pretty, 2003).  
There are three stages of social capital. In the first stage, each actor type has social 
capital with similar actors and other types of actors. The second stage is reached when 
those actors’ interactions result in connections such as bonding and bridging, which occur 
and are affected by previous experiences. The third stage occurs after a critical amount of 
social capital accumulates, and at this time actors are willing to work together for 
common goals (Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2007). 
There are also three types of connections that result in social capital. First is 
bonding, which refers to the relationships between family, close friends, and members of 
a specific subgroup. The second connection, bridging, refers to the relationships that an 
actor has with those of a greater social distance than those in the bonding category. They 
include distant friends, colleagues, and associates in other subgroups. An example of the 
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latter would be a member of an ENGO developing a relationship with a member of a 
hunting and angling organization. Lastly are linkages, which are the vertical relationships 
with those such as politicians, senior bureaucrats, and others who have greater influence, 
and using those relationships to obtain information, resources, and ideas (Woolcock, 
2001). 
Through social capital, actors are able to obtain both positive and negative 
benefits through social networks and other social structures (Portes, 1998). These benefits 
include positive relationships, such as group support and trust, and political capital 
(Portes, 1998; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000a). Some of the negative consequences of 
social capital include the exclusion of outsiders from social groups or networks, 
limitations on individual freedoms that constrain independent thought or action, excessive 
claims for use of resources by group or network members, and downward leveling norms 
which restrict the ability of group members to advance themselves (Portes, 1998). 
POLITICAL CAPITAL 
As stated earlier, one of the benefits of social capital is political capital 
(Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000a). Political capital is “the resources used by an actor to 
influence policy formation processes and realize outcomes that serve the actor’s 
perceived interests” (Birner and Wittmer, 2003, p. 298). Political capital can be created 
from social capital in different ways. Social networks can facilitate lobbying by creating 
opportunities for access to political and administrative decision-makers (Birner and 
Wittmer, 2003). As well, political capital can be exercised through petitions, public 
protests, electoral leverage of large groups, and the use of public pressure using scientific 
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knowledge or ideology (i.e. environmentalism versus industrial use versus commercial 
use of parks) (Birner and Wittmer, 2003). 
Once created, political capital must be maintained by investing resources such as 
time, effort, and money. Political capital must also be used wisely, as political and 
administrative decision-makers will be limited in their ability to assist a certain group or 
individual (Birner and Wittmer, 2003). There is a risk in investing in political capital with 
specific individuals, particularly politicians, who may not be re-elected; therefore, actors 
may diversify their political capital by spreading it around multiple individuals or parties. 
Political capital can also be subverted by opponents, or lost if an interest group is unable 
to deliver promised benefits of supporting the group (i.e. electoral support) (Birner and 
Wittmer, 2003). 
Through political capital, it is possible for a stakeholder to gain power to influence 
decisions (Birner and Wittmer, 2003). Power “is the ability to influence people to behave 
in ways that may not be in their own immediate self-interest” (McCool, 2009, p. 143). By 
moving up Arnstein’s Ladder of Participation, actors are empowered both collectively 
and individually. Empowerment during the planning process can lead to inclusion of 
diverse sets of knowledge, a greater chance for consensus and ownership of the 
management plan (McCool, 2009). However, political power is unevenly and arbitrarily 
distributed throughout society with some groups having what McCool (2009) calls 
“virtual veto authority” (p. 144)”. 
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DECENTRALIZATION FRAMEWORK 
As decentralization  involves the devolution of power by central government to 
low power actors it is a form of governance (Graham et al., 2003, p. 1; Ribot, 2004).  As 
well, to have the greatest influence on decision-makers stakeholders must participate in 
the decision-making process, and use their social and political capital to influence the 
decisions made and to hold decision-makers accountable (Birner and Wittmer, 200; Blair, 
2000; Graham et al., 2003; Knack, 2002). The Decentralization Framework allows the 
researcher to determine the actors involved, how they influence the decision-making 
process, and how they hold decision-makers accountable. 
Below is a description of the three discrete components of Agrawal and Ribot’s 
(1999) decentralization framework mentioned in the introduction. Those components 
are the actors, powers, and accountability. Each component is described in detail to 
provide the reader with greater understanding of factors that Agrawal and Ribot (1999) 
identified as being significant to all acts of decentralization. 
Actors 
According to Agrawal and Ribot (1999), actors in a decentralization context are 
those individuals or organizations that control public resources. They include elected 
and appointed officials, powerful and influential individuals, corporate bodies such as 
communities and industrial interests (Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal), committees and 
cooperatives, NGOs and First Nation leaders. However, Buchy and Hoverman (2000) 
argue that determining who is an actor in a planning process can be controversial, and 
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that a process that identifies actors should not de facto exclude any group. In support of 
this, others such as Graham, Amos and Plumptre (2003) and Eagles et al., (2002) have 
identified the general public as an actor in protected area planning in addition to those 
identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999).  
The literature identified a number of actors that are involved in the planning and 
management of Ontario Parks. They include Ontario Parks’ staff, First Nations 
communities, non-governmental organizations, including environmental NGOs, park 
visitors, tourism operators, local communities, and resource extraction companies 
(Buteau-Duitschaever, 2009; Eagles et al., 2002; Porter, 2001). McIntyre, Yuan, Payne, 
and Moore. (2004) also identified four stakeholders that recreate on Crown lands near 
the Quetico region: U.S. citizens, northwest of Ontario residents, Thunder Bay residents, 
and the rest of Canada. 
Each of these actors has certain types of influence and is usually accountable to 
an individual, agency or constituency (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Buchy and Hoverman, 
2000; Lockwood, 2010). To whom these actors are accountable is dependent on the 
political, social and historical influence of each actor (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Blair, 
2000). The basis of each actor’s power can include wealth, heredity, ideology, election, 
electoral clout, or appointment (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Blair, 2000). Actors can also 
be distinguished from one another by the internal structure of their organization, 
including the financial and membership sources of the organization, the laws, policies 
and legislation that control their actions, and their beliefs and objectives (Agrawal and 
Ribot, 1999). 
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As decentralization is about shifting control from higher to lower levels of 
authority, the actors involved are positioned at different levels of social action (Buchy 
and Hoverman, 2000; Schlager, 1999). As each actor has different personal or 
organizational interests, it is likely that if similar powers are devolved to different 
actors, this will lead to different outcomes. Therefore, the characteristics of 
decentralization are dependent on the actor to whom power is devolved and this, in turn, 
is dependent on how or whether the actor is held accountable (Buchy and Hoverman, 
2000; Schlager, 1999). 
Powers 
Actors have four broad types of powers of decision-making that are critical to 
understanding decentralization (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). They are: 1) the power to 
create or modify rules, 2) the power to make decisions about the use of resources, 3) the 
power to implement and enforce compliance of the new or altered rules, and 4) the 
power to adjudicate disputes that occur during the creation and enforcement of 
compliance of new or altered rules (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; 
Jones, 2009; Kapoor, 2001; Nagendra, Karmacharya, and Karna, 2005; Virtanen, 2003). 
Increasing the decision-making powers of lower level actors to any of the four types of 
powers listed above constitutes some form of decentralization (Agrawal and Ribot, 
1999). Decentralization does not eliminate the issues of checks and balances and 
separation of powers to which more centralized forms of governing are subject. 
The power to create or modify rules allows actors to legislate principles that 
coordinate decisions and actions that determine who, how, and to what extent benefits 
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are realized from a resource. If a government is attempting to decentralize this power, it 
is usually in relation to a particular group of actors. An example of this type of power 
would be community-based forestry, where the community controls who, where, when 
and how timber and non-timber forest products are harvested (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; 
Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; Kapoor, 2001; Nagendra et al., 2005; Virtanen, 2003). 
The power to make decisions about the use of resources can increase the 
autonomy of the actor who gains this power and influences others who do not have the 
power. The greater these powers, the greater the discretionary authority of local bodies 
and the more direct their effect on the use of the resource. The power to make decisions 
does not have to affect the behaviour of others by mandating what they must, must not, 
or may do. An example would be shifting the ability to make budgetary decisions to a 
lower level of government. If that level of government has the power to decide how to 
spend a budget and raise revenue, then a degree of decentralization has been achieved, 
even if the power to mandate what others must, must not, or may do has not also been 
transferred (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; Jones, 2009; Nagendra 
et al., 2005; Virtanen, 2003). 
The power to implement and enforce compliance of new or altered rules entails 
the power to execute, and to gauge and monitor whether actors are performing their 
prescribed roles. Also included is the power to impose and enforce sanctions on actors 
who do not perform as required. For example, if a particular group or individual is not 
supposed to harvest game in a specific area and fails to comply, rule makers may then 
impose sanctions on that group or individual. The power to enforce compliance also 
includes the ability to ensure that those who break the rules follow the imposed 
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sanctions. It should be noted that the power to make decisions and rules without the 
power to enforce those rules could result in the powers being meaningless, because 
decision-making and enforcement of powers are complementary. Additionally, these 
powers also require administrative and fiscal resources to carry out any necessary 
monitoring and sanctions (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; 
Nagendra et al., 2005). 
The power of enforcement can be transferred to local administrative branches of 
government (e.g. OMNR) rather than to a representative local government at the same 
level (e.g. a local municipality). Whether or not the transfer of the power to implement 
and enforce will lead to effective decentralization depends on the nature of the 
accountability relations, the mix of powers that a given actor holds and the horizontal 
relations among actors at the same level. Agrawal and Ribot (1999) suggest effective 
decentralization can be achieved even if the powers of rule making and enforcement are 
divided, so long as the actors who have the power of enforcement are either controlled 
by or accessible to those who make the decisions and rules (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; 
Hayes and Ostrom, 2005; Nagendra et al., 2005). 
The power of adjudication is important when rules are created or the type of 
decisions a particular actor can make is changed or modified. When these changes 
occur, there are often disputes and negotiations that will need to be adjudicated. The two 
important aspects of adjudication are accessibility and independence. For local people 
who are affected by the devolution of powers to be fairly treated, they require the ability 
to access channels of adjudication for appeal. Additionally, the channels of adjudication 
should be organized in a manner that does not have links to sectoral interests. The rules, 
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decisions, their implementation, and enforcement should be challengeable by 
constituents, and the outcome of those challenges should not be biased in favour of 
power holders. The most critical aspect of the powers of adjudication is that they are 
exercised in a non-biased, systematic and accessible manner (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; 
Ribot, 2003; Virtanen, 2003). 
Accountability 
Accountability is a measure of how actors are held responsible by those they 
represent, and has been found to improve management effectiveness (Agrawal and 
Ribot, 1999; Dearden, Bennett, and Johnston, 2005). Accountability of decision-makers 
to the public is an important aspect of governing a protected areas as it ensures that 
funding is properly spent and tasks and objectives are completed and finished within 
specified timelines.  
According to Dearden et al. (2005), there is a lack of literature on accountability 
mechanisms. However, in their study these authors found that the mechanisms that are 
used in park planning and management include state of the park and annual department 
reports, external audits, advisory committees, parliamentary debates, stakeholder 
roundtables, internal audits, and the use of a public “watch dog”. Agrawal and Ribot 
(1999) found that other methods of accountability include: procedures for electoral 
recall; third party monitoring by media, NGOs, or independently elected controllers; 
auditing and evaluation; and political pressure and lobbying by associations and 
associative movements. These and many other approaches to accountability are 
necessary as the electoral process is generally not sufficient to guarantee accountability 
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to constituents, given that elected officials are often more accountable to their political 
party or other individuals or organizations (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). 
However, some of these mechanisms are not always very effective. For example, 
Ontario and many other Canadian provinces do not have procedures for electoral recall. 
Electoral recall occurs when registered voters petition a body that is responsible for 
administering the electoral process for the removal of their elected representative 
between elections (Elections BC, n.d.). As well, there is some concern regarding the 
effectiveness of media monitoring as politicians can obfuscate transparency by 
manipulating the media that converts political and legal issues into mass entertainment 
(Balkin, 1998).  
Greater public involvement has been identified as a reason for greater 
accountability, because it increases stakeholder communication and input. Dearden et al. 
(2005) found that park management was better as a result of increased accountability. 
As well, legally mandated management plans were also found to provide greater 
accountability as park superintendents must follow the management plan. However, 
Eagles (2009) found that management by a government agency could result in weak 
accountability and poor transparency, because they are rarely subjected to independent 
audits. It was found in Denmark that, due to the complexity of a park planning process, 
science could be politicized by excluding non-experts and, because of this, experts 
might disguise their political interests as objective science to further personal agendas. 
By doing so, experts risk legitimacy, scientists can lose credibility, and the public may 
be unable to hold decision-makers accountable for the decisions they make (Lund, 
Boon, and Nathan, 2009). 
CHAPTER 2                     39 
 
Eagles (2009) found that private entities such as NGOs and ENGOs have 
moderate levels of accountability, and as such are not accountable to society as a whole. 
In Canada, however, these organizations are considered to be quite transparent because 
they must provide governments with statements of operation which identify major 
activities and the names of directors, and include audited financial statements. 
Decentralizing powers to actors that are not accountable to a constituency, or are 
only accountable to superior authorities within a government structure, is unlikely to 
achieve the stated goals of the decentralization actions taken and is termed 
deconcentration (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Lockwood, 2010). Decentralization can be 
effective only when the actors are downwardly accountable and the actor’s constituents 
are able to exercise accountability as a counterbalancing power (Agrawal and Ribot, 
1999; Lockwood, 2010). Accountability is relational and about the mechanisms to 
implement countervailing powers by those who are subject to the actors with 
decentralized power. A system that is accountable can prevent arbitrary decisions or 
actions by actors (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Therefore, downward accountability can 
increase the participation of those who are subject to actors that hold decentralized 
power (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Dearden et al., 2005). 
Downward accountability of actors is enforceable through various methods 
(Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Dearden et al., 2005). The most common form of 
accountability for elected representatives is the electoral process (Agrawal and Ribot, 
1999; Lockwood, 2010). Horizontal and vertical ties between government departments 
can also influence accountability between local government actors and their 
constituents. Furthermore, the relationship between the administrative superiors and 
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customary authorities can affect the downward accountability of those authorities. As 
downward accountability can broaden the participation of local populations and enhance 
the responsiveness of empowered actors, it is a primary element of decentralization if 
those who receive powers from the central state on behalf of a constituency are 
downwardly accountable. The reason for this is that the many acclaimed benefits of 
decentralization are achieved through greater participation of local populations and the 
responsiveness of empowered actors (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). 
Some of the other methods of accountability include: procedures for recall; third 
party monitoring by media, NGOs, or independently elected controllers; auditing and 
evaluation; and political pressure and lobbying by associations and associative 
movements (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Dearden et al., 2005). These and many other 
approaches to accountability are necessary as the electoral process is generally not 
sufficient to guarantee accountability to constituents, given that elected officials are 
often more accountable to their political party or other individuals or organizations 
(Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Dearden et al. (2005) found that highly developed countries 
like Canada were less likely to use accountability mechanisms such as external audits 
and parliamentary debate than were less developed countries. However, highly 
developed countries are more likely to use accountability mechanisms such as internal 
audits and monitoring by external groups such as ENGOs and the media. 
Lockwood (2010) states that a governing body should also be upwardly 
accountable to higher level authorities such as parliament, external audits, and 
instruments such as the 2006 Provincial Park and Conservation Reserves Act (PPCRA). 
There is also some concern that as protected area management is decentralized 
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accountability may become weakened, because accountability structures such as the 
electoral process for non-parliamentary actors are not well developed. The lack of 
accountability can also be weakened when responsibility has been widely spread and 
poorly defined, so that actors do not have control over growing problems (Lockwood, 
2010).
CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I will situate myself as a researcher and describe the 
methodology for the study. Situating myself will allow the reader to understand any 
personal or intellectual biases that I have in my approach to the study (Dupuis, 1999; 
Mays and Pope, 2000). The description of the methodology includes justification for the 
use of a grounded theory approach and an outline of why I chose a multiple methods 
qualitative data analysis approach to trace if, how, and why decentralization occurred 
over the last 100 years of administration of Quetico Provincial Park. It also includes 
measuring the extent to which decentralization has taken place, the concepts of 
theoretical sensitivity, theoretical sampling, theoretical saturation, and constant 
comparison to theoretical categories. I then describe what a case study is and how 
Quetico was chosen as the case study for this project. After that, I provide an overview 
of how the framework was used to guide the study and then explain how the data was 
collected using a document review and semi-structured interviews, both of which are 
also described. In the final section, I describe the ethical dimensions of the study. 
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SITUATING MYSELF 
My goal for this research is not to prove that Ontario Parks has or has not 
centralized or decentralized the planning and management of Quetico over the last 100 
years. My goal is to explore whether decentralization has occurred and, if so, to identify 
how, to what extent and why it has taken place and gain insight that will help all 
affected by the planning and management of parks in a positive manner. 
I grew up on a farm in southern Alberta, where there was only one right method 
or way of approaching an issue. After travelling internationally, working in the tourism 
industry for over 15 years, living in two provincial parks for a total of 10 years, 
obtaining a degree in Ecotourism and Outdoor Leadership from Mount Royal College in 
Calgary, Alberta, and beginning my Masters of Environmental Studies in Nature-Based 
Recreation and Tourism, I learned that there are many valid points of view and methods 
of dealing with any issue. 
I believe that in many cases, but not all, local placed-based communities should 
have more influence than distant communities on the decisions about the natural 
resources that surround them. Crown lands in Ontario are managed to benefit all 
Ontarians, the majority of whom live very far from the Quetico region. In my opinion, if 
distant communities want to have greater input, then they should be willing to provide 
support that offsets any sacrifice made by local communities in regards to potential 
gains from those resources. For example, I am a supporter of community-conserved 
areas or IUCN Category VI protected areas. These areas, also known as Managed 
Resource Protected Areas, are managed largely by the local community(ies) for the long 
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term protection and maintenance of biological diversity, while also providing a 
sustainable flow of natural resources and services to meet the community’s needs 
(Dearden, 2009). 
I am a strong advocate of greater community control of natural resources 
through concepts such as co-management, community-based forestry, and 
decentralization, with the knowledge that these management regimes do not work for all 
communities or situations. Therefore, while I will attempt to be neutral about the 
decentralization that has occurred within Quetico Park, I am strongly biased towards 
local communities having more power, benefits and responsibility for the natural 
resources that they use in their daily lives, and therefore, my interpretations may tend 
towards supporting the decentralized form. My bias has also led me to read material on 
co-management, adaptive management, adaptive co-management and governance. 
METHODOLOGY 
There has been little research on the decentralization of protected areas in a 
developed country context, especially Canada and Ontario. As such, a qualitative 
approach is the preferred method to investigate the related phenomena (Cresswell, 
2009). I chose to use the grounded theory method, because it is a flexible emergent 
method that will allow me to build a broad knowledge about the decentralization of park 
management and planning, and then focus on those aspects that I find to be most critical. 
Being an emergent method, it is inductive, indeterminate, open ended, and is compatible 
with the study of dynamic, contingent, or unknown phenomenon (Charmaz, 2006, 
2008). An example of this would be evaluating the decentralization of parks in a 
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developed country context using Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) framework, which has 
only been tested in developing countries. One implication of this may be that, while they 
found accountability to be the most significant factor, the same may not be true in this 
context. Grounded theory is also useful for generating, mining and making sense of 
data. These qualities make it especially useful when researching new or poorly 
understood phenomena, such as decentralization of the planning and management of 
parks in a developed country context, as it allows for new properties of the phenomenon 
to develop that identify new conditions and consequences to study (Charmaz, 2006, 
2008). 
Glaser and Strauss developed the grounded theory method in the 1960s (Bryant 
and Charmaz, 2007). Changes to how it is applied over the last 40 years have resulted in 
a less positivistic and more emergent qualitative method (Charmaz, 2006, 2008). The 
emergent qualities of grounded theory involve four essential properties: theoretical 
sensitivity, theoretical sampling, theoretical saturation, and the constant comparison of 
data to theoretical categories (Charmaz, 2006; Hood, 2007; Kelle, 2007).  
Theoretical Sensitivity 
Theoretical sensitivity occurs when the researcher has theoretical insight into the 
area of research, and combines it with the ability to develop their own insights (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967). This means that the researcher uses the analysis of data to determine 
which theories apply best in a given context instead of using theories to impose pre-
existing categories on the data prior to data analysis. Consequently, Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) have advocated that the literature review should be left until the analysis is 
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completed. By doing so, they argue, the researcher is less likely to see the data through 
the lens of other ideas. Similarly, Charmaz is not insistent that a complete literature 
review needs to be conducted prior to the data analysis. 
Kelle (2007) asserts that it is very difficult for a novice researcher to develop 
theoretical categories with little to no knowledge of a topic; however, to aid in the 
process of coding and developing categories, Holton (2007) recommends that the 
researcher read widely in other disciplines to enhance their theoretical sensitivity. I feel 
that the reading on decentralization and protected area management I did to prepare the 
proposal for this project, in addition to previous literature reviews on the related topics 
of governance, co-management, adaptive management, and adaptive co-management, 
provided me with a strong knowledge foundation that allowed successful development 
of theoretical categories. By doing so, reflexivity was easier, and I was able to see the 
world through the interview participants’ experiences rather than forcing the data into 
pre-existing categories that are based on a literature review (Charmaz, 2006, 2008). As I 
followed Charmaz’s (2006) method, I did not conduct a thorough literature review prior 
to conducting either the document review or the personal interviews. The method 
requires that the researcher conduct the literature review after the analysis has been 
completed, whereupon, I was able to determine if my understanding of the analysis 
coincided with, contradicts, or reveals a new or existing theory. After the analysis was 
conducted I then turned to the literature to determine if my understanding of the analysis 
coincides with, contradicts, or reveals a new or existing theory.   
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Theoretical Sampling 
Grounded theory does not prescribe where the data will take the researcher. 
Therefore, theoretical sampling is tentative and changes as the data is gathered and 
analyzed. Theoretical sampling seeks out relevant comparative data to identify, 
elaborate on and refine hidden properties of a category and by doing so develops an 
emerging theory (Charmaz, 2006; Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). To accomplish this, 
participants were deliberately sought who were able to provide responses about their 
experiences regarding the planning and management of Quetico. These responses were 
obtained by asking targeted questions with the aim of verifying and linking information 
gathered during the document review and previous interviews (Morse, 2007). As well, 
participants were sought who held particular concepts or ideas that appeared to be 
significant (Morse, 2007). These ideas included their thoughts on participating in the 
public participation process, how it has changed, who the power holders are, areas for 
improvement, success of their group under the process at attaining goals, limitations and 
barriers, issues of adjudication and accountability, and who they felt should benefit from 
the park and how that should occur. Theoretical sampling was conducted by selecting 
participants to develop the properties of the identified and emerging categories until 
theoretical saturation was achieved (Charmaz, 2006). 
I interviewed individuals from a variety of backgrounds that had been involved 
in, or had extensive knowledge of, the planning and management of Quetico Park. 
These respondents included members of the local community, Thunder Bay, and 
southern Ontario. The respondents are knowledgeable about public participation in park 
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management and planning from one of many perspectives and were willing to discuss 
decentralization of park planning and management. Their perspectives address how and 
why decentralization has occurred from the inception of Quetico to the present day and 
the level of decentralization that presently exists. Being knowledgeable does not 
necessarily mean that an interviewee was directly involved in planning and management 
decisions for Quetico Park. It also meant that the interviewee had participated in a 
planning process by indicating their opposition or support for the management options 
provided by the planning team. The most important criterion being that they represent a 
particular viewpoint about the planning and management of Quetico. 
As mentioned earlier a number of potential Ontario Parks’ stakeholders were 
identified in the literature (Duteau-Duitschaever, 2009; Eagles et al., 2002; McIntyre et 
al. (2004); Porter, 2001). The actors identified through this process included Lac La 
Croix First Nation, provincially elected officials, MNR bureaucracy staff , the tourism 
industry; ENGOs, NGOs, the forestry and mining industries, the community of 
Atikokan, the general public, and U.S. citizens. The initial informants were identified 
through a small document review that was conducted during preparation for the project. 
These included ENGOs, community leaders, and agency staff. Additional informants 
who have special knowledge or distinctive qualifications (Johnson, 1990) were also 
identified through a snowball sampling process, approached and, if willing, interviewed. 
In addition, internet chat forums were used to identify members of the general public.  
It should be noted that U.S. citizens were included as an actor, because they 
constitute the majority of Quetico users. According to informants, the greater use of 
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Quetico by U.S. citizens provides them with a great deal of influence over day-to-day 
management decisions, such as portage and campsite conditions. However, the amount 
of influence that U.S. citizens have during management planning exercises was not as 
well known. In addition, there was a lack of agreement amongst informants as to how 
much influence any group or individual from outside of Canada or Ontario should have 
during the management planning process. So while U.S citizens constitute the majority 
of park users it was felt by the majority of informants that control of the park should 
belong to those who own the resource (i.e. Ontarians) rather than those who use it. 
As well, other than the local communities of Atikokan and Lac La Croix there 
was no evidence during the document review that other communities or residents of 
northwestern Ontario, including Thunder Bay, could be listed as specific stakeholders 
today. Historically other northwestern Ontario communities, such as Thunder Bay and 
Fort Frances, were affected by Quetico Park management decisions, because the lumber 
processing mills were located in communities such as Atikokan, Fort Frances, and 
Thunder Bay, and any decision that affected the harvest of timber could have economic 
impacts to those communities (Thunder Bay Chamber of Commerce, 1971). The 1977 
abolition of logging within the park meant that future management decisions would no 
longer directly affect those communities other than Atikokan, to the same degree again.  
Another reason that in the past the list of actors included northwestern Ontario 
and Thunder Bay residents is that Quetico is the largest park in the area, and according 
to OMNR (2007) and Whiting and Mulrooney (1998) provincial parks in Ontario 
provide both economic and non-economic benefits to local communities. The 2007 
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Quetico Background Information Report claims that Quetico only provides economic 
benefits to the communities of Atikokan and Lac La Croix. These benefits are largely 
limited to person years of employment (18 in Atikokan and 2 in Lac La Croix). 
However, logic indicates that the proximity of Thunder Bay and Fort Frances to Quetico 
must result in some degree of economic impact as some U.S. citizens travelling to 
northern entry points must pass through these two communities and are likely to 
purchase goods and services or eat meals while there.  
The other benefits attributed to parks include protection of ecological functions, 
health effects, worker productivity, educational and scientific benefits, fulfillment of 
international responsibilities, business location decisions, and community cohesion 
(OMNR, 2007; Whiting and Mulrooney, 1998). These latter benefits are likely to be 
experienced by the northwestern Ontario and Thunder Bay residents either through their 
use of the park or through the knowledge that the park exists. However, these benefits 
are unlikely to be negatively affected by management planning decision-making 
because the 2006 PPCRA provincial parks objectives prevent that from occurring. The 
2006 PPCRA provincial park objectives mandate that all park management decisions 
must protect the ecological integrity of the area, provide opportunities for outdoor 
recreation, provide opportunities to increase knowledge and appreciation of the natural 
and cultural heritage of the park, and the facilitation of scientific research. 
Another historically significant actor was the population living in the southern 
Ontario region known as the Greater Golden Horseshoe (i.e. Toronto, Hamilton, 
Oshawa, Peterborough, etc.) The region is home to two-thirds of Ontario’s population 
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(Statistics Canada, 2009), and because of its large population it was thought that the 
residents of this region could still be considered to be an actor on its own. However, this 
population was not identified as an actor during the current planning process, because 
there was no evidence of significant participation by this group during the document 
review and informant interviews.  
It should be noted that during the literature review other Ontario Park’s 
governance research did not identify other semi-local communities (e.g. Thunder Bay, 
Fort Frances, and northwestern Ontario) or southern Ontario as specific actors. It was 
felt that the interests of these groups (i.e. the Ontario public) were represented through 
actors representing park users, ENGOs, and local communities (Buteau-Duitschaever, 
2009; Eagles et al., 2002; Porter, 2001). As the researcher was unable to contact a 
significant number of individuals from the General Public actor group it was not 
possible to represent the interests of all actors through individual groups (i.e. Thunder 
Bay, Fort Frances, northwestern Ontario, and southern Ontario). Therefore, to represent 
the interests of all Ontarians this study uses the actors ENGOs, NGOs, and General 
Public. For future researchers to have stronger studies it will be necessary to identify 
and interview members of these various groups. 
To approach all of the potential informants, both a telephone script and letter (or 
email) was crafted with the Lakehead University logo that outlined the goals of the 
project, what was expected of the interviewee, and indicating their right to anonymity 
was used to satisfy the Lakehead University Ethics Review Board (Appendix 1 and 
Appendix 2).   
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Theoretical Saturation 
Theoretical saturation occurs when gathering more data fails to provide 
additional theoretical insights, and does not reveal further properties of the core 
theoretical categories (Charmaz, 2006). Some researchers argue that saturation of the 
theoretical categories supersedes sample size and that samples can be very small 
(Charmaz, 2006). 
Saturation is strongly linked to sampling and constant comparison, because 
interviewing knowledgeable respondents and constantly comparing the data they 
provide can cause saturation to occur quickly. Identifying when saturation takes place is 
important because it allows the researcher to avoid wasting time collecting, transcribing 
and analyzing redundant information and focus on those categories that require further 
examination (Holton, 2007). Saturation was reached when informant responses began to 
be similar if not exactly the same. For questions such as “Who has control over how 
funds are spent for the park?” saturation was reached very quickly. Other questions such 
as “Have you or your group been able to achieve the goals that you set out to get in past 
or current planning and management decision-making?” were asked of all non-
bureaucratic staff as each informant’s group had a different experience in its ability to 
achieve its goals. 
Constant Comparison to Theoretical Categories 
Theoretical categories emerge from the data and/or codes that are the most 
significant and/or frequent. The categories also make the most analytic sense for the 
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complete and insightful categorization of the data. Theoretical categories explain ideas, 
events and processes in the data, and may subsume common patterns and themes of 
several significant codes. By constantly comparing data, codes and theoretical 
categories, conceptual understanding becomes more sophisticated because the defined 
analytical properties of the categories can be treated with more rigorous scrutiny. From 
this scrutiny the analysis becomes more theoretically explicit by fitting the data into 
specific theoretical categories and by examining how the categories and fundamental 
aspects of human existence are related (Charmaz, 2006). 
By using the three essential properties of theoretical sampling, theoretical 
saturation and the constant comparison method, the interviews yielded rich (detailed, 
focused and full) data in which respondents’ views, feelings, intentions and actions, plus 
the contexts and order of their lives, were revealed. To obtain rich data, it was necessary 
to seek thick descriptions by writing extensive field notes of observations and 
accumulating detailed narratives (Charmaz, 2006). When addressing these three 
essential properties, I took care to be reflexive when designing the study and collecting, 
analysing, and describing the data, because the researcher is a part of the study; this is 
the reason I situated myself at the beginning of the chapter (Charmaz, 2006; Mruck and 
Mey, 2007). 
This study used a constructivist grounded theory approach that places priority on 
the phenomena of the study and views the data and analysis as being created from the 
shared experiences of the researcher and the participants and the relationship between 
them. A tenet of constructive theory is that multiple realities exist, that data reflect the 
researcher’s and participants’ mutual constraints and that the researcher, to some extent, 
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enters and is affected by the participant’s world. This approach provides an interpreted 
portrayal of the world, not an exact picture. The researcher wants to learn the 
participants’ implicit meanings of their experiences to build a conceptual analysis of 
those experiences. A constructivist approach takes implicit meanings, experiential views 
and the grounded theory analysis as constructions of reality with the data being 
contextually situated. This approach also stresses the respondent’s definitions of terms, 
situations, and events (Charmaz, 2006). 
CASE STUDY 
A case study research approach is used to conduct an in depth study of one or a 
few instances of a phenomenon. A case study approach is better suited for trace social 
constructivist theories that stress the importance of an individual’s perceptions or the 
predominant discussions regarding social processes (Blatter, 2008). Case studies have a 
major strength when attempting to produce a detailed complex historical account 
through a thick description (Blatter, 2008; Hodkinson and Hodkinson, 2001). There is 
some debate about what a case study is. Some feel that a case study should be spatially 
and temporally varied, while others state that a case study should range from 10 to 60 
cases, thus being able to bridge the qualitative–quantitative gap (Blatter, 2008). 
Generally though, the strength of a case study approach is the in-depth examination of 
fewer instances (Blatter, 2008; Hodkinson and Hodkinson, 2001). 
Some of the positive aspects of case studies are that they are better able to 
represent real lived experiences than are other forms of research such as structured 
questionnaires (Hodkinson and Hodkinson, 2001). A case study can also explore lived 
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unusual or unexpected experiences that other forms of research cannot. By identifying 
the unusual, multiple case studies are able to also compare and contrast the idiosyncratic 
rather than just the common or shared experience. As well, a case study can identify the 
reasons behind a causal relationship that a large –N study has identified as being 
statistically significant. Case studies can facilitate the development of new theories, 
because existing theories are often confronted with the complex realities of real lived 
experiences that can be unexpected and idiosyncratic (Hodkinson and Hodkinson, 
2001). 
Some of the limitations of case studies identified by Hodkinson and Hodkinson 
(2001) are that there is often more data than a researcher is able to analyze, resulting in 
the omission of some information. The cost of a case study can be related to the scale of 
the project with small scale studies being more affordable than large scale due to the 
time required to collect and analyse data. Another limitation is that once the data has 
been analysed, it can be difficult to represent the complexity found in a simple manner, 
because while writing the findings is generally linear, the story that the research has 
uncovered can be non-linear. As well, while some case study work can be numerically 
represented, much of it cannot, because the complexity of the findings do not fit neatly 
into theories, models, or frameworks (Hodkinson and Hodkinson, 2001). Case studies 
are often not able to be generalized, because they usually have small sample sizes that 
can be idiosyncratic. Case studies are also quite dependent on researcher expertise, 
knowledge, and intuition, but these aspects often raise concerns about the objectivity of 
the study. 
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It is possible to make theoretical generalizations using a constructivist case study 
approach. However, the quality of the study is not dependent on the researcher to 
provide detailed evidence at each step of the causal chain. Instead, the quality of the 
study depends on how skilfully the researcher uses empirical evidence to make their 
argument within a scholarly discussion that includes both complementary and 
competing theories. For a constructivist approach, the case should be documented using 
a comparative structure, rather than chronological or linear-analytic structures (Baltter, 
2008). 
Selection of Case Study 
Originally the goal of this project was to study and compare three wilderness 
class parks. However, it was realized early on that it would not be possible to conduct, 
transcribe and analyse the required number of interviews within the time available, and 
there were also financial constraints with accessing all three parks. Therefore it was 
decided to limit the study to Quetico Provincial Park, because it is the park with the 
longest history, and financially it was easier to access Quetico than the other parks 
Therefore, the study area is limited to Quetico Provincial Park and nearby 
surrounding area, including Atikokan and Lac La Croix. The reason for this limitation is 
that the primary sphere of influence of park management decisions is limited to the area 
within the boundary of the park by the 2006 Provincial Parks and Conservation 
Reserves Act and the 2007 Quetico Background Information Report claims that the park 
only provides economic benefits to Atikokan and Lac La Croix. However, the study 
does include actors that do not reside within this boundary, because they have a 
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significant affect on management decisions. Examples include the Minister of Natural 
Resources who is ultimately responsible for the decisions that are made, ENGOs that are 
based in southern Ontario, members of the general public who may live locally or in 
other areas of Ontario or Canada, and citizens of the United States. 
There are three reasons for the selection of Quetico. First, Ontario Parks 
classifies it as a wilderness class park, which is the equivalent of an IUCN category II or 
national park (Dearden and Rollins, 2009; IUCN, 2009). Wilderness class parks are a 
minimum of 100,000 ha in size, the largest provincial parks in Ontario, where the forces 
of nature are allowed to freely exist, and have the second highest level of protection next 
to nature reserve class parks (OMNR, 2008, 2009c). Protection means that protecting 
the ecological integrity is the most important aspect of the park. The park is mainly a 
recreation area, with the limitation that visitors may participate only in human-powered 
low impact activities such as canoeing and hiking. All motorized forms of recreation 
(i.e. ATV and snowmobile use) are prohibited, and industrial activity is not allowed 
within the park boundary (OMNR, 2007).  
The second reason is that the large size also means that wilderness class parks 
are more likely to overlap with traditional and industrial users (i.e. trapping, tourism, 
forestry and mining) than is the case in smaller parks in other park classes. In addition, 
the high level of protection means that wilderness class parks are also more likely to 
have affected, and therefore been pressured to involve, traditional and industrial users in 
decision-making than parks in other less restrictive park classes. Therefore, examining a 
wilderness class park offers the best means to measure the extent to which 
decentralization in planning and management within Ontario Parks has taken place. As 
CHAPTER 3                     57 
 
this class of park is highly protected, there will be more rules limiting the activities 
allowed within their boundaries and there is less likelihood that control would be given 
up to local interests that could come into conflict with those rules. 
The third reason Quetico Park was chosen is that the date of its establishment—
1913—means that it was one of the first provincial parks established in Ontario. The 
extensive history of the park will allowed the researcher to trace the administrative past 
of Ontario’s provincial parks from the establishment of the first Ontario-wide provincial 
park legislation to the present, including the wide range of types of public involvement 
that occurred within the Ontario Parks system. For example, Quetico Provincial Park 
involves the earliest days of provincial parks when there was no public involvement in 
planning or management of Ontario’s parks.  
AGRAWAL AND RIBOT’S (1999) FRAMEWORK 
The purpose of Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) framework is to provide a 
foundation that limits and guides the analysis of the actors, their powers, and how they 
are held accountable. The aim of studying these three components is to determine if and 
how decentralization of Quetico Park planning and management has occurred. 
The framework was used to identify the actors involved, the powers they 
possessed (i.e. 1) the power to create or modify rules, 2) the power to make decisions 
about the use of resources, 3) the power to implement and enforce compliance of the 
new or altered rules, and 4) the power to adjudicate disputes that occur during the 
creation and enforcement of compliance of new or altered rules), and how the decision-
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makers are held accountable. This was accomplished through the document review and 
informant interviews.  
During the analysis of the data it was discovered that Agrawal and Ribot’s 
(1999) definition of actor was limited in that it did not allow for the inclusion of those 
groups or individuals that do not have any of the four powers identified in the 
framework, but are still able to influence planning and management decisions. For the 
purposes of this study, an actor is defined as any group that has either direct influence 
through the four identified powers, or indirect influence through other means of public 
participation (i.e. lobbying, attending openhouses, providing written submissions, etc.).  
From the document review an initial list of actor groups was identified, and 
informants from these groups were contacted. Then through the informant interviews a 
snowball method was used by asking respondents to identify other actors involved in the 
current Quetico Management Plan Review (QMPR) and confirm the findings of the 
document review.  
Once the actors had been identified, informants were contacted about an 
interview. During the interview informants were asked if their group possessed any of 
the four powers, or if they knew of other actors that possessed them. They were also 
asked to comment on the accountability of those groups or individuals that do have 
some or all of the four powers. The information gathered was then used to determine if 
the planning and management of Quetico is decentralized.  
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DATA COLLECTION METHODS 
As grounded theory is an emergent method, two techniques of collecting this 
type of data are document reviews and semi-structured active interviews (Altheide, 
1996; Holstein & Gubrium, 1995), both of which are outlined below.  
Document Review 
The document review provided a greater understanding of the current and 
historical planning and management context, offered insight that assisted with gaining 
richer data from the interview participants, and supplied a method of triangulation for 
information discovered during the interview process (Altheide, 1996). To obtain the 
richest and most useful data, the researcher must have extensive background knowledge 
about the topic, through either research or personal experience. The document review 
enabled the researcher to ascertain the actors involved, how decisions are made, and to 
attempt to discover accountability. By conducting a document review, familiarity with 
the contextual, cultural, interpretive and material circumstances of the respondents’ 
behaviour, orientation and the vocabulary that the respondents used was gained. This 
knowledge allowed the researcher to understand what was being said and the 
respondents’ perspectives and interpretations, and was a way to develop shared 
understanding and experiences that provide a reference base for interviews. Background 
knowledge also allowed the researcher to move from the hypothetical to the concrete by 
asking relevant questions of the respondents’ experiences during the semi-structured 
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active interviews. This in turn provided rich descriptions of the respondents’ lived 
experiences (Altheide, 1996). 
To obtain the necessary background knowledge, I reviewed newspaper articles, 
historical accounts and government documents, including background reports, 
management plans, policies and legislation. Examples include legislation such as the 
1993 Environmental Bill of Rights and the 2006 Provincial Parks and Conservation 
Reserves Act; policies including the 1977 Quetico Provincial Park Master Plan and the 
Draft version of the 2009 Ontario Protected Areas Planning Manual; and webpages for 
ENGOs involved in park planning. Information gathered at this stage, in conjunction 
with historical readings (i.e. newspapers, historical accounts) and informant responses 
during previous interviews, made it possible for each questionnaire to be specifically 
targeted towards the informant’s group affiliation. For example, respondents from 
ENGOs and NGOs were asked how they determined their position on an issue. In 
contrast, MNR staff were asked the differences in influence on the decision-making of 
large organizations such as ENGOs and NGOs versus individuals or smaller 
organizations. As an informant’s responses often required clarification, or opened new 
avenues of inquiry interviews, questions were not limited to those developed prior to the 
semi-structured active interviews (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995). 
Semi-structured Active Interviews 
Active interviews are appropriate when there is an interest in subjective views or 
interpretations and sampling flexibility is required (Charmaz, 2002; Holstein and 
Gubrium, 1995). Like grounded theory, the sample is not determined in advance when 
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using active interviews, because, as new information is gathered through constant 
comparison, previously unknown perspectives may be needed (Charmaz, 2002 & 2006; 
Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). 
Qualitative interviews in general are used when trying to identify common 
patterns or themes between respondents (Warren, 2002). Semi-structured active 
interviews encourage the respondent to direct the conversation towards the area of the 
researcher’s interests through a flexible approach that allows the respondent to provide 
fresh insights to community issues. The result is that discussions are more like a one-on-
one conversation than a formal interview about community issues and problems 
(Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). Situating the interview as a conversation builds a level of 
trust and confidence between the researcher and the interviewee, resulting in rich 
detailed information. As well, non-verbal forms of communication can and were 
observed and provided additional insights by recording them in field notes and 
connecting those notes to the transcripts for analysis (Charmaz, 2006; Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990). 
Prior to starting the project there was concern that agency respondents would not 
be as accepting of this form of interview technique as non-agency respondents. To 
compensate for this, a more structured questionnaire was developed for agency staff. 
However, during the interviews with agency staff, it was found that this concern was not 
warranted. That may be because informants were provided with the questionnaire prior 
to the interview when possible so that they would be able to provide more in-depth 
responses. 
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By using open-ended, semi-structured interviews, respondents were able to use 
their own voice to situate themselves. Due to the flexibility of this method, interviews 
were guided towards the research agenda by using probing questions about areas that 
needed to be further explained. To direct the conversation, the questionnaire was 
prepared in such a way to incite responses that addressed the project’s research needs 
and engaged the respondent, but the interview was not set in stone. To ease the process, 
the initial context was provided to the respondent at the time of the interview request to 
inform the respondent about how it was perceived the respondent could help with the 
research (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). 
One of the assumptions of the active interview technique is the multiple 
perspectives of respondents (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). Multiple perspectives are an 
individual’s reflections from many viewpoints. Respondents for this project represented 
different occupations, environmental ethics, recreation types, regions of residence (i.e. 
urban southern Ontario versus rural northern Ontario), levels of education, political 
connections, and locations in which they were born and raised. It was found that all 
respondents provided a sometimes surprising number of multiple perspectives, which 
resulted in a reduced number of interviews (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). 
In addition to these assumptions, the active interview technique encourages 
respondents to switch narrative positions (i.e. from occupation to environmental ethic) 
and discuss the topic from multiple points of view. This often yielded contradictions and 
complexities, because the meaning of an experience is dynamic and dependent on the 
context and circumstances of the narrative. For example, one respondent stated that 
logging should be allowed to resume in the park and then a few minutes later said that 
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the park must be protected from all environmental impacts. These contradictions, and 
the fact that a respondent may provide perspectives that do not necessarily reflect the 
point of view of all group members, are seen as a limitation of the technique (Holstein 
and Gubrium, 1995). To avoid extreme viewpoints skewing the data, a minimum of two 
people from each actor group were interviewed. For example, there were two outfitters, 
four ENGO members, and three agency staff interviewed for each of those perspectives.  
In active interviews, the respondent’s positional shifts, relationships and 
perspectives of meaning take precedence over the implied relationships and perspectives 
inherent in the prepared questions.  The interviewer can interject himself into the 
interview in many ways to provoke the respondent’s narrative through conversational 
give-and-take or drawing on mutually familiar events, experiences or outlooks to secure 
rapport, fix the conversation in a particular direction of meaning and encourage 
respondent elaboration (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). 
Interviews were recorded in a variety of locales ranging from a restaurant, to 
offices, to interviews conducted over the phone. Those interviews conducted face-to-
face were done using two digital recorders to avoid loss of data through equipment 
failure or other accidents. The Multimedia Services Unit of the Technology Services 
Centre at Lakehead University recorded all phone interviews. 
After each interview, notes were made and the recordings were reviewed and 
analysed to determine if there were any common themes with previous interviews, or 
the document review. As well, subsequent interview questionnaires were adjusted to 
exclude themes that had been saturated, or to further explore new areas of inquiry 
(Charmaz, 2006; Holton, 2007; Lepp and Holland, 2006). 
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There were twelve interviews transcribed by the researcher. It should be noted 
that the sample size is small and there was some homogeneity in regards to the 
environmental advocacy statements among the informants. Transcription of the 
interviews by the researcher allowed greater familiarity and understanding of the data 
(Park and Zeanah, 2005; Tilley, 2003). Such immersion in the data is one of the 
methods to develop additional theoretical sensitivity during the analysis process (Strauss 
& Corbin, 1990). The transcripts were then coded sentence by sentence using the 
qualitative data analysis software Atlas.ti v6 software program (Pope, Ziebland, & 
Mays, 2000). The software allows basic coding and complex analysis of the transcripts. 
Data can be kept in its whole form or segmented for ease of analysis. The software also 
allows the researcher to create models that demonstrate relationships between codes and 
respondents (Atlas.ti, 2009; Pope et al., 2000). 
The initial coding resulted in approximately 3000 codes. Through merger of 
similar codes these were then consolidated to approximately 500 codes. An example 
would be the merging of the two codes PARK USER and PARK VISITOR or 
COOPERATION and PARTNERSHIP. From the remaining codes five families—
Accountability, Actors, Participation, Power, and Relationships—were developed a 
posteriori. These families were then analysed to determine the relationships between 
them, and diagrams of these descriptions were created. 
Ethics 
For this study, great care was used to maintain the safety of all interview 
respondents who volunteered to participate in this study. Each of the individual 
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interviews respondents, whose ages ranged from mid-thirties to early seventies, were 
required to provide free and informed consent using the form in Appendix 3 Informed 
consent letter. before they could participate. All interview data was collected by and 
available to only the primary researcher, and were transcribed and analysed on a secure 
computer, with the original audio being stored at the School of Outdoor Recreation, 
Parks and Tourism at Lakehead University for five years. The primary researcher 
completed the Tri-Council training on research with human subjects (certificate as 
Appendix 4), and ethical approval was obtained from Lakehead University before any 
interviews occurred (Research Ethics Board, 2007).  
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CHAPTER 4 – RESULTS 
This chapter will present the background on the case study of Quetico Park and 
an analysis of the documents reviewed and interviews conducted. The analysis of the 
document review and interviews provided insight into the current and historical 
management and planning mechanisms for the park. The document review provided an 
understanding of the issues that were present from the 1960s until today. Many of these 
issues have been constant sources of conflict between parties that have a relationship 
with Quetico. Examples include motorized access, lack of economic benefit to local 
communities, majority use by U.S. recreationists and outfitters, and development of new 
access zones. While the aim of the study was to document the entire 100-year 
management and planning history of Quetico, this was not possible as there were neither 
documents nor firsthand individual accounts available for the entire period. However, 
some of the respondents did have knowledge of decisions making in the past and 
provided as much information as possible.  
The document review for this project consisted of examining both government 
documents and studying historical accounts, newspapers, and other documents from the 
early 1950s through to present times. The documents analysed include community-
based land use planning documents, historical and current legislation, previous Quetico 
Park master plans, planning manuals used by Ontario Parks’ staff, and documents 
relevant to the management plan review that was underway during this project. Other 
sources included historical books, newspaper articles, a tabloid produced by Lac La 
Croix First Nation, and webpages hosted by ENGOs.  
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BACKGROUND OF QUETICO PARK  
This section provides: a description of Quetico Park and nearby communities; a 
planning history; a cultural history; details the commercial aspects of the park; the 
management planning history; and finally the stages of a management plan review. The 
information gathered at this stage through a document review provided direction for the 
interview stage and questionnaire development. 
Below is a timeline of significant policy and management events that have 
affected the planning and management of Quetico. 
Figure 2. Chronology of Significant Policy and Management Events in Planning and 
Management of Quetico Park. 
1873 
Treaty #3 signed between the Government of Canada and local First Nations including Lac La 
Croix enshrining Aboriginal and Treaty Rights 
1909 Quetico designated as a Forest and Game Reserve 
1913 First Provincial Parks Act enacted and Quetico becomes a provincial park 
1939 Prospecting and mining in the park approved as an emergency measure for World War II 
1949 Lac La Croix First Nation members allowed to trap in park 
1954 Ontario Provincial Parks Act passed 
1956 Mining and prospecting ban reinstated 
1959 Wilderness Areas Act passed 
1967 Quetico classified as a Natural Environment park to be managed under a multiple-use policy 
1970 Quetico Advisory Committee appointed to examine the conflict over logging in the park 
1971 
Logging banned in Quetico by Premier to appease conservationists, and public consultation 
becomes entrenched in the park management planning process 
1973 
First management plan begins to be developed and Quetico designated as a Primitive Class 
Park 
1977 
Quetico Park’s first Master Plan approved resulting in the banning of logging, mining, 
hunting, and motorized access 
1978 Quetico designated as a Wilderness Class park 
1982 First review of the Quetico Master Plan completed and released 
1989 Second review of the Quetico Master Plan completed and released 
1992 
Agreement of Co-existence signed between Lack La Croix First Nation and the Ontario 
Government, and Ontario Provincial Parks: Planning and Management Policies updated 
resulting in the Blue Book 
1993 
Environmental Bill of Rights, enshrining public participation in development of provincial 
government policies, enacted 
1995 Revised Park Policy 1995 released 
1997 First Quetico Provincial Park Fire Management Plan approved 
1999 Class Environmental Assessment for Provincial Parks begins 
2004 Class Environmental Assessment for Provincial Parks completed 
2006 Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves Act enacted, and initiation of the current Quetico 
CHAPTER 4                     68 
 
Provincial Park management plan review process 
2009 
Updated Quetico Provincial Park Fire Management Plan approved, and the 2009 Ontario 
Protected Areas Planning Manual replaces the 1992 Blue Book 
Quetico Provincial Park area 
The following is the description of the case study area based on the planning 
history, cultural history, and commercial aspects of Quetico Park. Quetico Provincial 
Park is Ontario’s third largest wilderness park encompassing 4,758 km², and is located 
approximately 160 kilometres west of Thunder Bay (Figure 3). The two nearest 
communities are Atikokan to the north and Lac La Croix First Nation on the western 
boundary. Quetico has over 1,400 km of canoe routes with 612 portages on 
approximately 542 lakes. In addition to canoe routes, Quetico also has six hiking trails, 
2,146 interior campsites, 107 car campsites, as well as two yurts (The Quetico 
Foundation, n.d.; OMNR, 2006). 
 
Figure 3. Map showing Quetico Provincial Park in relation to Thunder Bay, Superior 
National Forest and the Boundary Waters Canoe Area. 
 
 
Source: Adapted from OMNR, 2009d. 
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Planning History 
Quetico was designated as a Forest and Game Reserve in April 1909, after 
President Theodore Roosevelt created the Superior National Forest in Minnesota in 
February 1909 (see Figure 3). The two main purposes for designating the area as a forest 
reserve were to establish a reserve of timber and to protect wildlife values. Protection of 
wildlife was important because the logging and mining camps in the area were using 
local fish and game to feed the men in their camps resulting in extreme pressure on fish 
and wildlife populations. The purpose of the park also changed over this time from 
being utilitarian to being preservation-based, so the park was re-classified as a 
wilderness class park in 1978 (Littlejohn, 1965; OMNR, 2005, 2006 & 2007; Peruniak, 
2000). 
When the area was designated a Forest Reserve in 1909, rangers were directed to 
evict any First Nation people to further the conservation goals of the area by reducing 
the pressure on fish and game. However, such actions did not halt the poaching of 
wildlife by work camp harvesters, likely because there were only ten rangers hired for 
five months of the year to patrol the area, and they did not venture from major 
waterways. To increase the efficiency of enforcement, regular ranger patrols were 
instituted, permanent ranger stations were built and a warden was appointed to oversee 
the Forest Reserve. In 1913, rangers were given the powers of peace officers under the 
new Provincial Parks Act. The Act also permitted the Minister of Lands, Forests and 
Mines to issue timber licences in parks (Peruniak, 2000). 
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Quetico became the first provincial park gazetted under the new Provincial 
Parks Act. Under the control of the first superintendent, park rangers were required to 
work year-round under all conditions patrolling for illegal trapping and hunting. The 
superintendent also directed the rangers to maintain good relations with Canadian First 
Nation people, but warned them not to trust the United States (U.S.) First Peoples as he 
felt they were poaching and illegally trapping in the region. While relations between the 
rangers and Canadian First Nation people may have been positive on a personal level, 
the Federal and Provincial governments de-listed a small reserve that was surrounded by 
the park. This area is now subject to a land claim by the Lac La Croix First Nation 
(Peruniak, 2000). 
Management of logging and timber licences was often an issue in Quetico. In 
1919 there was a political scandal regarding logging in the park when the Minister of 
Lands and Forests sold timber licenses to a fellow Member of Provincial Parliament’s 
(MPP) timber company for less than half of the going rate. This same business, the 
James A. Mathieu Lumber Company, was also often accused of ignoring regulations but 
did not suffer any penalties. That changed in 1941 when Quetico’s superintendent, 
Walter Cain, who considered logging second in importance to tourism, enforced 
regulations (Killan, 1993; Peruniak, 2000). 
As early as 1920, Quetico staff had been recommending that tourists be 
encouraged to enter from the Canadian side of the park to help develop a Canadian 
tourism outfitter trade. To make the Canadian side of the park more attractive to 
recreationists, portages were made easier to find and use (Peruniak, 2000). 
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Poaching and illegal trapping regulations were enforced more stringently to 
maintain or grow wildlife populations. However, contrary regulations were often 
instituted towards the same end. For example, there had been a request to allow gill 
netting on one of the lakes that was denied, but ring-necked pheasant, an exotic species, 
were introduced for beautification purposes. As well, in 1949 the governments of 
Ontario and Canada were able to come to an agreement that allowed the Lac La Croix 
First Nation to develop trap lines in the park to provide the community with a small 
income (Peruniak, 2000). 
During the 50s and 60s, there was a recreation boom in Ontario’s parks with a 
great number of pressures being placed on parks by people looking to recreate. One of 
those pressures in Quetico was the use of airplanes to access the remote lakes. 
Eventually an air space restriction had to be instituted (Killan, 1993; Peruniak, 2000). 
Later in the 60s and 70s, the purpose of a park was debated between 
preservationists and utilitarians (Killan, 1993; Peruniak, 2000). During this debate, a 
classification system was developed in 1967 that provided five classes of parks. These 
classifications ranged from parks with the primary objectives of ecological integrity 
based on scientific knowledge through to multiple use parks in which industrial 
activities such as logging would continue (Killan, 1993). With the change to a focus on 
a scientifically-based classification system, greater emphasis was placed on 
systematically representing and protecting biodiversity, as well as designating areas for 
other human uses (Killan, 1993; Wright & Rollins, 2009). Preservationists prevailed in 
the utilitarian-preservationist debates and Quetico was designated as a Primitive Class 
Park in 1973, resulting in a ban on logging, mining and hunting. To further the goals of 
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preservation, the boundaries of the park were adjusted, a buffer zone was created and 
garbage reduction rules were implemented. To help further tourism goals, more access 
points were created in the northern part of the park and a daily quota system for 
southern entry points was implemented. As well, motors were prohibited except for 
members of the Lac La Croix First Nations Guide Association, and these were limited to 
a maximum of 10 horsepower (Peruniak, 2000). 
Planning and management became more long-term oriented, and in 1973 park 
superintendents, with assistance from the Quetico Park Advisory Committee, began 
developing a Master Plan for the park that was brought into force in 1977. The core of 
this plan was a determination to co-exist with the Lac La Croix First Nation people. All 
waters of Lac La Croix were de-gazetted from the park to allow access to the Lac La 
Croix First Nation by boat (OMNR Provincial Parks Council, 1983; OMNR, 2006; 
Peruniak, 2000). To keep the plan current and relevant and to address specific issues, the 
1977 plan was reviewed in 1982 and in 1989 (OMNR Provincial Parks Council, 1983; 
OMNR, 2006). Then in 1992, Lac La Croix First Nation proposed a major amendment 
that provided employment opportunities and economic diversification that resulted in 
the Lac La Croix Agreement of Co-existence and the Revised Park Policy in 1995 
(OMNR, 2006; Spielmann and Unger, 2000). 
One last management issue is that of fire suppression, which was carried out, 
likely for economic reasons, from sometime prior to 1909 until the 1990s. However, in 
the period when the first Master Plan was being developed, research demonstrated that 
fire might be an essential ecological process fundamental to ecosystem health and 
sustainability. Since that time, this finding has been accepted as fact with the result 
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being that there is a fire management plan that allows 63% of Quetico to burn naturally 
(Peruniak, 2000; OMNR, 2008).  
Cultural History 
There is a strong cultural heritage in the region for both Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal people. Aboriginal people have continually occupied the area since the 
Paleo-Indian Period (10,000 to 7,000 BP). Other significant cultures that inhabited the 
area include the Middle Shield (7,000 to 1500 BP), Laurel (3,000 to 1500 BP) and 
Blackduck (1500 BP to contact) who are the ancestors of today’s Cree and Ojibwa 
cultures. Evidence of occupation by these cultures is in the form of artefacts such as 
arrowheads found in archaeological sites and pictographs (OMNR, 2007). 
Today Quetico lies entirely within the Treaty 3 area (Figure 4). The purpose of 
Treaty 3 from the European perspective was to exploit the lumber and mineral resources 
of the area. Treaty 3 stipulates that in return for surrendering 14,245,000 hectares, the 
Saulteaux tribe of Ojibway First Nation and all its descendants “shall have right to 
pursue their avocations of hunting and fishing throughout the tract” (Aboriginal Affairs 
and Northern Development Canada, 2010b). The closest First Nation community to the 
park is Lac La Croix First Nation reserve, which abuts the southwest corner of the park. 
Much of the traditional lands1 of the Lac La Croix First Nation are within Quetico 
Provincial Park. The Lac des Mille Lac and Seine River First Nations have also 
traditionally used the area. When Quetico was first established as a Forest Reserve in 
1909, hunting and fishing were banned (contrary to their Aboriginal and treaty rights). 
                                                 
1 Lands historically occupied and used by the First Nation. 
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Aboriginal people who lived in the area were relocated to residential reserves outside of 
the Quetico boundary (OMNR, 2007). 
Aboriginal and treaty rights include hunting, fishing, trapping and harvesting of 
other non-timber forest products such as berries, rice and, medicinal plants within the 
treaty areas in which they live. Treaties such as Treaty 3 also acknowledge that the 
designated reserve lands are for the use of the Aboriginal people from those 
communities (Daugherty, 1986). 
 
Figure 4. Map of Treaty #3 area. 
 
Source: Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat (2002). 
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Non-Aboriginal heritage in the area started with traders and explorers such as 
Jacques de Noyon, David Thompson and the voyageurs who utilised the two major 
water/trade routes that pass through the area (INAC, 2009; OMNR, 2006). The first 
route, used from 1731 to 1798, went from Grand Portage to Rainy Lake, now forming 
the international boundary. From 1798 to 1821 the Kaministiquia route, which later 
became the Dawson Route, went from Fort William up the Kaministiquia River to 
Rainy Lake. The Dawson Route was completed in 1870 by troops sent to arrest Louis 
Riel in Manitoba during the Red River Rebellion, and then abandoned after 1885 when 
the Canadian Pacific Railway provided a direct route from eastern Canada to the 
prairies. Passage to the park and through the area did not become easy until 1956 with 
the development of Highway 11 (Litteljohn, 1965a; Quetico Provincial Park Advisory 
Committee, 1972). 
The three major non-Aboriginal communities in the area, Fort Frances, Kenora 
and Atikokan, were founded in the 1800s (1817, 1836 and 1899 respectively). The 
region was settled and developed to capitalize on the fur trade and the mining and 
forestry industries (100th Birthday Committee, 1999; Lund, 1976).  
Commercial Aspects of the Park 
When the Quetico Forest Reserve was originally designated, the area was closed 
to prospecting, hunting and trapping, and mining, but remained open to logging, with 
the later two industrial activities starting in the 1880s (KBM Forestry Consultants Inc., 
2005; Quetico Provincial Park Advisory Committee, 1972). At the beginning of World 
War II, as part of an emergency measure, prospecting and mining were again permitted 
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in the park from 1939 until the ban was reinstated in 1956 (Quetico Provincial Park 
Advisory Committee, 1972). There were no mines developed, and many of the claims 
staked in the permitted period were later purchased back by the government (Peruniak, 
2000). Commercial fishing licences were established in the 1920s but the practice was 
discontinued after 1970 (OMNR, 2007). 
A reinstatement of trapping occurred in 1949, at the request of the Federal 
Department of Indian and Northern Affairs to provide economic opportunities for the 
Lac La Croix First Nation (OMNR, 2007; Quetico Centre, 1987). Later in 1971, after a 
prolonged debate, logging was banned to appease conservationists (Thunder Bay 
Chamber of Commerce, 1971; Hakala, 1971). One of the results of the debate was the 
formation in 1970 of the Quetico Park Advisory Council (QPAC). The nine member 
Advisory Council was appointed by the Minister of Lands and Forests and charged to 
advise the provincial government about the public will, and provide an avenue for 
public participation regarding the debate surrounding logging within the park (OMNR 
Provincial Parks, 1983; Quetico Provincial Park Advisory Committee, n.d.). 
Today, the main form of commercial enterprise in Quetico is recreation and 
tourism. Since the early 1900s, there have been complaints that the majority of park 
users are non-residents of Ontario. The majority of non-resident visitors are U.S. 
citizens who enter the area from the Boundary Waters Canoe Area (BWCA) in 
Minnesota. The non-resident use of the park has varied from as high as 500 U.S. 
Citizens to each Canadian in 1954 to approximately 75% today (Schrag, 1954; OMNR, 
2007). The main concern about the high rate of non-resident use and access from the 
BWCA is that the majority of the economic gain realized from the park goes to U.S. 
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outfitters in Ely, Minnesota. Overall the number of park users is controlled by a quota 
system, though that does not limit entrance by residency as has been requested in the 
past by the Community of Atikokan and local tourism businesses (OMNR, 2007; 
OMNR Provincial Parks Council, 1983). 
Management Planning History 
Planning for parks involves two overlapping and sometimes competing goals of 
provision of access and protection of both natural and cultural heritage. The development 
and reviewing of management plans is an attempt to resolve the incompatibilities between 
the two goals while protecting park values and providing economic opportunities for local 
residents and businesses. Doing so often requires compromising one of the goals to 
achieve the other (McCool, 2009). 
In 1977, Quetico was the first provincial park in Ontario to develop a master 
plan. Prior to that, the 1954 Provincial Parks Act, the 1959 Wilderness Areas Act, and 
other provincial policies regulated all parks in Ontario. With the advent of the 
environmental ethic in the 1960s, protection of ecological values and public 
participation in resource management became highly contested issues. The conflict 
surrounding these issues was particularly significant in Quetico between utilitarian and 
preservationist worldviews. At this time, there was also significant pressure for public 
involvement in planning and management of provincial parks, and consultation became 
a mandated part of park management planning in 1971 (Killan, 1997). As a result, the 
government of the day established the Quetico Park Advisory Committee. 
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The members of the committee were provincial leaders and included 
representatives from industry, environmentalists, local municipal officials, Members of 
Provincial Parliament, Lakehead University, and the Chief of Lac La Croix First Nation. 
The Advisory Committee held 23 public meetings in Quetico Park, Atikokan, Fort 
Frances, Lac La Croix First Nation, Thunder Bay, and Toronto in April 1971. It also 
received 263 written briefs and ~4500 letters. From this process there were 26 
recommendations based on input from the general public that were then used to develop 
the 1977 Quetico Park Master Plan (Quetico Provincial Park Advisory Committee, n.d.; 
Quetico Provincial Park Advisory Committee, 1972). 
After the creation of the original 1977 Master Plan, there were subsequent 
reviews to address specific issues and ensure relevancy in 1982 and 1989. Then in 1995, 
the Lac La Croix Agreement of Coexistence was signed and resulted in the Revised 
Park Policy in 1995. The purpose of the Agreement of Coexistence was to provide 
business and employment opportunities to Lac La Croix First Nation. 
The Agreement of Coexistence is a statement of political relationship that 
recognizes that Lac La Croix First Nation has an inherent right to self-government and 
that the relationship between Ontario and Lac La Croix First Nation must be based upon 
respect for that right. The agreement is an attempt to right the many injustices that 
occurred as a result of the creation of Quetico Park on Lac La Croix First Nation’s 
traditional lands. It states that Lac La Croix must be an active and full participant in 
future planning and development of the Quetico area, share in the resource management 
(i.e. fisheries and trapping), develop employment and economic benefits for the 
community, and that a portion on the western periphery is to be co-managed by Lac La 
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Croix and Park staff. As well, the community is to have access by air and powerboat for 
economic, cultural, and spiritual purposes (Spielmann and Unger, 2000). 
Stages of the Management Planning Process 
Currently Ontario Parks has two management plan reviewing processes; both 
will be discussed below. The first was developed under the auspices of the 1954 Ontario 
Parks Act, with policies and procedures being developed and used until the creation of 
the current process developed in 2009 based on the 2006 Provincial Parks and 
Conservation Reserves Act. The greatest difference between the two processes related to 
this study is that public participation is required for the review process under the 2006 
PPCRA, but not for the 1954 Ontario Parks Act. As well, there are differences in how 
the two processes occur as will be seen below. The current Quetico Park management 
plan review process uses the 1992 Blue Book management plan review process because 
planning began prior to the development of the new 2009 Ontario Protected Areas 
Planning Manual. 
Quetico Park has undergone three management plan reviews since the 
implementation of the 1977 Quetico Park Master Plan and a fourth is currently 
underway. There are three guiding tools utilized to complete these reviews. They are the 
Ontario Provincial Parks Act, 1954, the Ontario Provincial Parks Policy Statement, and 
the Ontario Provincial Parks Planning and Management Policies (OMNR 1992). The 
Master Plan was developed in 1977, under the auspices of the 1954 Ontario Provincial 
Parks Act. This legislation was enacted with the purpose of guiding the management 
and development of the park system, and remained largely unchanged until the passing 
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of the 2006 PPCRA. The development of the second tool, the Ontario Provincial Parks 
Policy Statement, was guided by nine principles: 1) permanence, 2) distinctiveness, 3) 
representation, 4) variety, 5) accessibility, 6) co-ordination, 7) system, 8) classification, 
and 9) zoning. The policy statement also identified the provincial park system’s four 
objectives of protection, heritage appreciation, recreation, and tourism and the goal of 
protecting the provincial parks system’s natural, cultural and recreational environments 
while providing outdoor recreation opportunities (OMNR, 1992). The third tool used by 
park planning teams was the Ontario Provincial Parks Planning and Management 
Policies, also known as the Blue Book because of its blue vinyl cover. The document 
contained a combination of program targets, management policies, systems rationale, 
and park philosophy in sections associated with each park classification. These were 
accomplished through six park classes, four objectives, internal zoning, and natural 
heritage features protection targets. In 2009, the Protected Areas Planning Manual 
replaced the Blue Book to meet the planning requirements of the 2006 PPCRA. 
Unlike the older planning process, the new 2009 planning manual also 
incorporates the assessment requirements and consultation procedures that Ontario 
Parks must follow as outlined in the 2005 Class Environmental Assessment for 
Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves (Class EA). The Class EA covers such 
topics as general operations, managing natural resources, construction of facilities, 
matters pertaining to park and conservation reserve boundaries, and acquisition of land 
for new or existing protected areas (OMNR, 2005). 
The new 2009 process also provides more options for planning teams than the 
former process; however, there is a potential for fewer opportunities for public 
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engagement using the 2009 process if a planning process is deemed to need only a 
Management Statement (see Appendix 1). The current Quetico Park management plan 
review is being conducted under the auspices of the older Blue Book planning regime 
that has five stages: Terms of Reference, Background Information Report, Management 
Options, and Preliminary Management Plan, Final Management Plan. 
The Terms of Reference stage outlines the roles and responsibilities of the 
people involved, the tasks to be accomplished, and a tentative schedule for completion. 
For the QMPR, the Terms of Reference identified the seven members of the planning 
team, two of which are not MNR staff. As well, because it is a high profile park, the 
QMPR required an advisory committee of ten individuals. They represent Lac La Croix 
First Nation and a variety of stakeholders including Atikokan, ENGOs, Lakehead 
University, the forestry and mining industries, and the Resource Management Advisory 
Committee—a local committee that advises OMNR during forest management planning. 
The second stage, the Background Information Report, provides information 
regarding recreational activities, demographic data on park users and a market analysis 
to be used by the reader to provide informed input to the planning team. As well, it also 
provides issues identified by the planning team that they feel need to be addressed. The 
planning team for the current QMPR identified 39 management issues that they thought 
should be considered. Topics covered included policy and development, ecology, 
culture, recreation, and visitor regulation. 
The third stage of the process, the Management Options Document, outlines and 
presents the management options available for each issue. In the Quetico Management 
Options document, there are nine management topics with an average of three to four 
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options identified. As well, another seven management topics were identified that 
require further discussion. Furthermore, the planning team has indicated that if an issue 
has been missed, then this is the stage at which it should be brought forth. All of the 
issues and their options listed were identified by the planning team and through input 
from the public, stakeholders, and other interests at the Background Information stage. 
The fourth stage of the process is the Preliminary Management Plan. The 
document presents the policies that will be developed based on the selected options for 
the issues identified in the previous stages. The Preliminary Management Plan stage has 
not been completed at the time of writing. However, unless a glaring omission or error is 
identified through the public participation phase of this stage, the policies proposed will 
form the fifth stage, the Final Management Plan. 
The Final Management Plan is the guiding document used by the park 
superintendent and senior bureaucratic staff to inform all decisions about the park. 
While each park management plan is unique, the issues discussed can include: relevant 
legislation, vision, and objectives, values and pressures, zoning, permitted uses, resource 
management activities (i.e. fire, vegetation, wildlife, and fisheries management), 
operational and development activities, implementation priorities, and monitoring 
activities (OMNR, 2009c). 
There are opportunities for stakeholders to participate after each of the first four 
stages (see Appendix 6). At each of these four stages, any stakeholder who wants to 
participate has 45 days to respond, after which all comments are collated and sorted by 
the planning team. The information gathered from these comments is then used to 
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identify the degree of support or opposition for any issues or options presented, and 
determine if there were any topics missed that need to be included. 
Under the new 2009 process, the number of opportunities for public participation 
available is dependent on the complexity of the planning process. The new process has a 
minimum of one opportunity for public participation for non-complex reviews and up to 
three for very complex processes (see Appendix 5). For either of these management plan 
review processes, planning staff are required to inform the public when a management 
plan process has begun and when and how they are able to participate. 
Under the 2009 process, communication about a management plan review is 
handled through a variety of methods. First is the mandatory contact list, which includes 
all the ENGOs and NGOs with provincial interests, local municipalities and citizens, 
other government ministries, and affected First Nations. Those on this list receive all 
planning documents and public notices associated with the planning process. Second is 
the use of media such as newspaper ads, postings in key community locations, mailouts 
to those not served by local papers, local, regional, and provincial press releases, and, in 
the case of Quetico, the park tabloid. Third are electronic forms of communication such 
as the Ontario Parks website and the mandatory posting on the EBR Registry mandated 
under the Environmental Bill of Rights, 1993. Fourth is the use of open houses in area 
communities during the Management Options and the Preliminary Management Plan 
stages. It is hoped that by using these methods of information distribution a broader 
audience will be reached. 
The 2009 Management Planning Manual process has many similarities to the 
older Blue Book process. However, there are also some significant changes. Under the 
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2009 process, it is possible for a planning team to consolidate a number of protected 
areas under one Management Plan. The reason for this is to reduce the number of 
Management Plans required and to allow Ontario Parks to meet its Management Plan 
responsibilities. The stages under this process differ from the former in a number of 
ways. First, the former planning process had only one management direction in the Final 
Management Plan; however, there are now two forms of management direction. Under 
the 2009 planning process there is now also an option for either a Final Management 
Plan or a Management Statement. Management Plans are used for complex protected 
areas, while a Management Statement is used for areas of limited complexity. The type 
of management direction is based on the complexity of the park, public profile of the 
park, classification, resource management values, proposed issues, and infrastructure 
development. 
The second difference is the number of opportunities for public input. A process 
that results in a management statement requires only one public input opportunity, while 
those resulting in a management plan will require either two or three depending on the 
complexity (See Appendix 5). 
Third is that the new process has a values and pressure analysis at the 
background information stage. This analysis helps to determine the complexity of the 
process and needs for zoning, identifies specific objectives and any necessary 
management actions that are required, and is used during the monitoring and assessment 
phase. The latter is also a fourth difference between the two processes, as the former 
process did not include a monitoring and assessment stage. 
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The final major difference between the two processes is that the new process 
utilizes an adaptive management approach. Adaptive management according to Ontario 
Parks (2009c) is the constant improvement of management policies and practices by 
studying the results of their implementation. 
The Current Quetico Park Management Plan Review 
The intent of the current management plan review is to incorporate the many sub 
plans developed since the previous management plan review. As well, the review is 
going to consider matters of zoning, natural resources management (fire, wildlife, 
vegetation, and fisheries), cultural resources management (First Nation values and 
historic sites), operations (e.g. Atikokan–Quetico tourism recommendations, outfitting 
issues, and research), and development for Atikokan and Lac La Croix First Nation (e.g. 
roads, recreational activities, and economic development) (OMNR, 2006). 
The current QMPR is being conducted under the policies of the former planning 
regime known as the Blue Book, and began on July 4, 2006 when the Terms of 
Reference was released to the public. The timeline for the process indicated that the 
Background Information and Management Options stage would begin in the fall of 2006 
and end in the spring of 2007. The Preliminary Management Plan was to be completed 
by the fall of 2007, and the Final Management Plan approved in the summer of (OMNR, 
2006). In reality, the Background Information and Management Options stages ended in 
the fall of 2010 and at the time of writing (August, 2012), the Preliminary Management 
Plan has yet to be approved. The most common response to a question about what 
informants would change about the process was to shorten the time that it takes to 
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conduct the planning process. The reason for this was the development of the new 2009 
Ontario Protected Areas Planning Manual. According to Ontario Parks’ staff, the 
development and vetting of the document consumed a great deal of planning staff 
resources. After the Background Information stage was completed in August of 2010, 
the Management Options document was released. The opportunity for comments at this 
stage closed October 15, 2010. As of August 2012, the process has not yet advanced to 
the Preliminary Management Plan stage. 
ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEWS USING ACTORS, POWERS, AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
This section analyzes the results of interviews conducted with twelve key 
informants, using the Agrawal and Ribot (1999) framework that focuses on actors, their 
powers, and their degree of accountability. It was found that there are two types of 
actors—high power and low power. High power actors each utilize some of Agrawal 
and Ribot’s four powers (discussed later), while low power actors do not utilize any of 
those powers. High power actors are also the only actors that are accountable for park 
planning and management decisions. 
Description of Informants 
In total 13 individuals were interviewed; however, the first informant had not 
participated in a planning or management decision processes, so that interview was not 
transcribed or analyzed. Three of the interviews were conducted as recorded telephone 
conversations, two of which were with the ENGO respondents living in southern 
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Ontario. The other phone interview was with a person who was interviewed from the 
general public perspective, and they live in southern Ontario as well. The remaining 
nine interviews were conducted face-to-face with respondents in a variety of settings 
ranging from restaurants, to offices, meeting rooms, and personal homes. Participants 
provided multiple perspectives (see Table 2). 
 
The informants ranged in age from mid-thirties to early seventies, and two were 
female. Seven of the informants were local to the region, and the five non-locals were 
from communities ranging from Thunder Bay to Ottawa. All informants were Ontario 
residents, and one had dual Canadian-U.S. citizenship. Nine informants, four of which 
were local people, expressed environmental/wilderness protectionist views, and of the 
local informants who did not express those views, two advocated for a return of 
industrial logging in the park, and one for creating mainstream commercial tourism 
within the park. 
  
 
Table 2. Perspectives of informants during interviews. 
Informant
Environmental 
advocate
Industrial 
advocate
Business 
advocate
Local 
community NGO
Tourism 
outfitting
MNR 
Bureaucracy
General 
public Local Non-local Park user
Non-park 
user
1 X X X X X
2 X X X
3 X X X X X X X
4 X X X X X
5 X X X X
6 X X X X
7 X X X X X
8 X X X X
9 X X X
10 X X X X X
11 X X X X
12 X X X X
Informant perspective
 
Note. The perspective of an informant was not necessarily limited to the actor group they represented. While only an individual from a local community could 
provide that perspective, other viewpoints such as Environmental Advocate, Industrial Advocate, or Business advocate were not limited to membership.
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The majority of respondents were very willing to answer all questions, though 
some had concerns that their responses could cause difficulties for their organizational 
relationships with other actors. For this reason organizational names have been avoided 
where possible. Most respondents were very supportive of the project, though one felt 
that governance issues were far less important than those of climate change and the 
effect it will have on the ecological integrity of the park. The responses of this 
individual to other questions seemed to be somewhat guarded; however, their responses 
did support the majority of findings from other interviews. 
As stated earlier, the questionnaires were developed by using the information 
gathered during the document review and informant responses during previous 
interviews. The questions were structured around Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) 
framework to determine if there were any unidentified actors, the powers actors may 
have, and how decision-makers are held accountable. Earlier interviews asked questions 
regarding adjudication, but saturation on this subject was achieved early in the 
interviewing process. 
Each questionnaire was specifically targeted towards the informant’s group 
affiliation (see Appendix 7, Appendix 8, and Appendix 9). It should be noted that if 
there was more than one informant from a representative group, their questionnaires 
were not necessarily identical, because either saturation occurred on a topic or new 
avenues of enquiry were discovered. 
All of the questionnaires began with inquiries about the individual’s historical 
and personal connections with the park. For example, they would be asked if they had 
grown up in the area, if they lived locally, or how long they had been visiting the region 
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if they were not local residents. The purpose of these questions was to develop a rapport 
with the informant, allow them to become comfortable with the process, and forget that 
they were being recorded.  Informants were also asked about their use of the park, and 
any thoughts they had about how the park was managed during their first Quetico 
experiences. The questions then shifted towards their involvement in planning or 
management decision-making processes, whether they felt the process was positive or 
negative, and how they participated (i.e. written submission, attend meeting, donate 
money to ENGO, etc.). The questions then targeted who the power holders were, and 
who the informant felt was the ultimate authority on decisions. All the questionnaires 
ended with two questions about the ecological state of the park and if the existence of 
the park had affected how that individual recreates on or uses the land. 
ACTOR GROUPS 
This section describes the actors involved in the current QMPR. In all, there are 
ten actor groups involved in management planning and decision-making in Quetico 
Park. They are Lac La Croix First Nation, Tourism Industry, Provincially Elected 
Officials, Industry, MNR Bureaucracy, General Public, Environmental Non-
governmental Organizations, U.S. Citizens, Community of Atikokan, and Non-
governmental organizations. These actor groups were developed through information 
gathered during the document review stage, combined with information gathered during 
the informant interviews. All actors exert varying degrees of control over planning and 
management decisions. The nature of each actor’s influence on management decisions 
varies from the ability to enact laws to influencing decision-makers through public 
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participation methods such as letter writing and attending open houses. While Agrawal 
and Ribot (1999) determined that all actors are accountable to differing individuals, 
agencies and constituencies, two actors were found in the study that are not accountable 
to any of these. Lastly, the actors discussed below have a variety of organizational 
structures ranging from none (i.e. the group General Public) to formal and highly 
structured (i.e. the group MNR Bureaucracy).  
Lac La Croix First Nation 
Lac La Croix is the small First Nation community located at the southwest 
corner of Quetico Provincial Park. Lac La Croix is located on the Indian Reserve # 127 
Neguaguon Indian Reserve, which abuts the southwest boundary of Quetico Provincial 
Park and has a population of 402, with 278 living on reserve and 113 off reserve (INAC, 
2009).  
Lac La Croix First Nation has a long history with the park including a spiritual 
connection to the land, as well as hunting, trapping, and gathering in the area. The 
creation of the Forest and Game Reserve in 1909 was the first significant impact on their 
way of life because community members were prohibited from hunting or trapping 
within the boundaries of the reserve. These regulations were contrary to Treaty #3 that 
made the commitment to allow the First Nation signatories to continue hunting and 
fishing on their traditional lands. Another impact was the forced removal in 1910 of 
some members from a reserve on Kawa Bay on Lake Kawnipi. In 1949, in an effort to 
alleviate poverty in the community the Government of Canada negotiated with the 
Ontario Government to allow community members to trap within the park boundary.  
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In 1977, the creation of the Quetico Park Master Plan resulted in the phasing out 
of motorized access. In 1995, Lac La Croix First Nation and the Government of Ontario 
signed the Agreement of Coexistence, a 15-year accord to improve the First Nation’s 
economic conditions and facilitate the community’s social and cultural ties to the area 
within the park. The agreement also allows community members to provide motorized 
guiding to anglers within the park and other employment opportunities in the park. 
Through the agreement, the community also provides some management of the fishery 
in the area designated for their motorized access, and road access was provided to the 
community in the late 1990s, previously accessible by only boat or plane. While the 
agreement has exceeded its timeline, it has been rolled over and Lac La Croix is still 
able to exercise any benefits that it provides. While the Agreement of Coexistence has 
technically expired, informants stated that it continues to be in effect as if it was still 
current. 
The community has participated in previous management plan reviews, but is 
not actively participating in the current management planning review process. Even 
without participating in the process, the community can have a significant impact on 
decisions made about the park due to treaty rights. One implication of Lac La Croix 
First Nation not participating in the planning process is that after the current planning 
process is completed, the community could reject the management plan forcing the 
process to begin all over again.  
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Provincially Elected Officials 
This group of actors includes the Ontario MPP for the Thunder Bay–Atikokan 
riding, the Minister of Natural Resources, and the Premier of Ontario. During the time 
of the current QMPR, there have been four Ministers of Natural Resources.  
The Minister of Natural Resources can have a significant impact on the influence 
of the bureaucratic staff, because the Minister decides how centralized decision-making 
will be. Some ministers have let senior bureaucrats approve policy changes such as 
management plans, while others insist that any decisions that have any potential for 
controversy be approved by the minister. 
The other members of this group also have some influence on decision-making 
as often stakeholders will approach them when the stakeholder is unhappy with a 
decision that park management has made. As all the members of this actor group are 
elected, they are often more sensitive to the will of stakeholders than they are to the 
policies and science that bureaucrats use to make decisions. 
MNR Bureaucracy 
The bureaucratic staff of the MNR discussed by informants ranged from the park 
superintendent through to the Director of Ontario Parks. The superintendent oversees 
daily operations of the park and is the chief writer of the management plan, while the 
Director of Parks is responsible for the administration, planning, management, and 
operation of all parks in Ontario. 
The park superintendent lives in Atikokan and manages the park from an office 
in that community. The superintendent’s supervisor is the Zone Manager, located in 
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Thunder Bay at the regional office, which is also where the park planner for this 
management plan review is located. The park planner assists the Superintendent to 
develop the plan. All other superiors are located at the OMNR head office in 
Peterborough, which is located approximately 1400 km from Thunder Bay in southern 
Ontario. All potentially controversial decisions are sent to staff in Peterborough for 
either confirmation of the action suggested by the Superintendent, or for further 
direction that is accompanied by any relevant information.  
If the Superintendent makes a decision that a stakeholder does not agree with, 
the stakeholder would start by contacting the Superintendent, and if they were not 
satisfied with the response, they work their way up through the chain of command until 
they contacted the Director. If they still were not satisfied they would then contact the 
Minister and their MPP. The reason for this latter tactic is that bureaucratic staff are 
subordinate to the Minister, and can have pressure applied to them from other MPPs. 
There were two active members and one retired member of this group 
interviewed for this project. The non-active member was very forthcoming about their 
planning and management experiences. The two active members were not as 
forthcoming, though one was more so than the other. The individual who was not as 
forthcoming was far more guarded in their responses to the extent that it seemed that 
there was a small piece missing from many of their answers. The other active member 
was actually interviewed twice, as they felt that the project had been misrepresented. 
After reviewing the thesis proposal they agreed to be re-interviewed. All of the 
questions in the second interview were derived from the first, and they provided the 
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same responses, with possibly more detail for some of the questions about the structure 
of the two planning processes. 
ENGOs 
The ENGO actor group consists of two ENGOs. One is a large national 
organization that has multiple chapters across the country, two of which are in Ontario. 
Support for its mandate comes from the public, private foundations, and corporations. 
The chapter of this organization that participates in the QMPRs has a paid staff, and 
positions on issues are based on the organization’s mission and vision statements. Both 
of these statements advocate the protection of ecological integrity, with local 
community and First Nations issues falling a distant second to these ecological integrity 
mandates. 
 The other ENGO interviewed is quite small, but each member, all of whom 
have significant political and bureaucratic connections, is invited to participate by other 
members. Where the former ENGO participates in a majority of management plan 
reviews in the province, this second group participates in a very limited number. 
Positions on issues are determined through consensus, and the group works to assist 
both the local communities and First Nations to realize greater economic and social 
benefits from the park. While the organization does not have a definitive mission 
statement, they do advocate for the protection of wilderness, though occasionally they 
support programs that may negatively impact the wilderness if it means greater benefit 
to the protected area in question. This latter group is directly involved in the 
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development of policy including the management plan review while the other 
participates through the public participation process. 
Two other ENGOs were mentioned during interviews; however, according to the 
informants, neither of the organizations is significantly involved in the current 
management plan review. According to an informant and former board member of one 
of the organizations, the group does not participate itself, but does request members to 
become involved. According to a staff person at the other ENGO mentioned, although 
they are often involved in provincial park management plan reviews, their organization 
has not been participating in the current QMPR because of a lack of capacity.  
There were two individuals from this actor group interviewed, both of whom live 
in southern Ontario. One of these individuals was concerned that their responses to 
some questions would have negative repercussions for the organization they represent 
and other actors. For this reason the ENGO organizations are not being named. 
However, the answers to the questions that they were most concerned about were 
similar if not identical to other informants. In spite of these concerns both informants 
were very forthcoming in their responses. The difference in their attitudes towards the 
planning and decision-making processes and local communities realizing economic 
benefits from the park were quite different. One group is quite supportive of Atikokan, 
and especially Lac La Croix First Nation, realizing economic benefits from utilizing the 
park, while the other feels that the park should be protected at all costs, with the 
exception of allowing canoeists to utilize the park. Where one group has a positive 
relationship with local, regional, and provincial Ontario Park’s staff, the other seems to 
have the opposite with every interaction being a conflict. Much of this conflict seemed 
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to be based on the legislation and policy that guide and constrain all decisions, but the 
conflict seems to be directed towards the decision-makers. 
Community of Atikokan 
The actor group Community of Atikokan is located 50km from the park with a 
population of 3,293 (OMNR, 2006; Statistics Canada, 2006). The group consists of local 
leaders of organizations such as the Town Council, Chamber of Commerce, and 
Economic Development Corporation (EDC). All have a similar goal of increasing 
Atikokan’s economic benefit from Quetico Park. The most effective member of this 
group would be the Town Council as they have the most capacity (something the 
Chamber of Commerce is lacking) and a reasonable relationship with the park 
superintendent (something the EDC seems to lack). 
Another group in the community of Atikokan actor group is The Atikokan 
Committee. It is an extension of the Atikokan Town Council used to develop and 
implement plans for realizing an economic benefit from the park. The major focus of 
this group seems to be exploiting the tourism potential, and its subsequent economic 
impact, of the corridor between Quetico Park and Highway 11 that parallels the northern 
border of the park. The Committee does not participate directly in the management plan 
review, but they do negotiate with the park superintendent and other members of the 
actor group MNR Bureaucracy to develop greater economic links between the town and 
Quetico Park. 
The community has a varied relationship with the park. One informant stated 
that when the economy is strong and employment is high, then the community tends to 
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ignore the park. However, when the economy suffers a downturn and unemployment is 
high, then the town looks to the area of the park as a source of economic return either 
through tourism or resource extraction. While there is some debate about whether 
residents would be in favour of opening the park up to logging or mining again, it seems 
that those who do favour such action are of an older generation, while the younger 
people are not interested. The reason for this demographic difference may be that since 
1964 all local high school students have had an opportunity to experience the park 
through a multi-day canoe trip in the park. 
Some local residents still have negative feelings towards the park. Some 
members of the community are still upset about the loss of motorized access that 
occurred in the 1970s. Others are upset by the lack of positive economic impact that that 
the town realizes from the park. The reasoning behind these feelings are based on the 
majority of park users being Americans who enter from the south end of the park 
resulting in Atikokan not being able to realise any economic gain from these visitors. 
One older local respondent stated that some residents feel that the Canada / U.S. border 
begins at the northern boundary of the park, rather than at its southern edge. 
Two individuals from this actor group were interviewed. One is a member of the 
town council and the other is with an organization involved in economic development. 
The individual from the town council was far more positive about the park, and what it 
could mean for the community, but was somewhat sceptical about how much economic 
impact the park could have or how soon it would occur. The other individual was quite 
negative about how the community was affected by the proximity to the park and park 
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management, as they felt the park policies and legislation were very restrictive and 
limited the community’s ability to obtain economic gain from the park. 
Tourism Industry 
The Tourism Industry actor group has two types of members. The first and most 
significant participants are the outfitters that use Quetico Park, while the second and less 
influential are the other tourism businesses. The outfitters, both Canadian and U.S., have 
an annual meeting in April hosted by park management to discuss issues such as access, 
entry fees, and maintenance. Park management has requested that local outfitters revive 
the defunct Canadian Outfitters Association, but the suggestion has not been followed 
up. 
According to an informant, seven local outfitters utilize Quetico for economic 
benefit, providing services such as trip logistics, canoe rental, guiding, air services, and 
provision of food packages. Not all of these outfitters live locally, though a local family 
owns and operates the largest outfitting company, Canoe Canada, in Atikokan. There are 
15–20 American outfitters similar to Canoe Canada, with another 25–30 providing other 
services such as towing and youth camp trips. The Canadian outfitters are seasonal 
operations and supply services only during the canoeing season. Some American 
outfitters utilize the park year-round as they provide both canoeing and dog sledding 
outfitting services.  
Tourism outfitters can have significant influence on decisions because they use 
the park more than any other stakeholder. Their use of the park provides the park with 
economic benefits through the purchase of park trip permits that all park users must 
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purchase. As well, the largest local outfitter has political connections with either those 
who have significant decision-making power, or who can influence decision-makers. As 
the majority of park visitors are Americans, many of whom use American outfitters, it 
was felt by some informants that American outfitters may also have a considerable 
amount of influence on park planning and management decisions. 
There were two individuals interviewed from this group, both of whom are 
Canadian outfitters. The first tourism informant has a very large and successful family 
business, is very active in Ontario Parks, and as a result of that and family connections 
has a great deal of influence with higher power actors. The second tourism industry 
informant had been unaware until just before the interview was conducted in late 2009 
that the management plan review was occurring, even though the process began in 2006 
and outfitters are on a must-contact list. Both of these individuals were open and willing 
to answer all the questions presented to them, and were quite environmentally and 
socially aware. Their responses were similar, though not exactly so, but the first 
informant was far more savvy to the planning and decision-making processes and how 
to navigate them. The first informant grew up in the region and his family has had 
commercial interests in the park for many years. The second informant is not local; they 
purchased their business from a family friend and they have a primary residence in 
Thunder Bay so are only in the area during the outfitting season. 
Industry 
The Industry actor group consists of representatives from the mining and forestry 
sectors. Both have seats on the Advisory Committee, but they do not participate. The 
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reason for this is that they are not allowed to exploit resources within the borders of the 
park, and the park management decisions do no affect industrial operations outside of 
the park boundary. However, the forestry companies are sensitive to the effect that their 
operations have on visitors inside the park, and they will often time operations to have a 
minimal impact on visitor experiences. 
The members of this actor group provide employment to local communities, and 
when park policies, such as the banning of logging within park boundaries in 1977, 
negatively affect industry members of the Community of Atikokan and other local actor 
groups, they often respond negatively towards the park. The park administration has 
attempted to work with industry through scientific studies by providing baseline forest 
information to researchers, but industry has not accepted these overtures. 
While there are no informants from this actor group, a member of the forestry 
industry did respond to an email and stated that they do not participate in the 
management plan review because the decisions made do not affect their operations, but 
they do arrange with the park administrator to take precautions to avoid affecting park 
users. There was no response from any members of the mining sector who were 
contacted. 
General Public 
The general public consists of all those individuals that participate on their own 
rather than through other actor groups. The main demographic in this group would be 
park users who have a strong emotional attachment to the park. They may also be 
members of one of the other actor groups, but choose to participate individually in 
CHAPTER 4                     102 
 
addition to participating through the actor group. For example, an individual may be a 
supporter of an ENGO, but also provides individual input during management plan 
reviews through the EBR website. This group was the most difficult to identify and 
contact, as there are no organizations that could be contacted to request an interview. 
Others that are part of this actor group, but were not interviewed, are those 
individuals who make submissions, but do not have computer access. This latter group 
was mentioned by two of the informants in regards to concerns that they may be 
experiencing participation barriers that others are not. 
Other members of the general public include residents of Atikokan and other 
local communities that participate individually rather than through local organizations 
such as town councils and economic development organizations. As stated by 
informants, Atikokan residents are not homogenous in their attitudes towards the park 
and the effects that it has on the community. Informants also stated that while there may 
be many local individuals who would prefer to harvest all of the resources within the 
park, there are also many who would prefer to protect the area for future local and non-
local generations. 
There were two individuals interviewed from this actor group. Both were born 
non-locally, but one has been in the region since 1987 and the other lives in southern 
Ontario. The non-local informant was contacted through a posting on an internet chat 
forum. Both are or have been members of ENGOs, have had long relationships with the 
park as park visitors, and have participated in previous park planning exercises. Neither 
were pleased with Lac La Croix’s use of motors in the park, but understood and 
supported the community retaining that right. Both are environmental advocates, but 
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also support local communities being able to realize an economic benefit from the park, 
as long as the environmental impacts are minimal. Of the two, the local informant was 
the one who was least supportive of local commercial use of the park. 
It should be noted that with the study sample size of 12 there were only two 
individuals interviewed from this actor group. As this is not a homogeneous group all 
results from the General Public perspective must not be viewed as being representative 
of the entire general public. As well, while Thunder Bay is the nearest large population 
centre, it no longer has any direct affect on the decision-making for Quetico. 
Historically, when forestry occurred within the park boundaries Thunder Bay attempted 
to influence decisions. For example, the Thunder Bay Chamber of Commerce gave a 
written submission to the Quetico Advisory Committee during the debates concerning 
banning logging in the park. However, after the logging ban in 1977 Thunder Bay no 
longer had an interest in the management decisions of the park. 
U.S. citizens 
The actor group U.S. citizens was discussed with all informants in regards to the 
influence that they have on decision-making and management planning, though no 
members of this actor group were interviewed. The group is included because 80–90% 
of park users are U.S. citizens, and there are strong feelings about the amount of 
influence that this group has. Their influence comes in the forms of written submissions, 
and support to Canadian NGOs and ENGOs through both individual and private 
foundation donations. There were also informants who stated that some U.S.-based 
ENGOs such as the Heart of the Continent Partnership, an organization that seeks to 
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improve or maintain the economic and ecological health of the Ontario/Minnesota 
border region, can also have a great deal of influence over park planning and 
management. 
It was found that this actor group does have significant influence on day-to-day 
management decisions (i.e. toilet cleanliness, portage conditions, etc.). However, U.S. 
citizens have far less direct influence on management planning. There is potential for 
there to be some influence as one MNR Bureaucracy member stated that if a good idea 
was presented to them they would consider it no matter what the source was. Also, there 
is potential that this group could have influence through the Tourism Industry group as 
this group will want to keep the U.S. park users happy, because they represent the 
majority of tourism business in the park.  
NGOs 
There was one individual interviewed from this actor group, which includes two 
NGOs. The first is the locally-based hunting and angling advocacy group. It has 
approximately 80 to 90 members, the majority of which are local residents. The group 
runs a walleye fish hatchery used to stock local lakes, and is working on a project to 
raise sturgeon fry. 
The second group is a provincial hunting and angling advocacy group. This 
NGO has over 100,000 members, and advocates for angler and hunter rights and 
traditions. The organization also has interests in invasive species, fisheries habitat and 
wildlife restoration, and anti-poaching. 
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Both of these closely aligned NGOs have advocated for access to hunting within 
Quetico Park. The local club is a supporter of changing the rules governing motorized 
access within the park. They and other local actor groups have proposed allowing small 
gas motors or electric motor access to the fringe lakes of Quetico Park. 
The individual from this actor group is a long-time local resident who supports 
reopening the park to logging and motorized access. As well, they would like to have 
the park opened up for guided hunting as well. Their organization does not have a 
positive relationship with local park management as they blame the superintendent for 
their lack of success in achieving goals such as hunting and motorized access in the 
park. Coupled with this is a severe lack of knowledge about existing legislation or 
policy, and their affect on the decision-making process. Often responses from this 
individual were contradictory. For example, they want to reopen the park to logging, but 
also to protect the area for all to enjoy in perpetuity. 
POWERS 
Below is a discussion of the powers used by actors. The study found that three of 
the actors are able to use three of the four broad powers identified by Agrawal and Ribot 
(1999): 1) the power to create or modify rules, 2) the power to make decisions about the 
use of resources, and 3) the power to implement and enforce compliance of the new or 
altered rules. The fourth power, adjudication, is not directly wielded by any actors 
because of legislative limitations, but can be influenced by those three actors. However, 
the remaining seven actors are able to influence decision-making through two additional 
new powers identified in the study. These powers have been termed Participation and 
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Relationships. As the actors who have the four powers make the planning and 
management decisions, they have been labelled as high power actors, while the 
remaining actors that use the Participation and Relationship powers are called low 
power actors. Low power actors do not have direct control over decisions, but are able 
to influence the high power actors through the Participation and Relationships powers. 
The following section is broken into five main segments. The first segment 
discusses why the four powers are restricted to the three high power actors. As well, 
there is a table that shows the powers that each actor has. The second segment discusses 
the three high power actors and how they use their powers. The third and fourth 
segments discuss the Participation and Relationship powers respectively, and the final 
segment describes how the two new powers interact by bridging through communication 
between actors. 
Why the four powers are restricted to three actors 
The process under which the QMPR is occurring is a largely centralized process. 
The basis for this statement is that decision-making powers are designated to the actor 
groups MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials by both legislation and 
policy. The 1990 Provincial Parks Act and the 2006 Provincial Parks and Conservation 
Reserves Act both state that provincial parks are under the control of the Minister of 
Natural Resources who is able to designate a superintendent to have charge of each park 
(R.S.O. 1990, c. P.34, s. 7(1); 2006, c. 12, s. 12(1)). Under the 2006 PPCRA, there must 
be a minimum of one public participation opportunity. Prior to 2006, the requirements 
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for public participation were based on guidelines stipulated in policy statements and not 
legislation, with a requirement of four opportunities for public participation. 
Also within the 1990 and 2006 legislation, the Minister has control and 
responsibility for preparing management directions, because the Minister is  responsible, 
through the division of powers for provincial governments, under The Constitution Act 
s. 92A (1867), for the management and conservation of forestry resources. As well, the 
more controversial or significant a decision is, the higher up in the MNR Bureaucracy a 
decision will be made, with the most important being decided by the Minister or cabinet 
of the government of the day. All of this indicates that power is centralized with the 
main instrument of power being legislation backed by regulations and guidelines. 
Through the legislation described above, Treaty Rights, legal agreements, and 
Supreme Court of Canada land claim rulings, there are three actors that have the four 
broad powers identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999). These three actors are 
Provincially Elected Officials, MNR Bureaucracy, and Lac La Croix First Nation. The 
Provincially Elected Officials and MNR Bureaucracy actors obtained their four powers 
through The Constitution Act s. 92A (1867), 1990 Provincial Parks Act, and the 2006 
PPCRA. Lac La Croix has the four broad powers due to Treaty Rights, legal 
agreements, and Supreme Court of Canada land claim rulings. The remaining eight 
actors do not have any of the four powers, with the result that there are two power levels 
of actors—high and low. The high power actors are Provincially Elected Officials, 
MNR Bureaucracy, and Lac La Croix First Nation, while the eight remaining actors are 
low power level actors (see Table 3).  
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Table 3. Actors and the powers they use to make or influence management planning decision-
making. 
Actors
Create or 
modify 
rules
Make 
decision 
about 
resources
Implement 
and enforce 
compliance 
of rules Adjudication Participation Relationships
Provincially 
Elected 
Officials X X X X
MNR 
Bureaucracy X X X
Lac La Croix X X X X X
ENGOs X X
Community 
of Atikokan X X
Industry
Tourism 
Industry X X
General 
Public X X
U.S. Citizens X X
NGOs X X
Powers
High Power Actor Powers Low Power Actor Powers
 
Note: The actor industry does not have any powers indicated, because it does not have any of the four 
powers, nor does it utilize the Participation power in planning decisions through its position on the 
Advisory Committee. The reason for this is that park planning and management decisions do not affect 
the operations of Industry outside of the park. 
 
The following sections will discuss the powers used by each high level actor, 
describe the Participation and Relationship powers and how they are used by low power 
level actors to influence decision-making. 
Use of the four powers identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999) 
The actors Lac La Croix First Nation, Provincially Elected Officials, and MNR 
Bureaucracy are all high power actors that each utilizes at least some of the four powers 
(see Table 3) identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999). These three actors and how they 
use the powers are discussed in the section below.  
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Lac La Croix First Nation 
Lac La Croix First Nation is one of the two most powerful actors because it is 
able to utilize the four powers identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999) as well as the 
Relationship power. Lac La Croix has the four powers through Treaty Rights, legal 
agreements including the Agreement of Coexistence and their seat on the planning team 
for the Management Planning Review, and Supreme Court land claim rulings (see 
Keewatin v. Minister of Natural Resources, 2011, Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada 
(Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005, and R. v. Sparrow, 1990). Access to these 
powers is a significant change from the influence the community was able to exert in 
1910 when it was forced from the Sturgeon Lake Reserve 24C (McNab, 1991). 
According to a former MNR Bureaucracy member during the Quetico Provincial Park 
Advisory Committee hearings in the early 1970s, Lac La Croix’s “…ability to exert 
their positions was a little bit limited.” A more recent statement by an MNR 
Bureaucracy member illustrates how much has changed: “I think that the power exists 
for First Nations to slow down or even stop a planning process so that it can 
accommodate their interests and their needs, but they have to make that happen.” Other 
respondents from the ENGOs, MNR Bureaucracy, General Public, and Community of 
Atikokan actor groups also agreed that the First Nation has a great deal of power to stop, 
slow, restart, or influence the process. However, there was a statement by one 
interviewee that, even though Lac La Croix First Nation has a great deal of direct power 
through Treaty rights, they can also be considered to be powerless, because their power 
is derived from the courts, and to wield that power Lac La Croix requires both human 
and monetary resources. 
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The OMNR State of Ontario’s Protected Areas Report (2011b) states that the 
Crown has a duty to consult an Aboriginal community if any decision or action affects 
established or asserted Aboriginal and treaty rights, and any planning is to consider the 
interests and rights of affected First Nation communities. However, the 2006 Provincial 
Park and Conservation Reserves Act does not address First Nation’s Aboriginal and 
Treaty Rights that are protected by s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and have been 
upheld in subsequent litigation (see Keewatin v. Minister of Natural Resources, 2011 
and R. v. Sparrow, 1990).  
It is through such legislation and litigation, plus the Agreement of Coexistence 
that Lac La Croix obtains its powers. The power that these afford Lac La Croix First 
Nation results in their ability to create or modify rules, and the power to make decisions 
about resources in the western periphery of the park. They also have some influence to 
implement and enforce compliance of new or altered rules. However, government and 
legislation, such as the Endangered Species Act (2007), can supersede that power. 
Through the Agreement of Coexistence, Lac La Croix also has some influence on the 
adjudication of disputes about rules, but it is limited to their Aboriginal and Treaty 
rights.  
Lac La Croix also has some influence through the power of relationships. For 
example, when the 1992 Agreement of Coexistence was being debated, they invited a 
member of the ENGOs actor group to conduct relationship building and gain the support 
of that group in their bid to conduct motorized guiding in the park.  
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Provincially Elected Officials 
Provincially Elected Officials are the other most powerful actor group. They 
have three of the four powers—the power to create or modify rules, the power to make 
decisions about the use of resources and the power to implement and enforce 
compliance of the new or altered rules—identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999), and 
can strongly influence the fourth,  the power to adjudicate disputes that occur during the 
creation and enforcement of compliance of new or altered rules. While the actor group 
MNR Bureaucracy creates or modifies the rules, policy, and legislation, the Minister 
gives final approval for any policies that are developed such as management plans and 
management plan reviews. However, if the Minister approves a policy or piece of 
legislation that is considered by large or influential groups, such as ENGOs, to be 
incompatible with the park objectives or planning and management principles, those 
groups may lobby the Premier, or use a publicity campaign to apply pubic pressure on 
these individuals that would cause the decision to be changed. An example of a publicity 
campaign that occurred in Quetico is the banning of logging and motor use in the park 
as a result of the environmental movement of the 1960s and 70s. Environmental groups 
such as the Wildlands League, through public protests and publicity campaigns that 
forced the Ontario Government to act, influenced the banning of logging in 1971 and 
development of the 1977 Master Plan that also phased out motorized access in the park. 
In addition to changing policies and legislation, the Provincially Elected 
Officials actor group can also overrule policies. These abilities can have a significant 
effect on decisions about the use of resources and the enforcement of compliance on 
new or altered rules. While Provincially Elected Officials do not adjudicate disputes 
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regarding new or altered rules, they can strongly influence the decision to enforce them. 
As well, the decisions of Provincially Elected Officials can be strongly influenced 
through the relationship and participation powers by the Industry, ENGO, and General 
Public actors through lobbying. While these groups can influence the Provincially 
Elected Officials, the decisions are made based on the information given to them by the 
MNR Bureaucracy, existing legislation, and the political landscape.  
MNR Bureaucracy 
The MNR Bureaucracy group is also quite influential, because it actually creates 
and modifies the rules that are put into policy and legislation, and provides the 
information that the Provincially Elected Officials use to make decisions. The MNR 
Bureaucracy group also has the power to make decisions about the use of resources in 
Quetico. However, through the Agreement of Coexistence, the MNR Bureacracy group 
shares that power with Lac La Croix First Nation for the western periphery of the park. 
As well, the MNR Bureaucracy implements and enforces all of the rules, including those 
that are new or altered. This group does not have the power to adjudicate disputes. 
However, for minor infractions they often prefer to use education to obtain compliance 
rather than sanctions. In addition, if a new or altered rule had unintended consequences, 
this group would be able to draft an amendment to the park management plan that would 
need to be approved by Provincially Elected Officials. 
Most respondents felt that the park superintendent was second in power only to 
the Minister, because the superintendent makes all of the day-to-day decisions, is the 
chief author of the management plan, and makes recommendations to the Director of 
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Parks about major decisions. While the superintendent does use tools such as the 
management plan, legislation, park policy, and input from superiors to make decisions, 
the reality is that those devices also limit the superintendent’s power. The members of 
the Politically Elected Officials actor group, legislation, and park policy all stipulate the 
rules that the superintendent must follow. While major policy decisions of superiors, 
such as the Director of Parks and their staff, are largely based on the information 
provided to them by the superintendent, they also face constraints based on the political 
landscape and political will of the Minister. 
THE PARTICIPATION AND RELATIONSHIP POWERS 
Below is a description of the two low power level actor powers Participation and 
Relationships. First, each power is explained, and then a full description of how the low 
power level actors use each power is provided. 
Participation power 
Participation is the act of an individual or group providing input or having 
influence on a decision-making process. While the MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially 
Elected Officials actors make final decisions, they do respond to public pressure. 
Participation can therefore provide a low power level actor a degree of influence on 
planning and management decisions. Actors are not guaranteed success by participating, 
but by providing suggestions to the planning team that do not contravene either the 
legislation or policy that decisions are based on, they are far more likely to be successful 
than those who do not participate. A diagram (see Figure 5) demonstrates the relations 
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between the themes of participation, power, policy, legislation, communication, 
knowledge, and decision-making. 
 
Figure 5. Participation and Power Diagram 
 
Figure 5. A = is associated with, C = is a cause of, P = is a part of 
*Note: the relations between the themes in Figure 5 were identified 
through the analysis of the informant interviews.  
 
From Figure 5, we can see that policy is derived from legislation. An example of 
this would be that under the 1990 Parks Act, public participation requirements came 
from policy rather than legislation. Also from Figure 5 we can see that legislation and 
policy cause decision-making, because all decisions must meet the requirements in 
policy and legislation. Decision-making is also a part of power because only the two 
higher power level actors have the power to enact any decisions made. The power to 
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make those decisions also derives from policy and legislation because the Minister has 
control of all provincial parks.  
Participation is the cause of actors having some degree of influence during the 
decision-making process. However, participation is associated only with decision-
making, because there is no guarantee that the decision will be made in a lower power 
level actor’s favour. Technically, all comments submitted are weighted equally, whether 
or not they come from an individual or a group. However, in reality the superintendent 
has stated that he will spend more time trying to understand what it is that a group wants 
than he does for individuals. For groups with disparate opinions, the superintendent also 
stated that he would give more weight to comments coming from an expert group than 
he would from one that is not. For example, when dealing with quotas and permits, he 
would put more weight on those comments coming from members of the actor Tourism 
Industry than he would on those coming from another actor. 
Participation is also associated with knowledge, because the act of participating 
does not assure that the participant has any knowledge about the process. However, 
those that do have knowledge about the process and the limitations that legislation and 
policy place on planning staff, have a much greater chance of affecting change. This 
latter aspect is why knowledge is also a part of power. 
Communication refers to any form of dialogue between participants. It is a part 
of participation, because to participate in a planning process actors must engage with 
one another and the public through a variety of methods including written submissions, 
face-to-face meetings, and openhouses. It is associated with power in Figure 5, because 
the MNR Bureaucracy actor group controls the information provided to the public, and 
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by communicating with members and the public at large other actors are able to 
influence decisions. Examples of the latter are the use of websites, mass emails to 
supporters, and advertising campaigns through public service announcements and other 
media. As will be seen later, communication and decision-making are both associated 
with the participation and relationships powers. Communication is a part of 
relationships, and the forms of communication used range from the personal, such as 
letters, face-to-face meetings, or phone calls, to the less personal planning documents, 
written submissions, or public service announcements. 
Participation mechanisms 
Lower power level actor groups use 13 identified participation techniques to 
influence decision-makers. These techniques are: 1) paying attention; 2) being 
proactive; 3) providing input; 4) being an advisor; 5) being on an advisory panel; 6) 
electronic participation; 7) writing a letter to the editor; 8) lobbying; 9) attending or 
requesting a meeting; 10) being on a mail/notification list; 11) attending an open house; 
12) participating through an ENGO; and 13) providing a written submission. No actor 
group or informant uses all 13 techniques, but all utilized at least one. For some actor 
groups one member of the group may use a technique, but that does not mean that other 
members of that group will.  
In Table 4 it can be seen which mechanisms of participation actors use. Please 
note that the actor NGO was not included as the group interviewed does not participate 
in any management or planning exercises. The Industry group also does not participate 
and was not included. As well, while these findings suggest that a group does not use a 
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mechanism, the data is limited to the responses of the informants. Others in the same 
actor group who were not interviewed or from actor groups that were not interviewed 
(i.e. Lac La Croix, General Public, and U.S. Citizens) may use mechanisms that the 
informants do not. The methods of participation for U.S. Citizens was obtained from 
interviews with members of the MNR Bureaucracy group. 
Table 4. Mechanisms of participation that actors use. 
  Actors 
Mechanisms of participation 
Lac La 
Croix 
Community 
of Atikokan ENGO Tourism 
General 
Public 
U.S. 
Citizens 
Pay attention   X  X  
Being proactive      X 
Provide input  X X X X X 
Be an advisor  X X X   
Be on an advisory panel X  X X   
Electronic participation   X  X  
Letter to the editor   X  X  
Lobbying  X X X   
Attend or request meeting  X X X X  
Be on mail/notification list X X X X X  
Attend an open house    X X X 
Participate through ENGO     X X 
Written submission  X X X X X 
Note: The actors Industry and NGO are not included because they are not participating in the current 
planning process. 
The form of participation titled “pay attention” is the act of a group or individual 
monitoring a variety of methods that planning staff utilize to inform the public about the 
management plan review process. Included would be monitoring newspapers and the 
EBR for notifications, and ensuring that the individual or group are on any relevant 
mailing lists. In interviews three respondents mentioned that this was a good method of 
ensuring participation.  
Being proactive refers to actor groups approaching Ontario Parks’ staff well in 
advance of a management plan review exercise to propose a new or altered activity or 
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policy. An example for the current management plan would be U.S. outfitters 
approaching park management about allowing commercial guided dog sledding in the 
park. This group proposed the activity well in advance so that park staff had an 
opportunity to conduct compatibility tests and would then be able to make a 
recommendation when the management plan review began. Being proactive was 
identified as a very successful tactic by an informant from the MNR Bureaucracy. 
Often when new activities or policies are proposed Ontario Parks staff will 
request advice from certain groups or individuals. Advice can range from what a 
group’s response will be to a proposed policy or technical assistance on developing the 
policy. 
Being an advisor is different than being on the Advisory Panel. The Quetico 
Advisory Panel is a formal group that the planning team establishes for management 
plan reviews of high profile parks such as Quetico. The panel provides advice based on 
local, regional, and provincial knowledge to the planning team. For the QMPR, the 
Advisory Panel represents environmental interests, Atikokan, Lac La Croix First Nation, 
Lakehead University, the forestry and mining industries, and the Resource Management 
Advisory Committee. Interestingly, while members of the panel are invited to 
participate by park management and senior levels of the bureaucracy, outfitters who use 
the park the most do not have a position on the current Quetico Advisory Panel. 
The next form of participation is that of Electronic participation. Included in this 
form of participation is the use of the EBR and Ontario Parks websites and internet chat 
forums. There is a trend towards use of technology during the management plan review 
process. Some of the positive aspects mentioned are reduced costs, as hard copies of 
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documents at each stage are no longer sent out, as they are now available online. As 
well, it is felt by some respondents that geographic participation barriers are reduced 
through these media for some participants. 
While the shift from a hard copy base to an electronic base does have its 
proponents, who feel that participation has been made easier through electronic 
participation, there was some concern by two informants that certain demographics may 
be being missed. Examples given were older individuals who do not have computer 
skills, and individuals who live in areas with no or poor internet connections. To address 
these barriers, Ontario Parks still offers hard copies of all documents, but they must be 
requested. This mitigation strategy does not, however, satisfy notification through the 
EBR website, or an inability to use website chat forums. To keep informed about 
planning activities these individuals must watch local newspapers for notifications about 
planning processes. According to one informant, older participants are used to this 
method and still use it with success. 
One participation method that has carried over from before the electronic age is 
that of Letters to the Editor. While the effectiveness of these is not known, it is one 
method of voicing opinions and applying pressure on planning staff and elected 
officials. There were no letters to the editor found regarding the current planning 
exercise. 
Letters to the Editor can be combined with the next form of participation, 
Lobbying. Lobbying is the act of a group or individual attempting to influence the MNR 
Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials actor groups. Local forestry and mining 
industry, multinational recreational equipment manufacturers, ENGOs, NGOs, local 
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communities, and tourism outfitters conduct lobbying. However, through political 
connections, financial influence, and large memberships, some organizations and 
individuals have greater success than others do. 
Another form of participation is Attending or Requesting a Meeting with a 
member of the planning team or other Ontario Parks’ official. Often these meetings are 
used to reach a compromise with groups or individuals who bring forward concerns late 
in the planning process. If the concern does not conflict with policy or legislation and 
Ontario Parks’ staff agree that the concern has merit and needs to be addressed, they 
will often use meetings to reach a compromise rather than restarting the entire process.  
Members of the Tourism Industry, which consists of both U.S. and Canadian 
outfitters, participate largely through an annual outfitters meeting hosted by local park 
management. The meeting is a forum for discussing concerns and any new rules or 
regulations that have come into affect. Examples of the latter include new fishing 
regulations and changes to permit fees.  
Being on the Mail/Notification List ensures that participants are kept informed 
when management plan review processes begin, as each stage is reached/completed, and 
when planning events will occur. Some planners have taken to using email lists for this, 
as they are then able to keep participants informed sooner and for less money. There are 
two mailing lists used. The first one is the must-contact list. It includes large 
organizations such as ENGOs and NGOs, local communities, industry, and First 
Nations. Under the new planning manual, there is now a requirement to do pre-
consultation with some of these groups, particularly First Nations. The second mailing 
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list is developed as individuals and organizations identify that they would like to be on 
the mailing list for a particular project, such as the QMPR. 
One of the planning events that participants can learn about through a 
notification list is an open house. By attending an open house, participants are able to 
see what issues are being discussed and, depending on the stage of the management plan 
review, the proposed or chosen options for each (see Figure 6). If attendees have any 
questions, concerns, or suggestions, planning staff are available to speak with and record 
any comments.  
 
Figure 6. Example of a Management option presented at Quetico Park Openhouse in 
Thunder Bay. 
 
 
In addition to speaking with planning staff at open houses, participants are able 
to provide a Written Submission. Written submissions, which include letters, comment 
forms, emails, faxes, and petitions, were the most common form of participation 
identified. To make collating comments and responses easier, park staff has provided a 
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comment form that lists each issue, the options for each, and a space for comment (see 
Appendix 10), and that can be emailed to the planning team. The actor group that was 
most likely to participate through written submissions were ENGOs, particularly those 
that do not have local representation. Additionally, because of the ease of electronic 
communication, ENGOs are now able to contact members and supporters to request that 
they send in their own written submissions or use form letters that are hosted on the 
ENGOs website. Use of ENGO form letters is also a form of participation through an 
ENGO, which is the last form of identified public participation. 
Participating through an ENGO consists of providing monetary support, signing 
petitions, submitting form letters hosted on the ENGOs website, or contacting the 
ENGO to inform them about issues they feel need addressing. As such, this form of 
participation can also be a type of accountability, because if the ENGO supporter feels 
that the organization is not fulfilling its mandate they can withdraw their support. In 
addition, the more supporters that an organization has, the more influence that 
organization can have on decision-makers, because those decision-makers are less likely 
to do something a large number of people oppose, as may be the case of an ENGO with 
public support which is monitoring their actions. 
Participation barriers 
While it is common for participants to use more than one form of participation, 
none use all 13 because there are barriers associated with many. For example, an 
individual living in Ottawa would have great difficulty attending any of the Quetico 
openhouses or requesting a face-to-face meeting. In total there were 43 participation 
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barriers identified. These barriers are relevant to all but the two actor groups—MNR 
Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials. These two groups do not experience 
barriers to participation because they control the process. Of these barriers, eight were 
found to be the most common. These barriers—capacity, communication, confusion, 
geography, knowledge of jargon, lack of interest, lack of power, and structure of the 
process—are shown in Table 5 listed with the actors that each barrier affects. 
Issues such as a lack of funding and other resources can limit the capacity of an 
actor group to participate. The actor groups for which this barrier were identified as 
being an issue were Lac La Croix, ENGOs, Community of Atikokan, General Public, 
and NGOs. 
Communication is a barrier for the General Public, Lac La Croix, and the 
Tourism Industry actor groups. The basis of this barrier is either difficult or poor 
communication by MNR with those groups. The General Public actor group had the 
greatest incidents of communication barriers being identified. 
Table 5. Eight most common participation barriers and the actors they affect. 
Barriers
Lac La 
Croix
Community of 
Atikokan ENGOs NGOs
Tourism 
Industry
General 
Public
U.S. 
Citizens
Capacity X X X X X
Communication X X X
Confusion X X X X
Geography X X X
Knowledge of 
Jargon
X X X
Lack of interest X X X X X X
Lack of power X X X X X
Structure of the 
process
X X X
Actors
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Confusion is a barrier when participants do not know when, how, or if they 
should participate. One common complaint about the QMPR was that at the Background 
Information Report stage, the notice to participate was at the back of the document, and 
the notice referring to participation was unclear as to how many times one should 
submit input to fully participate. Confusion is a barrier for the General Public, Tourism 
Industry, ENGO, and the Community of Atikokan. Confusion is not as big of a barrier 
for those actor groups such as ENGOs that participate regularly, as they are very 
familiar with the stages of the process. However, it was identified as an issue for ENGO 
individuals when they were new to the process. 
Geography is a barrier mostly because it limits who can attend open houses or 
have face-to-face meetings with planning team staff. The actor groups for which 
geography was identified as a barrier were ENGOs, General Public, and US Citizen. 
From the point of view of local groups, this barrier provides them with greater influence 
on the process because they are able to develop relationships with planning team 
members. 
Knowledge of jargon is a barrier because groups do not understand the meaning 
of terms used by MNR. It was identified as an issue for the actor groups General Public, 
Tourism Industry, and ENGOs. Similar to the confusion barrier, the ENGO actor group 
identified jargon as an issue when an individual first participated in the process. Other 
actor groups may also experience jargon as a barrier, particularly when an individual 
from that group is new to the process, but this issue was not identified during interviews. 
The barrier Lack of Interest occurs for a number of reasons. First, is the duration 
of the process, because the process can be very drawn out and people can move, or 
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change interests. Second, is a sense that Ontario Parks is on the right track and there is 
nothing to worry about. Third, is the lack of contentious issues brought forward in the 
management plan review process. With nothing to get people really stirred up, they are 
unlikely to participate because it was noted by an MNR Bureaucracy member that the 
public is reactionary rather than proactive about issues. Fourth, people lead busy lives 
and do not have time to participate. Fifth, there is a sense that it takes too much effort 
and time to make changes that actors would rather just live with it. Six, is a lack of trust.  
Lack of interest was identified as a barrier for the actor groups Lac La Croix 
First Nation, ENGOs, Community of Atikokan, NGOs, General Public, and Tourism 
Industry. One informant felt that Lac La Croix First Nation might not have interest 
because of a lack of trust due to historical treatment of First Nations by government 
bodies. Lack of interest could be surprising for ENGOs, but in this instance, it refers to 
changing priorities of members, particularly when the process takes so long. For the 
Community of Atikokan the lack of interest is not pervasive, but is limited to those 
groups or individuals who have been unable to make desired changes through a lack of 
power. The NGO actor group also has a lack of interest for the same reasons, and they 
feel that the effort to make change is not worth it. The General Public actor group’s lack 
of interest was thought by informants to be based on the lack of contentious issues, 
being too busy, and the duration of the process and resulting change of interests. 
Informants from the Tourism Industry actor group did not all have a lack of interest as a 
barrier, but those that did said they were busy doing other things. In addition, members 
of this actor group may not participate during the stages of the process, because they 
have meetings and regular communications with park management. 
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When actor groups experience the barrier Lack of Power, participants can seem 
as if they have lost interest, but it is distinctly different. The causes behind the lack of 
power barrier are: feeling as if they do not have the same voice as others, or that the 
final management plan is a forgone conclusion with the planning team just going 
through the motions to satisfy participation requirements. The actor groups that 
experience lack of power are Lac La Croix First Nation, who, even though they have a 
significant amount of influence through Treaty rights, are not always able to exercise 
those rights due to a lack of capacity. Additionally, some ENGOs experience this 
barrier, while others do not. This lack of power will be further discussed in the 
relationship section to follow. Some segments of the Community of Atikokan group also 
experience the lack of power barrier. They and NGOs feel they have a complete lack of 
power, but it is often not because they do not have any influence, but due to a lack of 
knowledge about what is allowed under legislation and existing policy. An example of 
this would be wanting hunting in the park. As hunting is illegal in Quetico Park, Ontario 
Parks’ staff will not include it in management plan reviews, because it would never be 
allowed to happen. The other actor group that experiences a lack of power is the General 
Public. Often this group also desires activities that are illegal under current legislation. 
However, they also experience this barrier because they are not an organized group that 
can apply pressure to politicians and bureaucrats. 
The last major barrier to participation is the Structure of the Process. The term 
structure of the process refers to the policies and procedures of the management plan 
review process that creates barriers for some actor groups. There are eight causes of the 
structure barrier:  1) limited opportunities to participate, 2) limited length of comment 
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periods, 3) change from public meetings to “open houses”, 4) lack of clarity about when 
and how to participate, 5) lack of clarity about need for participation at multiple stages, 
6) switch from hard copies to electronic input, 7) limited location for open houses, and 
8) the length of time required for input. 
First, is the limited number of times available to participate, which are more 
limited for management plan reviews that require management statements under the new 
planning process. Second, is the limited length of comment periods. While 45 days is 
long enough to respond, the difficulty occurs when the 45-day period includes a holiday 
period such as Christmas. Third is the change from public meetings, where the public 
was able to make and listen to presentations, to open houses where the public views 
displays and interacts with Ontario Parks staff only. Fourth is the lack of clarity about 
when and how to participate in the management plan review. Fifth is the lack of clarity 
about the need for participation at multiple stages of the management plan review. Sixth 
is a change from hard copy documents such as the Background Information Report 
being mailed out to electronic versions being posted on the EBR website. Seventh, there 
are a limited number of locations where open houses are held. Finally, is the time it 
takes to complete the entire management plan review. 
There are three actor groups that experience the structure of the process as a 
barrier. The General Public actor group was the most impacted by this barrier with only 
the limited number of times to participate not being indicated as an issue. The General 
Public can have difficulty with the length of the comment periods around holidays and 
during the summer when many of them are using the park. As well, some preferred the 
former public meetings to the current open house system, and the lack of clarity about 
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how, when and the need to participate at multiple stages was also a problem. The change 
from hard copy to electronic of documents was a concern for this actor group because of 
a potential for poor internet service and computer skills of older participants. The 
location of open houses was a concern for this group if they did not live in a community 
that hosted one, and the time to complete the process was considered to be too long for 
the public to maintain interest. 
Some in the ENGOs actor group felt that the limited number of opportunities to 
participate, the length of comment periods, and the time to complete the process were 
the structural barriers that affected them the most. The actor group Community of 
Atikokan experienced the structural barrier through the limited number of opportunities 
to participate and the time to complete the process. 
For a lower power level actor group to have any influence, they need to 
overcome some, but not all, of the participation barriers that they are experiencing. For 
example, if a group is experiencing geographic barriers, they can provide written 
submissions or request phone rather than face-to-face meetings. By participating in 
some fashion, interviewees felt that participants greatly increased their influence. 
Additionally, a member of the MNR Bureaucracy actor group stated that there is a 
greater chance for success if participation starts well before a management plan review 
begins. As well, advocating to all levels of the MNR Bureaucracy and to Provincially 
Elected Officials, particularly with a strong petition, greatly improves the chances of 
success. 
Participation by actor groups in a management plan review or other decision-
making process can develop relationships between those participants, but is not 
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guaranteed to do so. Those participants who have the greatest success in achieving their 
goals have also developed positive relationships with other actors. 
Relationships Power 
Relationships are the connections that exist between individuals, organizations, 
and/or actors. Through these connections, actors are able to influence the planning 
process, have disputes adjudicated, and hold decision-makers accountable (see Figure 
7). There were four elements of relationships identified: communication, conflict, 
consultation, and cooperation. By using these elements, lower power level actors are 
able to build relationships and influence decision-makers.  
Positive relationships with higher power level actors can provide lower power 
level influence during the decision-making process. For example, when a bridge to a 
major Quetico access point used by park outfitters washed out, the outfitters asked park 
management to replace it. Unfortunately, the budget would not allow park management 
to comply, so individuals from the actors Tourism Industry and Community of Atikokan 
contacted members of the Provincially Elected Officials actor group for assistance. The 
result was that the Minister ordered Ontario Parks to find the money so that park 
management would be able to replace the bridge. 
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Figure 7. Relationships and Power map 
 
Figure 7. A = is associated with, C = is a cause of, P = is a part of. 
*Note: the relations between the themes in Figure 7 were identified 
through the analysis of the informant interviews.  
 
Elements of relationships 
Below is a description of the four elements—communication, conflict, 
consultation, and cooperation—of relationships that were identified in the study. 
Communication. The first element of relationships is communication, and it 
refers to any form of dialogue between participants (see Figure 7). There were two 
forms of communication found: personal and impersonal. Personal forms of 
communication consisted of letters, face-to-face meetings, phone calls, and emails. 
Impersonal forms of communication were represented by planning documents, written 
submissions, websites, public service announcements, the EBR registry, and surveys. 
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Some participants, such as the Atikokan Town Council and park management, 
communicate or interact personally on a regular basis. An analysis of the interviews 
suggests that those participants who communicate using personal methods have either 
greater goal achievement or more positive relationships with other participants.  
As seen in Figure 7, communication is also associated with power, because by 
communicating with any of the MNR Bureaucracy actor group, a participant can have a 
significant influence. For example, a member of the ENGOs actor group stated that, if 
the park superintendent made a significant decision that they strongly disagreed with, 
“[w]e would say that’s absolutely the wrong decision and we would tell him why … and 
we’d go at him a third time.” The interviewee then stated that if they felt the issue was 
important enough, they would use political connections within the MNR Bureaucracy or 
Provincially Elected Officials actor groups to have a decision changed. 
Conflict. The second element of relationships, conflict, consists of both the 
positive and negative relationships between participants. Positive relationships in this 
study are based on either no conflict (i.e. agreement about issues) or conflict avoidance. 
The bases for negative relationships in this study are the actual or perceived positions of 
other participants’ issues. Participant relationships can also be both positive and 
negative, as they may cooperate on some goals while being adversarial on others. As 
well, some members of an actor group may collaborate with that of another actor group, 
while others do not. For example, member A of the ENGOs actor group is working with 
the Atikokan Town Council to help the community realize greater financial gain from 
the park, while ENGO member B does not. As such, member A has a more positive 
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relationship with the Town Council and may enjoy some influence with the community 
while member B does not. 
In addition to being part of relationships, conflict is also associated with power 
(see Figure 7). It was found that those participants who have positive relationships with 
higher power level groups, such as the MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected 
Officials, are more likely to achieve or partially achieve their goals than those who have 
negative relationships.  
Consultation. The next aspect of relationships, consultation, is the seeking of 
advice or input from an actor or participant by the MNR Bureaucracy. The actor MNR 
Bureaucracy often consults with others. In particular, park management often consults 
with one of the members of the actor ENGOs about a new or changing policy or 
decision. While ENGOs do not have veto power over a decision, they can create a great 
deal of grief for not only the park superintendent, but also senior Ontario Parks’ staff 
and the Minister. As an inactive member of the MNR Bureaucracy groups stated: “I 
would sooner have all those groups for me than against me.” However, an active 
member of the MNR Bureaucracy group stated that conflict could be helpful because it 
may increase participation and interest in the planning process and, by doing so, 
generate creative compromises. However, all MNR Bureaucracy informants also 
mentioned that senior management and politicians tend to avoid conflict at all costs and 
that all communications from the planning group are sanitized to avoid conflict. One 
method used by the MNR Bureaucracy to reduce conflict is to consult a group or actor 
about a proposed decision to determine what the response would be.  
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Cooperation. The final aspect of relationships, cooperation, occurs when two or 
more organizations or actors work together to achieve a goal. Relationships such as 
these allow the participants to pool their respective influences on the MNR Bureaucracy 
and Provincially Elected Officials actor groups. Examples include one of the members 
of the actor ENGOs cooperating with the Community of Atikokan in trying to develop a 
strong municipal economy that helps the community to see Quetico Park as a valuable 
asset rather than an impediment to economic sustainability.  
Accountability. Also associated with the relationships theme is accountability 
(see Figure 7). As accountability is one of the three main components of Agrawal and 
Ribot’s (1999) framework, it will be discussed in the accountability section following 
the discussion about powers.  
Adjudication. The second aspect associated with relationships is adjudication, 
which is the act of hearing and settling a dispute about new or altered rules. It is 
associated with relationships because the analysis indicates that a party that does not 
have the adjudication power identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999) to have a dispute 
settled needs either relationships with a high power actor or the ability to create political 
pressure. The relationship needed would be either with a senior member of the MNR 
Bureaucracy or in the Provincially Elected Officials group. Otherwise, the group or 
individual seeking adjudication must be able and willing to complain long and loud 
enough that individuals with the power would rather settle the dispute than deal with the 
repercussions of not settling. However, while there are methods to have a dispute 
adjudicated, it is often difficult if not impossible to do so because rules are based in 
legislation and policy and are therefore non-negotiable. However, if an offence is not 
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too severe the park superintendent may deal with it, but major issues require the 
attention of very senior Ontario Parks’ management or members of the Provincially 
Elected Officials. The best time to dispute rules is when they are being developed, 
because after they become either policy or legislation there is little that can be done. If, 
for example, immediately after the 1973 Management Plan was completed a park user 
carried glass bottles into the park unaware that it was no longer legal, the park 
superintendent or park warden would likely let the individual off with a warning. 
However, if someone was to cut down trees for their campsite, they would likely face 
stiff penalties. 
Actor relationships 
The relationships between actors, particularly between low level and high level 
actors was found to be a significant factor in low power level actors achieving park 
planning and management goals. Below is a discussion of the relationships of the actor 
groups Lac La Croix, ENGOs, Community of Atikokan, Industry, Tourism Industry, 
General Public, U.S. Citizens, and NGOs that were identified in the study. 
Lac La Croix First Nation 
While Lac La Croix First Nation does have the ability to utilize the four powers 
identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999), they also have some influence through the 
power of relationships. For example, when the 1992 Agreement of Coexistence was 
being debated, they invited a member of the ENGOs actor group to conduct relationship 
building and gain the support of that group in their bid to conduct motorized guiding in 
the park. In addition to the positive relationships with other actors, there are also 
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negative relationships. For example, there is some resentment about Lac La Croix’s 
unique ability to use motorboats in the park, but the majority of those who take issue 
with this understand the economic reasons for the community to have that access. 
ENGOs 
There were two ENGO organizations interviewed for this study. Both use the 
relationship power, though not in the same way or with the same degree of success in 
attaining planning and management goals. According to non-ENGO informants, ENGOs 
have two methods of achieving their goals. The first is conflict-based in which a group 
takes an extreme stance based on environmental goals and fights long and hard to 
protect that position. Goal achievement is attained when there is a compromise 
somewhere in the middle between the poles of the conflict. By taking these types of 
extreme stances, one member of the MNR Bureaucracy group felt that other individuals, 
particularly members of the General Public actor group, may experience a barrier to 
participation because they feel they do not have the capacity to compete. Another more 
collaborative approach consists of seeing the area of concern as part of a larger 
landscape where all actors are willing to work together towards a consensus.  
There was no evidence that either of the two ENGOs currently participating in 
the QMPR are using extreme stances. However, there was a great deal of evidence that 
one of the ENGOs is cooperative and supports the economic viability of local 
communities, while the other is focused on environmental protection regardless of the 
cost to local communities. Interestingly, the group that practices cooperation is far more 
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successful at attaining its environmental protection planning and management goals for 
the park. 
To accomplish its goals the cooperative group uses a direct approach to 
participating in planning and management decision-making, including performing an 
advisory role to park management, giving written submissions, being on 
mailing/notification lists, taking part in face-to-face meetings with park management, 
and lobbying senior Ontario Parks’ bureaucrats and members of the Provincially Elected 
Officials. The group also participates in a limited number of management plan reviews 
and other decision-making processes for parks, as its mandate is limited to wilderness 
class parks rather than participating in park planning across the entire province or 
nation. 
All informants, with the exception of one MNR Bureaucracy member, felt that 
the cooperative ENGO has a great deal of influence on decisions about Quetico Park 
based on the relationships that it has with local and non-local MNR Bureaucracy and 
Provincially Elected Officials. Even the informant from this ENGO stated: "It’s highly 
unlikely that ... [the park superintendent] would make a significant decision on the park 
that would affect the protection of wilderness without letting us know in advance." The 
positive relationship that the group has with these two actors, as well as the Community 
of Atikokan, local outfitters who are part of the Tourism Industry group, and Lac La 
Croix First Nation is due to the positive consensus-based approach the group uses when 
dealing with issues both internally and with other actors. 
Other methods of developing positive relationships with Lac La Croix First 
Nation and the Community of Atikokan that the cooperative group uses are the 
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programs such as multi-day canoe trips within the park for local students, summer job 
opportunities, and local student educational bursaries that the group provides. As well, 
while this ENGO has a mandate to protect wilderness within the park, that mandate does 
not always supersede the social and economic needs of the communities.  
The second ENGO is a large nation-wide organization that participates in 
planning exercises across the province regardless of the park classification. The group’s 
mandate is also to protect the park wilderness and values, though it is not as concerned 
with the economic welfare of local communities. This group has fewer positive 
relationships with other actors, including both of the higher power actors and other low 
power actors. As a result, the relationships that this larger ENGO has with decision-
makers came across as being more confrontational than the cooperative ENGO, with the 
majority of the organization’s complaints being about the restrictions of policy and 
legislation.  
Another difference between the two organisations in this group is that while both 
are based in southern Ontario, the smaller, more cooperative organisation has one local 
active member, while the larger organization does not have an active member on the 
board or a local member of the chapter that participates in the planning process. There 
may be local supporters of the larger organization (i.e. donors), but those individuals are 
not part of the chapter that makes the submissions. 
While only two ENGOs were interviewed for the study, there have been other 
similar organisations that participated in the past, but are not involved in the current 
planning process due to a lack of capacity. An example would be Ontario Nature, which 
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does not have the capacity to address all of the environmental concerns in its area, so 
has decided to forego participating in park management planning in Quetico altogether. 
Community of Atikokan 
Two of the members of the Community of Atikokan actor group utilize the 
relationship power. Park management works with the Town Council and a committee 
created to enhance Atikokan’s economic benefit from the park. It also has relationships 
with members of the Provincially Elected Officials and senior members of the MNR 
Bureaucracy. When it has specific goals that it wants to achieve, it will lobby these 
individuals or cooperate with the ENGOs and Tourism Industry actor groups.  
Interviewees from this actor group indicated that the community does not have 
the influence that they feel it should. Informants from this actor group felt that the 
community should be able to create or modify existing park rules and have greater 
influence about how park resources are used. For example, a Community of Atikokan 
informant stated:  
Yeah, I think the local people should have more of a say in that. Well, 
they're the ones that live there. We're the ones that ... know the issues, 
and know about what the local history is … . And we're the ones who are 
being affected by the economy. 
Informants felt the community would have that ability if they were members of 
the planning team in addition to being on the Advisory Committee.  
A degree of conflict may exist between some members of the Community of 
Atikokan and non-local interests such as ENGOs and U.S. citizens and outfitters. The 
cause of the conflict is due to the levels of influence on the decision-making process that 
the Community of Atikokan informants perceive the other actors to have. However, 
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Atikokan has an informal cooperative relationship with one of the non-local ENGOs to 
realize greater economic benefits from the park. The MNR Bureaucracy, as one of the 
actor group’s members stated, also supports the community in this endeavour: 
… certainly the park wants to have a positive impact on a local economy 
… . In that case, we would probably be more thoughtful of how our 
decisions are affecting a place like Atikokan than we would be thinking 
about how they affect Toronto. 
The community also supports local outfitters when they lobby Provincially 
Elected Officials and MNR Bureaucracy for changes to park management decisions or 
policies.  However, they cooperate with Lac La Croix First Nation only on issues 
involving the development of mining in the region exterior to the park, and not in 
regards to park management issues. While the majority of groups and individuals within 
the Community of Atikokan actor group have positive relationships with the MNR 
Bureaucracy group, there are a few that do not. The main cause for any negative 
relationships with the MNR Bureaucracy seems to be the lack of Community of 
Atikokan members’ knowledge or appreciation for the limitations imposed on park 
management through legislation, policy, and the political considerations of Provincially 
Elected Officials.  
The other members of this actor group, the Chamber of Commerce and 
Economic Development Corporation, do not participate in the management planning 
process. The reasons for this are likely based on the fact that the Chamber of Commerce 
does not have any capacity, neither funding nor manpower, and the EDC is not 
interested because park planning is not a focus of the organization. As well, the EDC 
feels that if it did participate, it is completely powerless to make change, and the EDC 
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has a very poor relation with local park management. The EDC’s relationships with 
other organisations within the Community of Atikokan actor group are positive, but the 
state of its relationships with other low power level actors is unknown.  
Industry 
With seats on the Advisory Committee, both the mining and forestry industries 
could have a significant impact on management planning. However, as neither industry 
is allowed to exploit resources within the park boundaries, they participate only enough 
to ensure that their operations outside of the park are not negatively affected. The 
forestry companies that have the Sustainable Forest Licenses bordering the park attempt 
to reduce any conflicts by timing their operations to minimize any impacts to park users’ 
experiences by not harvesting near the park boundary during canoeing season. 
The forestry members of this actor group seem to have a positive relationship 
with the local park administration as they work together to ensure that logging 
operations do not affect park visitors, and the administration allows the forestry 
companies to use park lands in scientific studies. 
Tourism Industry 
The two outfitters from the Tourism Industry interviewed were quite dissimilar, 
in that one has a great number of political and bureaucratic connections and advises 
Ontario Parks about management of the provincial park system, while the other does not 
have the same political connections and did not know a management planning process 
was occurring until well after it began. 
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The relationships with the park management of both group members that were 
interviewed seemed to be positive. The group has positive relationships with the 
cooperative ENGO, the Community of Atikokan, MNR Bureaucracy, and Provincially 
Elected Officials.  
Members of this actor group have relationships with the General Public and U.S. 
Citizens groups. However, from the interviews it was found that their relationships with 
these two groups are limited to communication about arranging trips in the park and the 
state of park facilities (i.e. toilets, campgrounds, portages, etc.). There was no indication 
that outfitters and members of the General Public or U.S. Citizens cooperate or consult. 
While it is possible that members of General Public or U.S. Citizens could try to 
influence management decisions through the Tourism industry by using conflict (i.e. 
boycotts), there was no indication of this occurring. 
The majority of actors felt that U.S. outfitters, who greatly outnumber the 
Canadian outfitters, have a significant amount of influence on the planning process. 
Those who disputed this were members of the actor MNR Bureaucracy with one of 
those informants stating that when the informant was involved in park planning and 
management, the U.S. outfitters were willing to go along with any rules so long as they 
are allowed into the park.  
General Public 
The actor General Public is the largest and one of the least influential actors 
participating. The members of the General Public group seem to have significant 
influence on the day-to-day running of the operation through comments made to 
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outfitters and parks staff about signage, portage and campsite conditions, etc. However, 
while all comments made during a management planning exercise are supposed to carry 
equal weight, whether they come from an individual or a large national organization, 
this is not always the case. A member of the MNR Bureaucracy stated that when they 
receive comments during a management planning exercise: “…[W]e record them all as 
equally weighted, but I think I would be more likely to go back and reread a couple of 
times anything coming from a larger organization just to make sure I got the gist of it.”  
The most significant weakness of the General Public actor group when 
attempting to influence decision-making is that they are not an official influence group 
with political connections, nor do they have any of the other benefits of being an 
influence group such as the ability to organize protests or funding to conduct a media 
campaign. 
Some members of this group do try to influence decision-making through the 
actors ENGOs and Tourism Industry. However, any degree of influence that is gained 
by their relationships with these actors are peripheral as their concerns must fall within 
the mandates of the ENGOs and have an impact on the bottom line of the Tourism 
Industry.  
A subset of this actor group that was identified by an informant is the poor and 
disenfranchised. While this subset has an interest in parks because they are citizens of 
the province, they do not participate, nor are they likely to have relationships with 
influential actors. 
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U.S. Citizens 
Similar to the General Public actor, U.S. Citizens can influence the day-to-day 
operational decisions by making comments to park staff and outfitters about facility 
conditions. There is, however, debate about the degree of influence that this actor has on 
management planning decision-making. The majority of non-MNR Bureaucracy 
informants felt that U.S. citizens have significant influence on decision-making. 
However, two members of the actor MNR Bureaucracy stated that even though U.S. 
citizens represent 80-90% of park visitors and an open house was held in Ely, Minnesota 
for the current management plan review, their influence is negligible. The two MNR 
Bureaucracy respondents were in complete disagreement about the value of U.S. input. 
The first felt that it was essentially discarded, while the second stated that they would 
use any good idea no matter from where or whom it came. 
Similar to the General Public, members of this actor group may have influence 
through ENGOs and Tourism Industry actors, but again the degree of influence gained 
through these relationships is likely to be minimal, because their concerns must fall 
within the mandates of the ENGOs and NGOs, and have an impact on the bottom line of 
the Tourism Industry.  
NGOs 
There are two NGOs in the region, and the locally-based NGO has a negative 
relationship with local park management and feels that they should be invited to 
participate. Much of the basis for the negative relationship between the NGO member 
interviewed and local park management is the NGO executive’s lack of knowledge 
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about the constraints placed on decision-makers by policy, legislation, and the political 
landscape. 
Bridging between Participation and Relationships 
The following section describes how the Participation and Relationships powers 
connect to one another through the communication element (see Figure 8).  
The Relationships and Participation powers are connected through the shared 
elements of communication and decision-making (see Figure 8). The reason for this is 
that communication is a part of both powers. Communication is the bridge between 
these two powers and is an integral part of both. Without communication, the 
development of relationships and ability to participate would not be possible. 
Communication enables lower power level actors to influence decision-makers, to 
participate in decision-making processes, and to keep their constituents informed. 
Communication is associated with power because on its own it does not give an actor 
power. For decision-makers the power is through the legislation and policy that gives 
them the four powers (i.e. : 1) the power to create or modify rules, 2) the power to make 
decisions about the use of resources, 3) the power to implement and enforce compliance 
of the new or altered rules, and 4) the power to adjudicate disputes that occur during the 
creation and enforcement of compliance of new or altered rules.) identified by Agrawal 
and Ribot (1999), and low power level actors derive their power through participation 
and their relationships with each other and with high power level actors. 
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Figure 8. Complete Power, Participation, and Relationships diagram 
 
Figure 8. A = is associated with, C = is a cause of, P = is a part of 
*Note: the relations between the themes in Figure 8 were identified through the analysis 
of the informant interviews.  
 
As seen in Figure 8, decision-making is also connected to relationships and 
participation because these two powers are able to influence decisions. Participation is 
associated with decision-making because the act of participation itself does not confer 
power, but not participating guarantees no influence. Relationships are a part of 
decision-making because the relationships between low power level actors and high 
power actors can influence the decisions made. 
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ACCOUNTABILITY 
The following section defines accountability, discusses which actors are 
accountable for park planning and management decisions, how they are held 
accountable, and to whom they are accountable. 
Accountability of actors 
Accountability is a measure of responsibility by which actors can be held 
responsible by those they represent, and who an actor represents can heavily influence 
what they will be held accountable for, so long as all of the defining constraints such as 
legislation are followed. For example one segment of the population may try to hold a 
Provincially Elected Official accountable for the lack of access to hunting inside 
Quetico. However, should the Provincially Elected Official group try to allow hunting 
within park boundaries, it would find that legislation prevents that from occurring. 
Should they try to change the legislation to allow hunting in the park, then they would 
likely be confronted with other constituents that do not want hunting allowed in the 
park. In this way a system that is accountable can prevent arbitrary decisions or actions 
by actors.  
Provincially Elected Officials and MNR Bureaucracy members are far more 
accountable regarding park planning and management than they were historically. 
According to a MNR Bureaucracy informant, in the early days of the park, the park 
superintendent would receive guiding instructions about how to manage the park, and 
would then have near autonomy as to how the park was managed. As well, 
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superintendents in the past allowed a logging company to ignore regulations but not 
suffer any penalties. Today park managers are constrained by policy, legislation, and 
must seek approval from superiors for all but the most basic day-to-day decisions. This 
upward accountability means that that decision-makers such as park management are 
not accountable to those affected by the decisions such as the members of the actors 
Tourism Industry or the Community of Atikokan, but are accountable to senior members 
of the MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials. 
When non-MNR Bureaucracy informants were asked how decision-makers were 
held accountable, some felt that decision-makers are not accountable, while others stated 
that they felt that to hold decision-makers accountable was quite challenging because 
the system of accountability can be difficult to navigate for the uninitiated.  
How decision-makers are held accountable 
The methods used by informants to hold decision-makers accountable are 
accountability through superiors, media and ENGO monitoring, political pressure, and 
lobbying. 
Below is a discussion of the accountability of the higher power level actors 
Provincially Elected Officials and MNR Bureaucracy. The methods by which they are 
held accountable by the other actors can be seen in Table 6. For the two higher power 
level actors, MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials, accountability is 
generally through superiors; however, the members of Provincially Elected Officials are 
also directly responsible to the public of Ontario through elections, though no instances 
of this method being used in regards specifically to Quetico were found. 
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Table 6. Methods used by actors to hold Provincially Elected Officials and MNR Bureaucracy 
actors accountable for Quetico planning and management decisions. 
Accountability 
methods
ENGO NGO
Tourism 
Industry
Industry
Lac La 
Croix
General 
Public
Through superiors X X X X X X
Monitoring X X X X X X
Political pressure X X X X X
Lobbying X X X X
Aboriginal and 
Treaty Rights
X
Actors
 
Note 1: This table is limited to only those actors that were found to use one of the 
identified methods to hold decision-makers accountable. 
Note 2: Use of a method does not denote success. 
Note 3: Only those methods that an informant stated were used are listed 
Accountability of Provincially Elected Officials 
The local MPP and the Minister of Natural Resources are both upwardly 
accountable to the Premier, and all three are downwardly accountable to the actors 
General Public, ENGOs, NGOs, and Community of Atikokan. The members of this 
actor group are held accountable through political pressure, lobbying, and monitoring by 
media and ENGO/NGOs. According to MNR employee informants, elected officials are 
highly sensitive to controversy and conflict, and it is the duty of the MNR Bureaucracy 
group members to ensure that neither occurs. By avoiding controversy and conflict, 
Provincially Elected Officials are able to avoid being held accountable for a 
controversial decision. However, while Provincially Elected Officials can be held 
accountable, informants felt that the members of this actor group were more likely to 
hold the MNR Bureaucracy accountable. Accountability in this instance can include 
reprimands, but it is more likely that an MNR Bureaucracy decision will be altered or 
reversed. 
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Accountability of MNR Bureaucracy 
Officially, the members of the actor MNR Bureaucracy are accountable to 
superiors within their group and the members of the Provincially Elected Officials 
group. However, other actors can also hold the MNR Bureaucracy members accountable 
through lobbying of senior members of the MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected 
Officials, through monitoring by ENGO/NGO and the media, and political pressure. The 
actors who can seek accountability of MNR Bureaucracy members in this way are 
ENGOs, NGOs, Tourism Industry, Lac La Croix First Nation, and the General Public.  
According to informants, there is a limitation of the accountability through 
superiors of the park superintendent, because the superintendent’s direct superior, the 
Northwest Zone Manager, is unlikely to challenge his decisions. The result is that three 
informants perceived that the park superintendent is unaccountable, because a 
complainant must contact senior staff, an MPP, or the Minister to achieve 
accountability. Other informants that have experience dealing with the bureaucratic 
system stated that, when a low power level actor wants a decision changed or a park 
superintendent held accountable, there is a system to work through (see Figure 9). The 
system consists of starting by asking the park superintendent to change a decision and 
then, if they are unable to obtain satisfaction, begin contacting superiors in order, 
starting at the lowest level, until they reach the Premier. The process is quite lengthy at 
each stage, and the individual or group seeking accountability should note that any 
decisions that could be even slightly controversial are made with the full knowledge of 
MNR Bureaucracy superiors and the Minister. 
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Figure 9. OMNR organisational chart for holding decision-makers accountable. 
 
Source: OMNR, 2011a and Service Ontario, 2011. 
 
Some actors try to circumvent the system if they feel that the issue is time 
sensitive. For example, the actor Community of Atikokan will request a meeting with 
the park superintendent to have a decision explained. The press is usually in attendance 
at these meetings, thus providing another avenue of accountability. As well, ENGO 
organizations that are unsatisfied with a decision will contact their membership and 
request that they write members of the Provincially Elected Officials to achieve 
satisfaction, while members of the Tourism Industry will use political contacts with 
senior MNR Bureaucracy members and Politically Elected Officials to achieve their 
goals. 
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Lac La Croix First Nation can theoretically secure accountability of the MNR 
Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials through its Treaty rights. However, to do 
so requires human and financial resources that many First Nations do not have. The 
other actor that finds it difficult to achieve accountability of the MNR Bureaucracy and 
Provincially Elected Officials is the actor General Public. This group does not have the 
organization or often the knowledge of how to hold a public servant or elected official 
accountable in between elections. As well, with the lack of organization the wishes of 
the public can be lost amongst those of larger organizations such as ENGOs, NGOs, 
industry, and local communities.
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CHAPTER 5 – DISCUSSION 
This chapter will discuss and compare the findings to the three objectives of the 
study. Results are compared to those found in the literature review that was conducted 
after the analysis of the data had been completed. First, will be a short description of 
how public participation in park planning and management has changed since the 
inception of Quetico in 1909. Then there will be discussion as to why decentralization is 
a form of governance, and a description of other forms of governance. Fourth, is the 
section describing the outcomes of answering the three study objectives with 
explanations for each of the findings. Lastly, are the recommendations to improve 
public participation in park planning and management for Quetico Park.  
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND QUETICO PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 
There have been significant developments in the ability of the public to 
participate in planning and management processes. From the beginnings of the park in 
1909 until the 1970s, government experts managed parks, with the thought that the 
public was unable to understand the complexities of managing a natural landscape. That 
ended when the environmental movement, in conjunction with protests about the 
management of parks such as Quetico, influenced the abolishment of activities that did 
not conform to the objectives of protecting parks for future generations, including 
industrial activities like logging and mining. Public participation became policy in 1971 
through the use of Advisory Committees and forums for public participation that 
included written submissions, the Environmental Registry (EBR), face-to-face meetings 
with park and planning personnel, lobbying of decision-makers, and many more.  
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Public participation in park management planning then became enshrined in 
legislation in the 2006 Provincial Parks and Conservation Reserves Act, though the 
number of opportunities for participation changed from four opportunities, no matter the 
complexity of the project, to a minimum of one and maximum of four depending on the 
project complexity (see Appendix 6 and Appendix 5). The change to the system of 
public participation opportunities being variable has caused some concern, particularly 
in the ENGO community, about the potential for the planning process to become less 
participatory. One informant from the MNR Bureaucracy group stated that they were 
not sure what the affect would be, though they did indicate that currently there is little 
participation occurring during planning reviews, so the changes should not have any 
negative effect on public participation. 
GOVERNANCE AND DECENTRALIZATION 
Decentralization is a form of governance because it involves the devolution of 
power by central government to low power actors (Ribot, 2004). Governance is the 
determination of how decisions are made, actors have their say, and power and 
responsibilities are exercised (Graham et al., 2003). Another form of governance is 
public participation by non-governmental actors such as park recreationists, ENGOs, 
commercial users, First Nations, and others that provide input for the management and 
planning of natural resources (Ingles et al., 1999). 
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Decentralization and the study objectives 
The objectives of this study are to trace how and why acts of decentralization in 
the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park have occurred from the 
inception of the park to the present day; 2) to determine the stakeholders involved, the 
powers they wield, to whom and how they are held accountable, and if their 
participation has increased or decreased in the planning and management of Quetico 
Provincial Park since inception; and 3) to determine which aspects of decentralization 
are most significant to stakeholder success. 
Determining if the process is decentralized 
The first objective was to trace how and why acts of decentralization in the 
planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park have occurred from the inception 
of the park to the present day. It was not possible to trace how and why decentralization 
has occurred, because the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park is not 
decentralized. Decentralization has not occurred because has not formally yielded any 
“powers to actors and institutions at lower power levels in a political, administrative and 
territorial hierarchy” (Ribot, 2004, p. 8). The current legislation allows only the actors 
MNR Bureaucracy and Politically Elected Officials the ability to utilize the four powers 
identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999). As well, the legislation creates a 
supersubordinate system, because the approval of and responsibility for all planning and 
management decisions rest ultimately with the Minister of Natural Resources. A 
Supersubordinate system is one in which: authority relationships are hierarchical; 
organizational tasks are guided by administrative rules; technical rules exist for 
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decision-making procedures; maintenance of files and records is the basis of 
administrative behaviour; and where impersonality of interpersonal relationships is the 
norm as the private lives of agency officials are considered to be separate from the 
office (Diamond, 1984). An example of how the Quetico management planning system 
is supersubordinate would be when the park superintendent makes a decision 
recommendation based on onsite information, but final approval for that decision would 
be  passed upwardly through a hierarchical system to the superintendent’s superiors up 
to and including the Minister.  Diamond’s (1984) definition also includes the 
characteristics of maintenance of files and records as the basis of administrative 
behaviour where impersonality of interpersonal relationships is the norm because the 
private lives of agency officials are considered separate from the office. However, the 
characteristics of  impersonality of interpersonal relationships and limited public input 
do not represent Quetico planning and management system because members of the 
MNR Bureaucracy have personal relationships with members of other actors such as 
ENGOs and Community of Atikokan and legislation requires public input. One last 
reason that the planning and management of Quetico cannot be considered decentralized 
is that the effective accountability of decision-makers to lower power actors is very 
complex. 
Role of Actors in Decision-making  
The second objective was to determine the stakeholders involved, the powers 
they wield, to whom and how they are held accountable, and if their participation has 
increased or decreased in the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park 
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since its inception. The study identified 10 actors, three of whom exercise some of the 
powers identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999). The study found that the decision-
makers are, for the most part, upwardly accountable with the exception that through 
elections lower power actors can hold the Provincially Elected Officials members 
accountable. Participation of low power non-governmental actors has increased, because 
of the requirement for public consultation in policy in 1971 and legislation in 2006. The 
participation of the Lac La Croix First Nation has also likely increased due to the 
enforcement of Aboriginal and Treaty rights in landmark litigation and the 
implementation of the Agreement of Coexistence.  
The 10 actors identified were—General Public, U.S. Citizens, Industry, Tourism 
Industry, ENGOs, NGOs, Community of Atikokan, Lac La Croix, MNR Bureaucracy, 
and Politically Elected Officials. Further evidence that the planning and management 
processes are not decentralized is the inability of the non-governmental actors to wield 
the four powers on rule-making and decision-making. The actors found to have these 
powers were the Provincially Elected Officials and the MNR Bureaucracy, with the Lac 
La Croix First Nation being limited to using these powers only in relation to their own 
use of the park. 
While the ten actor groups identified and the forms of accountability afforded 
them were as expected, the powers and how they were obtained were a surprise. While 
Agrawal and Ribot (1999) did not identify participation or relationships as significant to 
the Power category, this study seems to suggest that, in the context of public 
participation in park planning and management in a developed country context, those 
two sub-themes of power were very significant. While it seems obvious that power is 
CHAPTER 5                     157 
 
achieved only through participation, this is not always so as will be seen later. As well, 
it was found that relationships, particularly cooperation and conflict, between interested 
parties have a significant effect on goal achievement. Subsequently, with this knowledge 
it was also surprising which groups or organizations did or did not cooperate, thus 
having an effect on goal achievement. 
To whom and how decision-makers are held accountable is complex. The reason 
for the complexity is that the decision-makers are in a supersubordinate system in which 
the members of the MNR Bureaucracy group are upwardly accountable both within 
their group and to members of the Provincially Elected Official group. The members of 
the Provincially Elected Officials group are then ultimately accountable to the electorate 
that is comprised of the members of low power actors. Low power actors such as 
ENGOs and NGOs capitalize on the Provincially Elected Officials’ accountability to the 
electorate by applying political pressure through organizing their large memberships to 
contact and voice the opinions of the group. These groups also communicate with the 
actor General Public to attempt to have that group also pressure the Politically Elected 
Officials via the power of the electoral process. Willetts (2002) who states that interest 
groups such as ENGOs and NGOs are able to influence social and political outcomes 
through political pressure supports these findings. Clark (1995) also states that these 
organizations are able to influence decision-makers through public support of their 
cause. In the literature, however, it was stated that the electoral process is not an 
effective method of holding decision-makers accountable, because elected officials are 
often more accountable to their political party or other individuals or organizations 
(Agrawal and Ribot, 1999), and ENGOs and NGOs can also be influenced by 
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government through government funding regimes (Willetts, 2002). As well, there has 
been a trend towards public policy not fulfilling public opinion (Petry and Mendelsohn, 
2004). However, there are other methods of holding decision-makers accountable or to 
have a decision changed (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Dearden et al, 2005). Two methods 
identified in this study are through the two powers Participation and Relationships. 
Support for these findings can be found in the literature. The power Participation 
is supported by Blair (2000) and Knack (2002) who found that participation by 
stakeholders can lead to the accountability of decision-makers. As well, Dearden et al. 
(2009) found that accountability increased because of greater stakeholder 
communication and input. However, Eagles (2009) found that management of a 
protected area by a government agency could result in weak accountability and poor 
transparency if there is a lack of independent audits. The Relationship power is 
supported in the social capital literature, as social capital is the most important method 
used to influence government performance, because government accountability is 
broadened to citizens at large (Knack, 2002).  As a result politicians must be responsive 
to the public’s desires. 
Decentralization Aspects Most Significant to Stakeholder Success 
The third objective was to determine which aspects of decentralization are most 
significant to stakeholder success. While it was established that decentralization has not 
occurred, it was found that the aspects of decentralization that are most significant to 
low power actors in this context are the ability of those actors to influence the planning 
and management decision-making processes through the two powers identified in the 
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study: Participation and Relationships. While these powers were not a part of the 
Agrawal and Ribot (1999) framework, it was found that in a more centralized process 
such as that found in Quetico that low power level actors were found to have influence 
over the process through the two powers identified in the study. It was found that by 
participating in the process and through the relationships, or social capital, they form 
through that participation, actors are able to influence decision-makers, thus making a 
planning or management decision-making process less centralized. 
Participation 
Public participation occurs when an individual or group takes part in a cooperative 
action or being an active participant with other community members (Ingles et al., 1999). 
From the informant interviews there were 13 mechanisms of participation used by actors. 
Five of these were identified in the literature review (i.e. advisory committees, lobbying, 
request or attend meeting, participation through ENGOs and NGOs, and written 
submissions).  
Two motivations for public participation were identified in the literature review. 
According to Cleaver (1999), the economic incentive is the main driver for stakeholder 
participation. The groups in this study that have the greatest economic incentive are the 
actors Community of Atikokan, Tourism Industry, and Industry. The Community of 
Atikokan group is somewhat reliant on the park for economic benefits through local 
employment, and tourism. The community would like to have the park make an even 
greater economic impact, but is hampered by park policies and legislation. The Tourism 
Industry is even more economically linked to the park than is the community, and is also 
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somewhat constrained by park policies and legislation. However, these restrictions do not 
have the same degree of negative impact on the tourism outfitters as they do on the 
Community of Atikokan group. The industry actor does not participate in any planning or 
management processes including the Quetico Advisory Committee on which it has a seat. 
When contacted a forest industry respondent stated that they are only affected by the park 
temporally as they adjust when they harvest timber along the border to avoid negatively 
affecting park users. As a result, these findings would support those of Cleaver (1999). 
The other motivation identified by Cleaver (1999) and Aguilar et al. (2012) is 
social norms such as the need for recognition, respect, purpose, community service, and 
responsibility. These would be the incentives for the other actors U.S. Citizens, General 
Public, and ENGO. From the interviews it was found that these actors are more concerned 
about the protecting the environment and other park values. For example, both of the 
ENGOs have mandates to that effect. The members of the Tourism Industry would also 
have social norms as an incentive as both of the informants from this group indicated that 
they want the ecological state of the park to be protected. It is possible that their 
environmental advocacy is a part of the marketing aspect of their businesses, but both 
described themselves as being strongly connected to the land. 
As the actors NGOs and Lac La Croix First Nation did not participate, they were 
not included in this motivational index. Without the opportunity to interview a member of 
the Lac La Croix group, it is difficult to say what their motivations would be. Spielmann 
and Unger (200) state that the reason for the development of the Agreement of 
Coexistence was to reverse the social degradation of the community (i.e. substance abuse, 
unemployment, cultural loss, etc.) that was occurring. Therefore, those motivations may 
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remain as there would certainly be an economic and employment incentive to continue 
providing motorized guided fishing of tourists. As well, the community’s spiritual 
connection to the land may assist in regaining some of the culture that was lost.  
The NGO group does not participate as it has little incentive. Hunting has been 
banned within the park boundary since it became a Forest and Game Reserve in 1909. 
The NGO informant would like to have the park opened up for hunting, and while the 
park area is very large, it is surrounded by a larger landscape of Crown land on which 
hunting is allowed. There is, therefore, little incentive to wage a long, potentially 
expensive, and likely unsuccessful campaign to have the park opened to hunting.  
The reason that the NGOs would be unsuccessful is because the legislation, a 
structure of the process barrier, states that hunting is not allowed in a Wilderness Class 
Park. While there are exceptions to this (i.e. Woodland Caribou and Wabakimi), it is 
because those parks were established in areas where there were existing hunting tourism 
operations. To avoid conflict during the establishment of the parks, exceptions were made 
that maintained the hunting areas for these businesses. 
According to Diduck and Sinclair (2002) there has been little study of the 
barriers to public participation in natural resource management. The participation 
barriers identified in this study were capacity, communication, confusion, geography, 
knowledge of jargon, lack of interest, lack of power, and the structure of the process. 
Those found in the literature review were inadequate information, capacity, inability to 
influence decisions, personality traits, process, extreme partisan behaviour, not knowing 
the process was occurring, potential for conflict, and a lack of trust. For the most part 
these two lists are very similar and the comparison can be seen in Table 7.  
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Table 7. Comparison of eight most common barriers found in study and literature. 
Study barriers Literature barriers Sources
Capacity Capacity 
(Cleaver, 1999; Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Robson et 
al., 2010; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b)
Communication
Not knowing the process 
was occurring 
(Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 
2000b)
Confusion Capacity 
(Cleaver, 1999; Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Robson et 
al., 2010; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b)
Geography
Knowledge of jargon Inadequate information (Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Robson et al., 2010)
Lack of interest Personality traits (Cleaver, 1999; Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002)
Lack of power Lack of power (Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002)
Structure of the process Structure of the process (Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002)
Extreme partisan 
behavior (Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b)
Potential for conflict (Coburn, 2011; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b)
Lack of interest Lack of trust (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b)  
Note1. The repetition of the barriers in the left column is to illustrate which of the barriers identified in 
the literature are comparable to those found in the study. 
Note 2. No corresponding barrier was found in the literature for the geography barrier. 
Capacity as defined through the study was the lack of funding or other resources. 
In the literature review, it also includes the knowledge about the planning process such as 
how or when to participate (Cleaver, 1999; Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; 
Robson et al., 2010; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b). In the study not knowing how, 
when, or if a stakeholder should participate was listed as Confusion. In the literature, 
Robson et al. (2010) found that those stakeholders who had previously engaged in at least 
one full planning process were less likely to have knowledge or expertise capacity issues. 
One of the ENGO informants, a highly educated professional, stated that during their first 
planning process they had a great deal of difficulty understanding what was happening, 
but that subsequent planning processes were much easier. 
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The Communication barrier found in the study resulted from poor communication 
by the QMPR planning team. The result was that individuals were unable to participate 
because they did not know what the process or stage of the process was occurring. In the 
literature, the barrier Not Knowing Process was Occurring was listed, often due to poor 
communication by the controlling entity, or policies limiting notification to certain 
geographic locations (Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002; Wondolleck and Yaffee, 
2000b).  
The Geography barrier identified in the study was because it limits who can attend 
open houses or have face-to-face meetings with planning team staff. While the limitation 
can be overcome with money that allows for travel, it was identified as a barrier for the 
actors ENGOs, General Public, and US Citizens. No similar barrier was identified in the 
literature, though due to the ability to overcome the barrier through travel, it may be 
linked to the capacity barrier found in the literature. 
The Knowledge of Jargon barrier identified in the study is very similar to the 
Inadequate Information barrier found in the literature identified by Coburn (2011), 
Diduck and Sinclair (2002), and Robson et al. (2010). Similarly to Robson et al. (2010), 
this barrier in the study was found to be more significant during an individual’s first 
exposure to the planning process even for the educated informants. 
The next barrier identified in the study, Lack of Interest, is similar to the 
Personality Traits barrier identified by Cleaver (1999), Coburn (2011), and Diduck and 
Sinclair (2002). In the study it was found to have six aspects associated with it. First is the 
duration of the process. Second is a sense that Ontario Parks is on the right track and there 
is nothing to worry about. Third is the lack of contentious issues brought forward in the 
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management plan review process. Fourth, people lead busy lives and do not have time to 
participate. Fifth is a sense that it takes too much effort and time to make changes so 
potential participants would rather just live with it. Sixth is a lack of trust. In the 
literature, Personality Traits is described as a lack of motivation, interest, time or 
acceptance of the status quo. As well, many stakeholders believe that they are adequately 
represented by others, individuals are too busy due to life issues such as work and family 
commitments, or they feel that, as long as there is no or little change resulting from their 
participation, there is no need to participate (Cleaver, 1999; Coburn, 2011; Diduck and 
Sinclair, 2002).  
The sixth aspect of the barrier Lack of Interest, is the same as that identified in the 
literature review, called Lack of Trust (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b). For the purposes 
of the study it was linked to the Lack of Interest barrier because those who experience this 
barrier appear not to be interested in participating. The actor that is most likely to 
experience this barrier is the Lac La Croix First Nation because of the many historical 
incidents such as the eviction of Reserve members in 1910, and the many promises that 
have been broken historically by governments or their agencies.  
The next barrier identified in the study, Lack of Power, was also identified in the 
literature. In the literature, the Lack of Power barrier is the inability to influence decisions 
due to a process that lacks openness, decisions being forgone conclusions, and 
insufficient opportunities to make meaningful suggestions that are evaluated through a 
systematic process (Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002). Informants who 
experienced this barrier also felt that management planning was not open, that plans were 
forgone conclusions from the time the Terms of Reference were released, that there 
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needed to more opportunities to participate, and that their suggestions were dismissed out 
of hand. Actors that experience this barrier do not all do so in the same manner. It was 
stated by some informants that Lac La Croix First Nation would experience this barrier 
because they were unable to exercise their Aboriginal and Treaty rights due to a lack of 
capacity. ENGOs that experienced the barrier felt that they did not have enough 
opportunities to participate, or that comment periods conflicted with inconvenient times 
such as holidays. The ENGO informant that identified this as a barrier was a member of a 
group that did not practice being proactive. Had they done so and had a more positive 
relationship with the MNR Bureaucracy members, they may not have experienced this 
barrier.  
The Lack of Power barrier is also experienced by the NGOs and Community of 
Atikokan actors. The NGO group feels that they have a complete lack of power, which is 
likely due to the lack of knowledge about what is allowed under legislation and existing 
policy. During the interview with the informant from this group, they blamed the park 
superintendent for not changing the rules to allow hunting and motorized access. It is not 
possible for the park superintendent to change these rules because it is legislation that can 
only be changed by the Provincially Elected Officials actor group. Some members of the 
group Community of Atikokan have similar expectations of the superintendent or other 
MNR Bureaucracy members. 
The other actor that experiences the Lack of Power barrier is the General Public. 
Similar to the NGO group, the General Public also often desire activities that are not 
allowed under current legislation. However, the barrier is also experienced by this actor 
because the General Public is not an organized group that can apply pressure to Politically 
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Elected Officials or MNR Bureaucracy members to the same degree that the ENGO actor 
with its large membership and lobbying abilities can. 
The last major participation barrier identified in the study is Structure of the 
Process. The term structure of the process refers to the policies and procedures of the 
management plan review process that creates barriers to some actor groups. There are 
eight causes of the structure barrier. They are: 1) limited opportunities to participate, 2) 
limited length of comment periods, 3) change from public meetings to “open houses”, 4) 
lack of clarity about when and how to participate, 5) lack of clarity about need for 
participation at multiple stages, 6) switch from hard copies to electronic input, 7) limited 
location for open houses, and 8) the length of time required for input. 
In the literature, this barrier is caused by policies and procedures that limit a 
stakeholder’s ability to participate effectively. Included are the lack of opportunity to 
participate due to policies that limit the number of times a stakeholder can participate, 
the length of time allowed for comments to be submitted, or inconvenient meeting times 
or locations (Coburn, 2011; Diduck and Sinclair, 2002). Also included in this category 
is government administration resistance, whereby agency staff are so resistant to the 
public participating that stakeholders do not feel comfortable being involved 
(Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b). There were two informants that indicated that they 
experienced administrative resistance, but upon further examination it was found that 
the park superintendent was not being so much resistant as constrained by policy and 
legislation. There were also three actors who indicated they had experienced the 
Structure of the Process barrier.  
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The General Public group is the most impacted by the Structure of the Process 
barrier. The limited number of participation opportunities was not found to be an issue 
for the group, but it did experience the barrier through the inconvenient comment 
periods, having a preference for public meetings which were replaced by open houses, 
and they also found difficulties with a lack of clarity concerning when, how and the 
need to participate at multiple stages. Also, there was some concern for members of the 
General Public regarding the change from a system that is based on information in hard 
copy form versus the new electronic-based system. The concerns for this revolved 
around the required computer skills and access to the internet that is needed to 
participate that many older or those living in remote areas may not have. Lastly, there 
were concerns about the length of the process with comments that indicated that 
members of this (and other) actor groups did not know if the process had been 
completed. Not knowing what stage the process was at would make it difficult to 
participate. 
The second actor to experience the Structure of the Process barrier was ENGOs. 
The barrier was experienced by ENGOs through the limited number of opportunities to 
participate, the length of the comment periods, and the time to complete the process. 
What is interesting about how one of the ENGO informants discussed these issues is 
that they felt that there should be more comment periods in the new 2009 planning 
regime for the non-complex park planning process. They also stated that the comment 
periods should be longer, and that the entire process should take less time. While the 
current Quetico process has taken far longer than was initially planned, the informant 
CHAPTER 5                     168 
 
did not seem to think that having more comment periods that were longer should impede 
planners from completing a management plan review faster. 
The other actor group that experienced the Structure of the Process barrier was 
the Community of Atikokan. The community informants felt that there should be more 
opportunities for them to participate. They essentially would like to have a far greater 
influence on decisions made about the planning and management of the park. They also 
felt that the time to complete the process was far too long. In that regard, all but one 
informant, a member of the MNR Bureaucracy, felt that the process was extremely 
protracted and had affected participation to some degree. 
There were two other barriers identified in the literature. The first, Extremist 
Partisan Behaviour, was found by Diduck and Sinclair (2002) and Wondolleck and 
Yaffee (2006) to exist when extreme positions are claimed by stakeholders that 
intimidate or prevent other individuals from participating. A local informant who is a 
non-active MNR Bureaucracy member made a similar statement:  
The public consultation system is the inclination for the extremists to 
show up, be very well organized, be very loud, vocal, be connected—
politically connected—and … I think it sways the whole thing. And it 
jades some of the guys down the street there that would like to see this or 
that as the case may be for perfectly valid reasons from his perspective. 
Of participating cause he … says, well shit, ... I’m up against these guys 
anglers and hunters or the miners association or the Sierra Club or 
whatever and who’s … gonna listen to me? And he may be right ... there 
is that element whether we like it or not. 
 
Other local informants from the Community of Atikokan group agreed with this 
statement, though they felt that the only extreme behaviour was from environmental 
organizations or park visitors being fanatical about maintaining an undisturbed wilderness 
experience. As well, an MNR Bureaucracy informant also stated that some environmental 
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groups would take an extreme position with the aim of negotiating closer to where they 
really want to be. 
The last barrier mentioned in the literature was that of the Potential for Conflict. 
In the literature this barrier is described as stakeholders choosing not to participate 
because they know that their stance on an issue will result in conflict between them and 
other individuals or groups. Therefore, they avoid participating and not cause issues with 
other stakeholders such as neighbours, colleagues, family, or friends (Coburn, 2011; 
Wondolleck and Yaffee, 2000b). While none of the informants indicated that Potential for 
Conflict would be a barrier to participating, one informant did state that their group 
refrained from taking a stance on certain issues to avoid developing conflict with another 
actor that they had an otherwise positive relationship with. Positive relationships are one 
of the beneficial aspects of public participation and will be discussed in the following 
section. 
In the literature review it was found that some positive aspects of participation 
are empowerment, increased capacity, trust, greater cost effectiveness, and resolving or 
mitigating conflicts (Beierle and Cayford, 2002; Reed, 2008; McCool, 2009). This study 
found that the actors who participated in the process the most have far greater influence 
than those who do not participate or participated minimally. Examples include the 
ENGO actors compared to the NGO actors. The ENGO actors were far more likely to 
achieve their goals during planning and decision-making largely because the NGO 
group does not participate.  
Those low power actors who do participate have found that they become 
empowered to a degree. They do not have the power to force the MNR Bureaucracy to 
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allow non-conforming activities, but they are able to have activities that have not been 
conducted in the park become the subject of trials early enough that the activity is 
addressed in the management plan review. An example would be that U.S. outfitters 
requested that they be allowed to provide guided dog sledding trips for their customers. 
The park superintendent obtained permission from his superiors to allow trial trips that 
were monitored by park staff. After determining that the activity did not have any 
obvious conflicts with park policy or legislation, commercial dog sledding in the park 
was put forward as a management option. By being proactive and interacting with the 
park superintendent, the low power actor has likely been able to have a new commercial 
activity allowed in the park. 
The last benefit of participation, Greater Cost Effectiveness, was not mentioned 
directly. However, the park superintendent stated in response to a question regarding 
how much influence the U.S. Citizens actor group has that he would use any good idea 
no matter where or from whom it came. Therefore, there is likely to be some degree of 
improved efficiency or effectiveness that occurs with a greater variety or number of 
participants. 
Relationships 
In the study, relationships were found to be the connections that exist between 
individuals, organizations, or actors. Through these connections, actors are able to 
influence the planning process, have disputes adjudicated, and hold decision-makers 
accountable. The study identified four characteristics of relationships: communication, 
conflict, consultation, and cooperation. By using these four characteristics, it was found 
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that lower power level actors are able to build relationships and influence decision-
makers.  
During the literature review, it was found that the Relationships power is very 
similar to that of the concept of social capital. Social capital involves cooperation, trust, 
formal and informal social networks, shared social norms, values and understanding 
(Jones et al., 2012; Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2007; Putnam, 1993). Through 
communication, conflict, consultation and cooperation, an actor can develop three types 
of connections: bonds, bridges, and linkages (Woolcock, 2001). For example, a group 
such as the cooperative ENGO, which has been quite successful in achieving its planning 
and management goals, has strong bonds within the group, and has bridges with other 
actors largely because of the consensus-based approach that it uses. Those linkages, plus 
the political and administrative connections that individual members of the organization 
have, provide vertical relationships with politicians and senior bureaucrats. These 
linkages are also known as political capital. Political capital allows the more cooperative 
ENGO and other actors such as Tourism Industry and Industry to influence members of 
the high power actors MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials (Birner and 
Wittmer, 2003). 
Further evidence that the power Relationships is similar to social capital is that 
the ENGO that participated the most had the strongest relationships or greatest amount 
of social capital with the park superintendent, other MNR Bureaucracy members, and 
other actors. Those relationships were based on trust. The group shares the four aspects 
of trust (i.e. interpersonal, organizational, competence, and fiduciary duty) with other 
actors or actor members that were identified by Beierle and Cayford (2002), McCool 
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(2009), and Reed (2008) . From interviews with many of the informants, it seemed that 
the cooperative ENGO has the greatest amount of trust with the park superintendent. 
There was interpersonal and competence trust with the park superintendent, and 
organizational and fiduciary trust with the MNR Bureaucracy. The statement that 
highlights this is when the informant from the cooperative ENGO stated: "It’s highly 
unlikely that ... [the park superintendent] would make a significant decision on the park 
that would affect the protection of wilderness without letting us know in advance." The 
group’s organizational trust is also based on the numerous powerful connections that its 
members have within the MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials groups. 
One of the benefits of social capital identified in the literature is the resolution or 
mitigation of conflict by developing social trust (Jones et al, 2012; Sanginga, 
Kamugisha, and Martin, 2007). The cooperative ENGO member described how their 
organization and Lac La Croix First Nation have developed methods to cooperate on 
issues around which they share interests and avoid conflicts on those they do not. On 
issues where they have common ground, the two groups work together to allow the First 
Nation community to benefit economically from the park, and on issues where they do 
not agree, they have found that the conflict can be avoided by not discussing the issue. 
Another indication that the Relationship power is similar to social capital is the 
shared social norms that the majority of those informants who participate hold. The 
most obvious shared social norm was that of environmental advocacy (see Table 2). 
There were nine of the 12 informants who expressed an environmental advocacy 
perspective during their interviews. Of the three informants who did not have that 
perspective, two did not participate in any park planning or management processes. 
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Neither of those individuals had a positive relationship with the park superintendent, 
while those who do participate either did have a very positive relationship with the 
superintendent, or they at least respected how he managed the park. It was relationships 
like those, or with other members of MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected 
Officials, that provided low power actors such as Tourism Industry, ENGO, and 
Community of Atikokan to experience success in achieving at least some of their goals 
during planning and management processes. The two General Public informants also 
expressed an environmental advocacy perspective, and largely felt that they were able to 
have their voices heard regarding planning and management decisions.
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CONCLUSIONS  
The following are the conclusions and recommendations of the study. It must be 
noted that the existing study limitations may influence the findings. However, I am very 
confident that the findings are sound. To remind the reader the limitations were: 1) a 
lack of representation from representatives of Lac La Croix First Nation, 2) the limited 
number of interviews (12) 3) the propensity of respondents to be environmental 
advocates, 4) the limited number of interviewees from the actor General Public, 5) there 
were no interviews with political officials or U.S. citizens, 6) the finding being limited 
to the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park. 
The first objective of the study was to trace how and why acts of decentralization 
in the planning and management of Quetico Provincial Park have occurred from park 
inception to the present day. The study found that the park planning and management 
decision-making process changed from a non-participatory expert based system to one 
that now requires minimum levels of public participation. The public participation 
requirements are enshrined in legislation such as the 1993 EBR, and 2006 PPCRA.  
However, even though public participation is currently required in all park management 
planning processes, the QMPR was found to not be decentralized, because the decision-
making process is still a hierarchal system with the Minister of Natural Resources 
having ultimate authority and decision-making power.  
It is not known if a decentralized management planning process would be 
successful or desirable for Quetico. The study found that there are polarized opinions 
between the preservationists and utilitarian actors about what is good for the park and 
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local communities. Members of each of the preservation and utilitarian groups felt that 
the other should not have more influence than they currently do because it could have a 
negative effect on the park or other actor’s ability to utilize the park in their preferred 
manner. If the process were decentralized, my fear would be that an actor with an 
extreme perspective would gain enough power to destroy the current balance between 
the utilitarian and preservationist viewpoints that is maintained by Ontario Parks and 
OMNR Ministerial staff. Similar instances were described by Reed (2008) who found 
that during decentralization peripheral groups could gain power and significantly shift 
the management of a protected area to fit their ideal rather than that of all actors. 
According to one of the MNR Bureaucracy interviewees planning staff consider a 
management plan as successful if all the stakeholders are dissatisfied with the results of 
a management plan, because they have probably done their job properly. 
Knowing that the process was not decentralized however did not prevent the 
study from meeting the second study objective of determining the actors involved, the 
powers they wield, to whom and how they are held accountable, and if their 
participation has increased or decreased in the planning and management of Quetico 
Provincial Park since inception. The actors identified were representative of those found 
in other studies including governance studies of other Ontario Provincial Parks (i.e. 
Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Buteau-Duitschaever, 2009; Eagles et al., 2002 and 2003; 
Graham et al., 2003; and McIntyre et al., 2004; Porter, 2001).  
However, as the system is not decentralized the actors identified were found to 
be either high power actors or low power actors. The high power actors are able to 
utilize at least three of the powers identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999) and strongly 
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influence the fourth power. The remaining seven actors were determined to be low 
power level actors and they did not utilize any of Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) identified 
powers.  
Nevertheless, the low power level actors were found to be able to influence the 
decisions of the high power level actors by participating in the process and developing 
relationships with both the high and other low power actors. It was also found that these 
two powers must be used together, as those groups that relied solely on using 
participation as a method of achieving planning and management goals were not as 
successful as those that developed relationships with other actors. These findings are 
also supported by the social capital literature (i.e. Berkes, 2007; Jones et al., 2012; 
Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2007; Portes, 1998; Pretty, 2003; Putnam, 1993; Wondolleck 
and Yaffee, 2000a; and Woolcock, 2001). While the social capital literature supports the 
findings, there were no other examples found of actors using social capital (i.e. 
participation and relationships) to influence park management planning of a protected 
area in other developed countries. 
It was found that the actor accountability is complex, because the decision-
makers (i.e. high power level actors) are in a supersubordinate system that is ultimately 
accountable to the electorate which is made up of the low power level actors. During the 
change from a purely expert based management system to one that involves public 
participation it was found the low power level actors such as ENGOs were able to 
influence the high power level actor Provincially Elected Officials through political 
pressure and monitoring by ENGOs and the media. The study found that there is some 
accountability of high power level actors through ENGO monitoring, but there has not 
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been any recent examples of monitoring by the media. The literature indicated that 
monitoring by the media has become less effective because politicians are often more 
beholden to their party than their constituents and are adept at manipulating the media 
(Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Balkin, 1998).  
The study revealed that actors who have positive relationships within the high 
power level actor groups MNR Bureaucracy and Provincially Elected Officials are able 
to obtain a degree of influence over decisions and some accountability of decision-
makers. The large less cooperative ENGO and other actors that are more likely to use 
aggressive and negative methods such as political and public pressure against high 
power level actors were found to be less successful at attaining desired park 
management goals than were those actors who used positive relationships. 
Participation seems to have decreased since inception of public participation in 
park planning and management in the 1970s. During the first Quetico management 
planning exercise the planning committee received 4500 letters, 263 written briefs, and 
listened to 144 oral presentations at a total of 25 public meetings. Today some actors 
that have seats on the planning committee no longer participate due to a lack of interest 
or capacity, and openhouses are poorly attended. 
There may be many reasons for the reduction in participation. First, management 
decisions have no real effect on either the forestry or mining sectors. The reason for this 
is that the 1954 Parks Act and 2006 PPCRA  limits the effect of management decisions 
to the area within the park boundary.  As a result, neither of those industries have any 
incentive to participate.  
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The general public does not participate in any significant manner. The reasons 
for this may have to do with participation barriers such as jargon, structure of the 
process, and a lack of knowledge about their ability to participate. One other reason may 
be a general lack of interest based on the fact they feel that they have a lack of power 
over decisions, or that there are no burning issues that make the process more important 
than the challenges of everyday life.  
It was found that ENGOs would participate more if they had greater capacity or 
there were greater controversy surrounding the process. There were two ENGO 
representatives spoken with who indicated that if their organizations had more financial 
or human resources or there were more controversial issues making it necessary to 
designate greater resources to the process they would be likely to participate 
significantly.  
The NGO respondent stated that they do not participate because they do not feel 
their input is valued. However, the reason that their input is not considered more 
seriously is that past and current legislation prevents the higher power actors from 
allowing the non-conforming activities that the NGO interviewee desires (i.e. hunting 
and motorized access within the park).  
The lack of participation by the tourism industry was surprising. All the 
outfitters attend an annual spring meeting hosted by the park administration.  Other 
interactions with park management happen on an individual basis. It was assumed that 
because they have a financial incentive to participate in the planning process that they 
would be more involved as a group through an association, but that is not the case. 
Possibly the reason for this is the competitive nature of the tourism business. However, 
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the study results seem to show that an organized group with positive relationships that 
participates is more likely to achieve management planning goals than are individual 
companies doing the same. 
The final objective was to determine which aspects of decentralization are most 
significant to stakeholder success. For the high power level government actors the key 
to their success is that they have the ability to utilize the at least three of the four powers 
identified by Agrawal and Ribot (1999). Lac La Croix is able to influence the process 
somewhat through use of three of the four powers, but has greater influence by 
exercising their Aboriginal and Treaty Rights. Those rights are also supported by key 
court decisions such as (Keewatin v. Minister of Natural Resources, 2011, Mikisew Cree 
First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005, and R. v. Sparrow, 
1990). 
The participation and relationships powers identified in this study were found to 
be effective methods for low power actors to influence the process. For an actor to be 
successful, they must use both powers in combination as those groups that relied solely 
on using participation as a method of achieving planning and management goals were 
not as successful as those that also developed relationships with other actors. However, 
to develop the relationships an actor must also participate. 
Overall it was found that while the current system has its challenges it is 
preferable to a decentralized system that has been taken over by one viewpoint or 
extremist view. That said the following are a few recommendations to improve the 
system. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following are recommendations for the QMPR process based on study 
findings. The first recommendation is in regards to use of Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999) 
framework in analysing a protected area’s governance regime in a developed country 
context. The second recommendation is in regards to the regional economic impact of 
the park. The remainder are recommendations for Ontario Parks’ staff to increase the 
public participation during management plan reviews.  
Agrawal and Robot’s decentralization framework 
As the process was found to not be decentralized there may be some thought as 
to the applicability of the Decentralization Framework in this context. The results of this 
study demonstrate that the framework is still applicable, because it allowed the 
researcher to identify the actors involved, the powers they wield, and to whom and how 
decision-makers are held accountable. The only differences being that the study 
identified that in this context there are two levels of power and that low power level 
actors are able to utilize two additional to influence the decision-making process. 
From the results of this study, I would recommend that anyone using the 
Agrawal and Ribot (1999) framework in a developed country context when examining a 
centralized park management planning decision-making process add the participation 
and relationship powers identified in this study. Doing so will allow the researcher to 
identify indirect methods of influencing the process utilized by low power level actors. 
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Regional economic impact assessment 
Ontario Parks should conduct a regional economic impact assessment to 
determine the regional economic benefits—personal, business, and societal—that 
Quetico provides to the region. A study of this nature was conducted by Whiting and 
Mulrooney (1998), but it does not provide the data regarding how those impacts are felt 
by individual communities and the Quetico Background Information Report only lists 
Atikokan and Lac La Croix as communities that are economically affected. If a regional 
economic impact assessment was conducted that determined the economic impact at a 
community level, it may be found that the park has an impact on other  communities in 
addition to Atikokan and Lac La Croix. Doing so may increase participation as 
communities such as Thunder Bay and Fort Frances may learn that Quetico does have a 
greater economic impact on them than the economic impact section of  the Quetico 
Background Information Report suggests. These and other communities and actors may 
begin to participate in planning processes, thus generating input from a greater number 
and variety of stakeholders. As was seen in the literature, input from a wider variety of 
stakeholders can result in better management of natural resources. 
Recommendations to improve public participation 
I have five recommendations that I feel would increase public participation in 
the planning process. Currently participation by the public and some actors is minimal at 
best. While attending the Management Options openhouse in Thunder Bay for two 
hours I saw two other attendees. The planning staff who hosted the event stated that 
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openhouses are generally poorly attended, and respondents from the MNR Bureaucracy 
actor group also stated that usually there is little public participation in management 
plan reviews unless there are contentious issues that need to be resolved. An established 
park such a Quetico rarely has any contentious issues according to those informants. 
1. Reduce jargon in documentation.  
Respondents that do not participate regularly in planning processes often find the 
process confusing. From the interviews the confusion is largely due to the jargon used in 
the planning documents such as the Background Information Report. In addition to 
respondent complaints about the level of jargon used, the literature has also identified it 
as a barrier to participation. It may not be possible or feasible to remove the jargon or 
“dumb down” the text, but a comprehensive glossary ideally within the documents or 
available separately (i.e. online or a separate document) should reduce the negative 
affect that jargon has on participation levels. 
2. Clarify when the public can and should participate. 
Similar to the issues around jargon some respondents indicated that there was a 
lack of clarity about when the public is able to provide input. As well, there was also 
some concern about the number of times that the public can participate (i.e. after the 
release of the Terms of Reference, Background Information Report, Management 
Options, and Preliminary Management Plan). Ideally a fully engaged person or group 
will participate at each of the four stages. However, one respondent indicated that they 
knew of members of the General Public actor group who thought they were only meant 
or allowed to participate once. 
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3. Make openhouses more accessible. 
The second most common complaint was the accessibility of open houses. 
Currently they are stand-alone events held during mid-week evenings in a limited 
number of communities, and attendance is generally very low unless there is a 
contentious issue to discuss. One suggestion made by an informant was that the open 
houses should be held in conjunction with other community events. The example given 
was to have a booth at the community’s annual fishing derby because there would be a 
large portion of the community there and the public would not have to make a special 
effort to attend.  
Another method of including other communities that would help to reduce the 
costs of openhouses and allow greater public participation would be to host openhouse 
video conferences at other Ontario Parks or OMNR regional offices. Park staff would 
remain in Atikokan or Thunder Bay, thus greatly reducing travel and venue costs. The 
public could attend the meetings by travelling to the closest regional venues to them 
where information could be displayed. Then if there were any questions, the public 
could ask the planning team via video conference link. There may be some trepidation 
by certain individuals to participate via a video conference, but by hosting them in 
regional offices the openhouses would be available to a greater number of Ontario 
residents. 
4. Have a clear, limited, and well-defined period for the planning process. 
The most common complaint by informants was the length of time that the 
QMPR process has taken. There was concern from some interviewees that people had 
lost faith in the system or interest in the QMPR because the process has taken so long. 
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Originally, the process was planned to take approximately two years beginning in the 
summer of 2006 and resulting in a completed management plan in the fall of 2008. Even 
taking into account that the new 2009 legislation and Ontario Protected Areas Planning 
Manual delayed the approval system, one wonders why the Preliminary Management 
Plan has not been released yet in the summer of 2012 when it was scheduled to be 
released in the fall of 2007. It may not be prudent to place a maximum time limit on a 
management plan review, as that could lead to other issues.  However, having guidelines 
and more importantly a need to justify why a process is exceeding anticipated dates of 
completion would likely solve the majority of public participation issues. 
5. Stop sanitizing conflict from planning processes.  
Interviewees from the MNR Bureaucracy actor group indicated that one of the 
reasons that the process was taking so long is that all management plan review 
documentation had potentially volatile statements removed or watered down to avoid 
conflict with influential groups or individuals. The literature does state that conflict 
during natural resource management can have negative consequences, however, there 
are also positive aspects to conflict. The most significant positive aspect is that conflict 
can encourage dialogue between parties and that dialogue can result in creative solutions 
(and Wadley, 1996; Lawrence, 2007). As well, one of the MNR Bureaucracy members 
felt that by sterilizing all conflict from the planning process public participation was 
being negatively affected as actors and the public could not see any proposed changes 
that necessitated participation either for support or opposition. I don’t advocate creating 
conflict or introducing topics that are too polarizing, just allowing some minor things to 
be floated by for public input.  By doing so participation may increase and those 
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participating will likely also make suggestions on all aspects of the management plan 
thus resulting in greater creativity in the process.
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Appendix 1. Telephone interview request transcript. 
Hello, 
My name is Troy Davis and I am a graduate student at Lakehead University 
researching the extent of public participation (decentralization) in the planning and 
management of Ontario’s Provincial Parks has changed over the past 100 years. I was 
speaking with ____________ who informed me [I leaned through _________ 
(document name)]that you were involved in the planning or management of 
Quetico/Woodland Caribou/Wabakimi Provincial Park.  
My hope is that by tracing the history and determining the amount of public 
participation (decentralization) of the planning and management in Quetico/Wabakimi/ 
Woodland Caribou Provincial Park, I will be able provide Ontario Parks’ staff with 
information that increases the management success of each park as well as the planning 
and management success of protected areas being developed under the Far North 
Planning Initiative.  
Would you be willing to help me with my project by participating in a 1 ½ to 2 
hour interview? 
Your participation is completely voluntary and you are free to refrain from 
answering any questions or to withdraw from the interview at any time.  All 
questionnaires will be kept confidential and all data will be analyzed in a form that 
assures your anonymity. 
APPENDICES                     202 
 
Appendix 2. Email request for interview 
Hello, 
My name is Troy Davis and I am a graduate student at Lakehead University researching 
how public participation in the planning and management of Ontario’s Provincial Parks 
has changed over the past 100 years. My hope is that by tracing the history and 
determining the amount of public participation in the planning and management 
occurring in Quetico Provincial Park, I will be able provide Ontario Parks’ staff with 
information that increases the management success of parks in Ontario including the 
protected areas being developed under the Far North Planning Initiative. 
To date it has been easy to identify and interview people from organizations that have 
participated during one or many of the Quetico Provincial Park management planning 
processes that have occurred. However, I am having difficulty finding someone who has 
done so as an individual.  
For my thesis to be as strong as possible I need to interview at least one person who has 
participated by writing letters/emails and/or attended public meetings or open houses in 
a Quetico management plan processes. 
To help me will involve an approximately 1 ½ hour interview either in person or by 
telephone. If you would be willing to help me, know someone who would, or have any 
questions please contact me by email (tdavis@lakeheadu.ca) or phone (807-343-8876).  
Please note that your participation is completely voluntary and you are free to refrain 
from answering any questions or to withdraw from the interview at any time. All 
questionnaires will be kept confidential and all data will be analyzed in a manner that 
assures your anonymity. 
Best regards,  
 
Troy Davis 
 
Researcher 
Troy Davis 
MES in Nature Based Recreation and Tourism Candidate 
School of Outdoor Recreation, Parks and Tourism 
Email: tdavis@lakeheadu.ca 
Phone: 807-343-8876 
Fax: (807) 346-7836 
 
Supervisor 
Mark Robson 
Assistant Professor 
School of Outdoor Recreation, Parks and Tourism 
Email: mark.robson@lakeheadu.ca 
Phone: (807) 343-8057 
Fax: (807) 346-7836 
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Lakehead University Office of Research 
Phone: (807) 776-7289 
Fax (807) 346-7749 
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Appendix 3 Informed consent letter. 
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Appendix 4. Researcher introductory tutorial for the tri-council policy statement: ethical 
conduct for research involving humans certificate. 
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Appendix 5. 2009 Management Plan flow chart. 
 
Appendix 5 Source: OMNR, 2009c, pp 15. 45 days = Minimum notice/external 
involvement period, including EBR posting.  
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Appendix 6. Stages of planning process prior to 2009. 
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Appendix 7. Semi-structured interview guide example questions 
Intro questions 
1. How long have you been in the area? Did you grow up in the area/community? 
What was that like? 
2. Did you spend much time using the park when you were younger? What 
activities did you do then? 
3. Do you use it much now? How? 
4. What are your thoughts about the park and how it was managed, when you were 
younger? 
5. Have your thought changed about that over time? 
Other Questions 
1. Have you ever been involved in a park planning or management decision-
making process for either a FMP or the park? Can you describe that for me? 
(How, when, individually/in a group) 
2. What was/is the best part of the process? 
3. What was/is the worst part? 
4. When did you become involved in the planning and management decision-
making for QPP? Can you describe that for me? 
5. Can you describe the methods that Atikokan uses to participate in planning and 
management decision-making? 
6. Can you describe how your group decided what their stance on issues would be? 
(Did you question the membership, vote on it, was it an executive decision, or 
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was there another process? If group members did not agree was there a method 
for them to voice that or was it indicated in anyway? )(With prejudiced). 
7. Has Atikokan been able to achieve the goals that it set out to achieve in past or 
current planning and management decision-making processes? Can you please 
describe that? 
8. Do you feel that Atikokan is limited in how it is able to participate in planning 
and management decision-making? If yes how? 
9. Is there any confusion as to how or when Atikokan is able to participate? Why? 
10. Do you feel that Atikokan’s ability to participate in planning and management 
decision-making has increased, stayed the same or decreased? Can you explain 
why you feel this way? 
11. Do you feel that the planning and management decision-making process takes 
too long, is to short, or about the right length? Why? 
12. When decisions about the park were made did you feel that Atikokan’s concerns 
were honestly considered or did it seem that the decisions were made without 
considering other view points? 
13. Would you say that planning and management decisions for Quetico are based 
on local citizen concerns, non-citizen concerns, made by local park staff, made 
by non-local park or ministerial staff, or made by the Minister of NR? Was it 
always this way or has it changed over time? Would you say it has always been 
this way or has there been a change? 
14. In your opinion to what degree are local communities/groups/organizations 
actively participating in the future planning, development and management of 
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the park? Do you feel that they could participate more? Are they restricted in 
anyway from participating? Do they participate too much? 
15. In your opinion how much influence do local communities have on the future 
planning, development and management of the park? Do you feel that they 
should have more influence? 
16. In your opinion are non-governmental organizations such as the Quetico 
Foundation, Friends of Quetico, CPAWS/Wildlands League actively 
participating in the future planning, development and management of the park? 
Do you feel that they could participate more? Are they restricted in anyway from 
participating? Do they participate too much? 
17. What about their influence? Do they have enough, too much? Do they represent 
local interests? 
18. Do you think that a complete range of interests are involved in the planning and 
management decisions that are being made, especially around this current 
management plan? How so? Is industry well represented? Tourism? Park users? 
Environmental concerns? Your community/industry? Are there any groups that 
you feel have been excluded? 
19. Do you think the ecological state of the park has gotten worse, improved or 
stayed the same in the time that you have been associated with it? 
20. Has Quetico affected how you recreate or use the land? 
21. Do you think others in Atikokan feel the same, or are there individuals that may 
have a different perspectives on anything we have discussed here today? 
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Appendix 8 Semi-structured interview guide questions that were later added. 
1. How many Canadian outfitters are there that utilise QPP? 
2. Is Canoe Canada the largest Canadian outfitter in Quetico? 
3. How old is the company? 
4. When did you become president of the company? 
5. Are you involved with the park in any other capacity? 
6. How long have you been in the area? Did you grow up in the area/community? 
What was that like? 
7. Did you spend much time using the park when you were younger? What 
activities did you do then? 
8. Do you use the park now? How and why? 
9. What are your thoughts about the park and how it was managed, when you were 
younger? 
10. Have your thought changed about that over time? 
11. Have you ever been involved in a park management planning or decision-
making process? Can you describe that for me? (How, when, individually/in a 
group) 
12. What was/is the best part of the process? 
13. What was/is the worst part? 
14. When did you become involved in the planning and management decision-
making for QPP? Can you describe that for me? 
15. Can you describe the methods that Canoe Canada uses to participate in planning 
and management decision-making? 
16. Has Canoe Canada been able to achieve the goals that it set out to achieve in past 
or current planning and management decision-making processes? Can you please 
describe that? Other outfitters? 
17. Do you feel that Canoe Canada is limited in how it is able to participate in 
planning and management decision-making? If yes how? 
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18. Is there any confusion as to how or when Canoe Canada is able to participate? 
Why? 
19. Do you feel that Canoe Canada’s ability to participate in planning and 
management decision-making has increased, stayed the same or decreased? Can 
you explain why you feel this way? 
20. Do you feel that the planning and management decision-making process takes 
too long, is to short, or about the right length? Why? 
21. When decisions about the park were made did you feel that the concerns of 
outfitters have been honestly considered or did it seem that the decisions were 
made without considering other view points? 
22. In your opinion who makes the decisions about the park? Why do you say that? 
23. Who are they responsible to and how can they be held accountable? 
24. Would you say that planning and management decisions for Quetico are based 
on local citizen concerns, non-citizen concerns, made by local park staff, made 
by non-local park or ministerial staff, or made by the Minister of NR? Was it 
always this way or has it changed over time? Would you say it has always been 
this way or has there been a change? 
25. Do you think local people such as MNR staff or other elected officials should 
have more influence over decisions that are made about the park? Why? 
26. In your opinion to what degree are other local communities/groups/organizations 
actively participating in the future planning, development and management of 
the park? Why? Do you feel that they could participate more? Are they restricted 
in anyway from participating? Do they participate too much? 
27. In your opinion how much influence do local communities and organizations 
have on the future planning, development and management of the park? Do you 
feel that they should have more influence? 
28. In your opinion are non-governmental organizations such as the Quetico 
Foundation, Friends of Quetico, CPAWS/Wildlands League actively 
participating in the future planning, development and management of the park? 
Do you feel that they could participate more? Are they restricted in anyway from 
participating? Do they participate too much? 
29. What about their influence? Do they have enough, too much? Do they represent 
local interests? 
30. How much influence do you think that US citizens or outfitters have on planning 
and management decisions? 
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31. Do you think that a complete range of interests are involved in the planning and 
management decisions that are being made, especially around this current 
management plan? How so? Is industry well represented? Tourism? Park users? 
Environmental concerns? Your industry? Are there any groups that you feel have 
been excluded? 
32. How much influence do you feel Atikokan or other groups have on deciding how 
the resources of the park will be used, by who, and in determining who would be 
able to use those? 
33. If Robin was to make a decision about something that affects your group, and 
your group disagrees with it who would you go to for assistance? Would you 
have to go to his superior's? 
34. In your opinion who has the final say when decisions about the park are made? 
35. How are decision-makers held accountable for the decisions they make? For 
example, are they accountable to superiors, or are they accountable to local 
citizens? 
36. Do you partner with other groups such as the QF or the Town of Atikokan to 
influence decisions? 
37. Do you think the ecological state of the park has gotten worse, improved or 
stayed the same in the time that you have been associated with it? 
38. Has Quetico affected how you recreate or use the land? 
39. Who do you think should benefit from the park? How and why? 
40. Do you think other outfitters feel the same, or are there individuals that may 
have a different perspectives on anything we have discussed here today? 
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Appendix 9. MNR staff semi-structured interview guide. 
1. What are the steps of a management plan process and what must be done to 
complete each step? As this is in transition could you please note the differences 
between the two processes. 
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the new system as you see it from a 
public participation point of view? 
3. How effective do you feel the public participation process that is used today is 
compared to previous ones? Do you feel the same stakeholders are being engaged? 
Why? 
4. Are all park management planning processes the same (cookie cutter) or can they 
be different? If different how so? 
5. Can parks of the same class have different regulations? 
6. Are advisory groups always used? Why? Are they useful? 
7. Has OP tried to speed up this process, and if so how? Has that made the process 
more or less responsive to individual situations? 
8. Is there a different level of engagement based on location? i.e. Toronto vs 
Atikokan vs Ely vs Lac La Croix 
9. What do you think of the time it takes to go through the process? How would you 
improve the system? 
10. Some have accused OP of having a predetermined outcome for management plans 
what is your response to this? 
11. Are release dates of documents generally timed so as to allow the public the 
greatest or least opportunity to access and comment on them? 
12. How is the public made aware of a management planning process? Is OP doing 
anything to make sure that all stakeholders or concerned individual are included? 
13. How do you ensure greater participation? Do you think the system could it be 
improved? 
14. How much influence does the public have on the planning and management 
decisions that are being made? Is it the same for small groups or individuals and 
larger organizations such as CPAWS or OFAH? 
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15. How do you determine which issues are dealt with or how issues are dealt with 
during the planning process? 
16. Is the concept of the Greater Park Ecosystem considered at all in park management 
planning? Can you describe that? 
17. Can decisions that are contrary to park interests be affected by factors external to 
parks that are also planned by MNR such as forestry, hydro, or renewable energy 
during a park management planning process? 
18. Are there aspects of the plan or planning process that are not negotiable with 
interest groups (Atikokan, LLCFN, QF, F of Q, etc.)? Can you describe them? 
19. Are there aspects that are completely open to negotiation and can parks of the 
same class have different regulations? Describe this please. 
20. How does the decision-making process work? How are the decisions made and 
who makes them? 
21. What types of decisions can the superintendent make? 
22. Can policy be overruled and if so who has the authority to do so? Do you have any 
examples of that? 
23. What is the highest level of decisions that the park superintendent can make? 
24. Who has the final say on the approval of management plans, and has it always 
been this way? 
25. Is there active management to allow greater benefits for local communities and 
people? How? 
26. In general would you say that when decisions are made that local community 
interests are given more or less weight than are those of policy or non-local 
interests such as ENGOs or more populated regions? 
27. How are the interest’s of groups worked into a management plan, especially 
differing views? Eg. Motor boats on lakes in Quetico or hunting in parks. 
28. How much influence do US citizens have versus a Canadian citizen? 
29. How much does political pressure from interest groups influence the outcome of 
planning and management decisions versus individuals? Eg. Interest group in the 
southern part of the province. Spring bear hunt. 
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30. Can you tell me if and how park users and local industry & tourism are 
represented during the management plan process? Could more be done to facilitate 
that? Are there restrictions that would affect how they can participate? 
31. How much influence do non-local or provincial industrial lobbyist have on park 
policy? 
32. In your opinion do local communities and organizations have much influence on 
the planning, development and management of the park? Can you please explain 
that? Do you feel that they should have more or less influence? Could they 
participate more or less? Do you know why local people participate in the levels 
that they do? 
33. How much influence do First Nations have on the planning process? How do they 
effect the outcome? 
34. Are the views and concerns of non-governmental organizations such as the 
Quetico Foundation, Friends of Quetico, CPAWS/Wildlands League being 
represented well enough in the future planning, development and management of 
the park? Are they restricted in anyway from participating? Do they participate too 
much? 
35. Do these groups have much influence in the process? Should they have more or 
less? 
36. Do these groups represent local interests? 
37. Do you think that a complete range of interests are being represented in general? 
How about the current management plan process? How so?  
38. Are there any groups that you feel have been excluded either intentionally or 
unintentionally? 
39. In your opinion are people as engaged with the Quetico park management 
planning process as they could be or have been in the past? Why? 
40. Do you think this may be due to satisfaction with policy and confidence that 
Ontario Parks employees and others involved are doing a good job? Why? 
41. Who are the individuals or groups that are on the advisory group for the current 
QPP management plan process? 
42. As I understand it the planning review for QPP, which started 4 years ago, has 
been stalled with a planning document at the main Ontario Parks office since June 
of 2008. Do you know why this is? 
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43. Do you think that the fact that the current QPP planning process has been stalled 
may cause those involved in the process to become frustrated and feel that their 
voices are not being heard? 
44. Do you feel that overall the planning and management process is centralized or 
decentralized? Why? 
45. How has the level at which management decisions are made within MNR/OP 
changed over the years? Would you say it is more or less centralized? 
46. Do you think that the final planning and management decisions are made to meet 
policy, address concerns of citizens or to be politically comfortable? 
47. What do groups or individuals need to do to ensure that their goals were achieved?  
48. Are OP and MNR staff as accessible to the public as they could be or have been? 
Why? 
49. Do you think the ecological state of the park has gotten worse, improved or stayed 
the same in the time that you have been associated with it? 
50. Has Quetico affected how you recreate or use the land? 
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Appendix 10. Quetico Park Management Options Comment Sheet 
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